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ABSTRACTS

Congruence between Citizens and Policymakers in Two Visions of Liberal Democracy

By JOHN D. HUBER and G. BINGHAM POWELL, JR.

This paper explores two quite different visions of the democratic processes that can create congruence between citizen preferences and public policies. In the *Majority Control vision*, electoral competition and citizen choices result in the direct election of governments committed to policies corresponding to the preferences of the median voter. In the *Proportionate Influence vision*, election outcomes result in legislatures that reflect the preferences of all citizens; legislative bargaining results in policies linked to the position of the median voter. The authors give more explicit theoretical form to those visions and link them empirically to specific types of modern democracies. They then attempt to test the success of each vision in bringing about congruence between citizen self-placements and the estimated positions of governments and policymaker coalitions on the left-right scale in twelve nations in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Although the analysis reveals weaknesses in each approach, it suggests a consistent advantage for the Proportionate Influence vision.

Women and Democratization

conceptualizing gender relations in transition politics

By GEORGINA WAYLEN

This article examines the impact of gender relations on democratization. It considers a number of key questions: what role do women's movements play in the transition to democratic rule and what impact does a return to competitive electoral politics have on women and women's movements. The starting point is a critique of the existing literature on democratization. That literature cannot provide a satisfactory analysis of the role of women in transition politics because of the narrow definitions of democracy used and the top-down focus of much of it. The article then develops a gendered analysis through a comparison of the different processes of transition in Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe. It highlights the significance of the relationship between civil society and the state and the existence of "political space."

Organizational Politics and Change in Soviet Military Policy

By STUART J. KAUFMAN

This article uses two puzzles from the Brezhnev period to test competing models of Soviet military policy and of innovation in military "doctrine." An organizational model of Soviet military policy offers the best explanation of both cases: why the Soviet Union's Brezhnev-era military strategy contradicted the Politburo's priorities (to prevent any war from escalating to nuclear use) and why the Soviet Union agreed to the ABM treaty. The ABM case shows that civilian leaders can force change in military "doctrine" when they have a policy handle—a way of redefining the issue to remove it from the military's exclusive area of competence. When civilians lack a policy handle, as in the military strategy case, they are unable to force innovation if the military is unwilling.

The Russian government now faces the task of finding effective policy handles that will institutionalize civilian control of military policy. The fate of Russia's reforms may depend on it.

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What Makes Rational Peasants Revolutionary?

Dilemma, Paradox, and Irony in Peasant Collective Action

By MARK I. LICHBACH

Peasant upheavals are studied from the perspective offered by the selective incentives solution to Olson's collective action problem. This article presents much evidence from three different forms of peasant struggles—everyday forms of peasant resistance, unorganized rural movements, and organized peasant rebellions—that demonstrates the widespread existence of selective incentives. Questions about the causes and consequences of selective incentives are then examined. First, what are the conditions under which peasant struggles emphasize material selective incentives rather than nonmaterial altruistic appeals? The level of selective incentives in any peasant upheaval is a function of demand and supply considerations. Peasants demand selective incentives. The suppliers include one or more dissident peasant organizations, the authorities, and the allies of both. A political struggle ensues as the suppliers compete and attempt to monopolize the market. Second, what are the conditions under which the pursuit of material self-interest hurts rather than helps the peasantry's collective cause? Selective incentives supplemented by ideology can be effective; selective incentives alone are counterproductive.

These questions and answers lead to the conclusion that the selective incentives solution reveals much more about peasant upheavals than simply that peasants will often be concerned with their own material self-interest. It is therefore important to study the following three aspects of peasant collective action: the *dilemma* peasants face, or how peasant resistance is in the interest of all peasants but in the self-interest of none; the *paradox* peasants face, or that rational peasants do solve their dilemma (for example, with selective incentives) and participate in collective action; and the *irony* peasants face, or that self-interest is both at the root of their dilemma and at the foundation of a solution to their paradox.

Power and the Control of Capital

By JEFFREY A. WINTERS

This essay reviews three recent books on the political economy of finance in postcolonial Asia and Latin America and suggests a framework for examining the relationship between political power and varying patterns of control over investment resources. The stress is on the constraints different controllers of capital can impose on state leaders, the conditions under which policymakers can subvert these constraints, and how conflicts within the state over the trajectory of policy are mediated by who (or what) supplies critical investment resources and the institutional channels through which the resources flow.

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CONGRUENCE BETWEEN CITIZENS AND POLICYMAKERS IN TWO VISIONS OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

By JOHN D. HUBER and G. BINGHAM POWELL, Jr.*

> A more reasonable justification for democracy, then, is that, to a substantially greater degree than any alternative to it, a democratic government provides an orderly and peaceful process by means of which a majority of citizens can induce the government to do what they most want it to do and to avoid doing what they most want it not to do.
>
> —Robert A. Dahl
> *Democracy and Its Critics*

LIBERAL democracy claims to establish connections between citizens and policymakers. The repeated processes of electoral competition and legislative bargaining are supposed to ensure that policymakers do what citizens want them to do. There are, however, at least two quite different visions of the democratic processes that can create congruence between citizen preferences and public policies.

In what we call the *Majority Control vision*, democratic elections are designed to create strong, single-party majority governments that are essentially unconstrained by other parties in the policy-making process. Policymakers are likely to do what citizens want them to do because the party that controls the government has won majority support in the election. Its announced policy comments, previous record, or both were preferred to the partisan alternative by a majority of the citizens. In the other vision, which we call the *Proportionate Influence vision*, elections are designed to produce legislatures that reflect the preferences of all citizens. After the election legislative bargaining between parties is necessary for policymaking, and the influences of the various parties in post-election bargaining processes determine the extent to which policymakers do what citizens want them to do.

*An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1992 annual meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago. The authors would like to thank Larry Bartels and Nancy Burns for helpful comments on an earlier draft.

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In this paper, we offer a simple way to conceptualize the degree of congruence between citizens and their governments, comparing citizen self-placements on the left-right scale with the placement of the governing political parties on the same scale by expert observers. We then attempt to give explicit theoretical form to the Majority Control and Proportionate Influence visions, to link them empirically to specific types of modern democracies, and to measure their successes and failures at creating congruence. We want to know in particular how such theoretically critical features as responsible incumbent governments at the time of the election, identifiable future governments in electoral competition, proportional representation in electoral outcomes, and the formation of majority governments after the election are related to levels of congruence.

Congruence, of course, is not the only democratic virtue: some of the processes treated here as intervening may be highly valued in their own right.[1] Voters oriented to control may wish to see government formations that change in response to even small vote shifts. Voters may prefer to have very distinctive choices. Voters may prefer that policymaking be highly efficient. Permanent minorities may prefer proportionate representation and consultative legislative bargaining, especially if other processes directly impose the preferences of the majority. We therefore do not propose that congruence between citizen preferences and public policy should be the only grounds for choosing or supporting one vision over the other. We do think, however, that congruence between the preferences of citizens and the actions of policymakers constitutes a major claim and goal of liberal democracy. Thus, Dahl's "reasonable justification for democracy" posits that "a majority of citizens can induce the government to do what they most want it to do and to avoid doing what they most want it not to do."[2] This is not a unique position but rather articulates more clearly than most a common assumption of those who theorize about liberal democracy. Hence, although congruence is only a part of our general interest in democratic processes, it is an important part.

Conceptualizing and Measuring the Congruence between Preferences of Citizens and Policymakers

Dahl's justification of democracy directs our attention to identifying the

[1] Some of these other virtues are more fully described and elaborated in G. Bingham Powell, Jr., "Elections as Instruments of Democracy" (Manuscript, University of Rochester, 1993).

[2] Robert A. Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989), 95. In a similar vein, see Hanna Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 234.

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policy position that is in some sense "most preferred" by the voters. We believe that the position that has the best claim to represent this "most preferred" policy is the position of the median voter. On a single issue or a single-issue dimension, if we assume that the preferences of voters are single-peaked, the position of the median voter is the only policy that is preferred to all others by a majority of voters.[3] Thus, the relationship between the positions of policymakers and the position of the median voter is central to the study of congruence.

To see the importance of the median voter's preferences in another light, imagine that the voters did not elect representatives but rather voted directly on policy. We should expect these voters to adopt (eventually) a policy position that corresponds to the policy position of the median voter because the median voter's position is the only one that cannot be defeated by a majority. If some position other than the median is adopted, then a minority has prevailed over a majority. Indeed, as the adopted policy position moves farther away from the median voter, the size of the majority that prefers some other policy grows larger and the size of the prevailing minority grows smaller. As the concept of democracy depends on minorities not prevailing over majorities, the position of the median voter has notable normative significance.[4]

Unfortunately, there are fundamental theoretical, as well as practical, problems that constrain our ability to use the position of the median voter as the solution to the congruence problem. In particular, social choice theory seems to demonstrate that the preferences of citizens are almost always collectively uninterpretable if they form more than one dimension. Regardless of the distribution of preferences or the relative weight citizens assign to the different dimensions, there is no single position that a majority prefers to all other positions. In fact, a process of sequentially pitting one position against another can almost always lead to any outcome.[5] These very general

[3] See Duncan Black, "On the Rationale of Group Decision Making," *Journal of Political Economy* 56 (February 1948).

[4] On the general importance of majorities for democratic theory, see Carl Cohen, *Democracy* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1971), 68–71; and Dahl (fn. 2), 135–53. To recognize the importance of majority positions in democratic theory is, of course, not to deny that taking account of intense minorities is an important theoretical and practical problem for democracy. We do not pretend to deal with it here.

[5] See Richard D. McKelvey,"Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models," *Journal of Economic Theory* 12 (June 1976); idem, "General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models," *Econometrica* 47 (September 1979); McKelvey and Norman Schofield, "Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point," *Econometrica* 55 (July 1987); and Charles Plott, "A Notion of Equilibrium and Its Possibility under Majority Rule," *American Economic Review* 57 (September 1967). For some recent challenges, see Ken Kollman, John H. Miller, and Scott E. Page, "Adaptive Parties in Spatial Elections," *American Political Science Review* 86 (December 1992); and Craig Tovey, "The Instability of Instability" (Manuscript, Georgia Institute of Technology, 1991).

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and very powerful results lead William Riker to argue that it is impossible to compare what citizens "prefer" with any set of government policies.[6]

Although these theoretical results severely constrain the meaning of any claim that democracies can give citizens "what they want," there is nonetheless at least one answer that satisfies both the claims of social choice theory and the claims of traditional democratic theory: that it is frequently possible to understand "what citizens want" as a distribution of preferences on a single-issue dimension that may include many specific issues.[7] Indeed, it may be that the ability of students of legislative voting behavior to describe voting over long periods of time in a single dimension and the ability of students of electoral behavior to describe party competition in many different countries using a single dimension reflect the need for democratic debate to reduce conflict to a single dimension in order to make it intelligible.[8] Without something like this single dimension for competition and discourse, it is at best very difficult—perhaps even conceptually impossible—to compare citizen preferences with the promises and actions of the policymakers.

The most common single dimension in modernized democracies is almost certainly the left-right ideological continuum. The language of "left" and "right" creates a unidimensional discourse that can assimilate the various issues and alternatives that continuously appear before the electorate.[9] Studies show that elites, political experts, and mass publics are able to think about political issues using the language of left and right.[10]

[6] Riker, "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions," *American Political Science Review* 74 (June 1980); and idem, *Liberalism against Populism* (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1982).

[7] There might also be an issue or issue dimension that citizens agree is so important that in comparison to it all other issues or dimensions can be ignored. Part of the power of democracy may, indeed, lie in the fact that a majority would reject the idea of officeholders looting the national treasury for their personal benefit, regardless of what other feasible policy promises were offered. Such an issue might never appear on the agenda of party competition, but its elimination as a possible outcome would be a powerful contribution of democracy.

[8] On legislative voting behavior, see Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, "A Spatial Model for Legislative Role Call Analysis," *American Journal of Political Science* 29 (May 1985); and idem, "Patterns of Congressional Voting," *American Journal of Political Science* 35 (February 1991). On party competition, see the contributions in Ian Budge, David Robertson, and Derek Hearl, eds., *Ideology, Strategy, and Party Change: Spatial Analyses of Post-war Election Programmes in Nineteen Democracies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

[9] See Budge, Robertson, and Hearl (fn. 8); and Ronald Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Democracy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 273–74.

[10] See Samuel H. Barnes, *Representation in Italy: Institutionalized Tradition and Electoral Choice* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977); Francis Castles and Peter Mair, "Left-Right Political Scales: Some Expert Judgments," *European Journal of Political Research* 29 (March 1984); Philip E.

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Existing studies also show that when surveyed, most citizens can place themselves reasonably meaningfully on a left-right scale. Citizen self-placement on left-right scales is determined by attitudes toward the issues of the day and by perceptions of the party system.[11] Although the substantive content of the scale positions varies from country to country, the distance between scale points seems to reflect roughly similar differences in attitudes toward important issues.[12]

Left-right scales therefore provide an obvious tool for analyzing congruence. One can measure the position of the median voter using opinion surveys that have asked citizens in many countries to place themselves on a left-right continuum (which usually ranges from 1 to 10). And one can measure the position of governments and policymakers using a 1982 survey conducted by Castles and Mair that asked experts, academics, and journalists to place the parties in their country of expertise on a 0–10 left-right scale.[13] We can then measure congruence by analyzing the distance between the position of the policy-making parties and the position of the median citizen: the larger the distance, the less the congruence; the smaller the distance, the greater the congruence.

Our study is obviously related to and influenced by those empirical studies of political representation that built on the seminal work of Miller and Stokes and that examined relationships between the positions of citizens and the positions or behavior of their representatives.[14]

Converse and Roy Pierce, *Political Representation in France* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986); Russell J. Dalton, "Political Parties and Political Representation: Party Supporters and Party Elites in Nine Nations," *Comparative Political Studies* 18 (October 1985); Dalton, Scott C. Flanagan, and Paul Allen Beck, eds., *Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Societies: Realignment or Dealignment?* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); and Inglehart (fn. 9).

[11] See John D. Huber, "Values and Partisanship in Left-Right Orientations: Measuring Ideology," *European Journal of Political Research* 17 (September 1989); Inglehart, "The Changing Structure of Political Cleavages in Western Society," in Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck (fn. 10); and Inglehart and Hans Klingemann, "Party Identification, Ideological Preference and the Left-Right Dimension among Mass Publics," in Ian Budge, Ivor Crewe, and Dennis Fairlie, eds., *Party Identification and Beyond* (London: Wiley, 1976).

[12] Huber (fn. 11).

[13] See fn. 10. Most of our estimates of the positions of the median voters are taken from the Eurobarometer surveys, which use a scale that ranges from 1 to 10. We also use citizen surveys taken in Sweden, Australia, and New Zealand. We convert the scales from these surveys, as well as those from the Castles and Mair expert survey, to the 10-point scale used by the Eurobarometer. Our analysis assumes that the experts on the country used a scale whose meaning was similar to that used by citizens in that country and that the distance between scale numbers was roughly the same for the experts and citizens in all countries.

[14] Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," *American Political Science Review* 57 (March 1963). See also Christopher H. Achen, "Measuring Representation: Perils of the Correlation Coefficient," *American Journal of Political Science* 21 (November 1977); idem, "Measuring Representation," *American Journal of Political Science* 22 (May 1978); Barnes (fn. 10); Converse and Pierce (fn. 10); Dalton (fn. 10); Morris Fiorina, *Representatives, Roll Calls, and Constituencies* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1974); Warren E. Miller, "Majority Rule and the Representative System of Government," in Erik Allardt and Yrjo Littunen, eds., *Cleavages, Ideologies*

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However, our work diverges from this tradition in three important respects. First, we treat parties as units in assessing policymaker positions;[15] given the high levels of unified party voting in most parliamentary systems, this is an essential starting point.[16] Second, we do not analyze connections between groups of voters and their chosen representatives; rather, we analyze those between the citizenry as a whole and the collective policymakers. Third, although our measures of congruence are closely related to Achen's "centrism" measure (which is the *squared* difference between the representative and the citizen mean), we focus on the citizen median rather than the citizen mean.[17] Our reason for using the median is theoretical: if the median and the mean do not coincide, a majority will always prefer the median to the mean. Moreover, since the mean minimizes the sum of the squared distances, it gives greater weight to cases more distant from the center. We see no justification in democratic theory for permitting minorities to prevail over majorities or for giving greater weight to ideologically extreme citizens. Indeed, there is no evidence to suggest that ideologically extreme citizens hold their positions more intensely, which might be the one possible, but hotly debatable, justification for weighting them more heavily. For those unpersuaded by our theoretical argument, however, we can report that all the subsequent results hold equally well using means, rather than medians, for citizens.

Alternative Visions of Democracy and Congruence

In each of the two visions of democracy examined here, there is a clear path by which both electoral and legislative processes can create congruence between the citizen median and the behavior of governments and policymakers. But the path in each vision is different and so are the areas where one may expect problems.

The Majority Control vision assumes that political power will be concentrated in the hands of identifiable governments chosen by the electorate and responsible to it. Elections involve competition between incumbent governments and challengers. Voters evaluate the past performance and future promises of each and choose the contender whose policies they expect will be closest to their preferences. That contender wins electoral and legislative majorities and comes to office committed

and Party Systems (Helsinki: Academic Bookstore, 1964); and Lynda Powell, "Issue Representation in Congress," *Journal of Politics* 44 (August 1982).

[15] Dalton (fn. 10) also uses parties as the unit of analysis.

[16] For linkage analysis confirming this point, see Converse and Pierce (fn. 10); and Barnes (fn. 10).

[17] Achen (fn. 14, 1978).

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to a set of policies favored by a citizen majority. When in office, the new government carries out those policies under the eye of the electorate, which can evict it in the next election if it fails to keep its promises.

The key stage in the Majority Control vision is clearly electoral competition: party alternatives, voter choices, and the aggregation of the two. Elections must provide voters with identifiable alternative governments; they must also produce clear control over policy-making for the party preferred by the citizens. If these defining characteristics of majority control are achieved, then whether there is a close correspondence between voters and policymakers will depend on another feature of the election: the presence of a party or candidate located at or very near the median voter. If neither identifiable alternative government is close to the median voter, then by our definition, the majoritarian democratic process will not result in a government that is committed to "what the voters want." Responsible incumbents in office at the time of the election should be helpful: single-party majority governments that bear clear responsibility for their actions will be pressed to anticipate the citizen majority as they look to the election; voters will find it easier to evaluate the credibility of promises and to choose the party whose true position is closest to their preferences.

Scholars have offered a variety of specific models to explain how Majority Control systems can deliver policies that the citizens want. In the well-known two-party competition model proposed by Anthony Downs, the desire to win elections drives both parties toward the position of the median voter. With a single dimension of party competition, a party that fails to converge nearly to the median can always be defeated by a party that does move to the median. The strategic incentives for the parties and the rational choices of voters act together to provide victories for the party that is closest to the median.[18] If the theory of center-driven party competition were empirically true, it would provide a powerful underpinning for the claim of the Majority Control vision to create congruence. However, there is much controversy about the correspondence between Downs's theory and the empirical facts of party competition.

Since only the winning party needs to be near the citizen median to create congruence, the Majority Control vision need not depend on

[18] Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1957); see also Heinz Eulau and Kenneth Prewitt, *Labyrinths of Democracy: Adaptations, Linkages, Representation and Policies in Urban Politics* (New York: Bobbs-Merril, 1973); Joseph Schlesinger, *Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966); and Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1942).

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Downs's strategic parties. It can also encompass "mandate" versions of democracy[19] or other models in which incumbents face challengers who over time offer a large array of possible alternatives.[20] We cannot here explicate the varying assumptions of these models, but we merely note that various specific models in the broad Majority Control vision can lead to the prediction that the *winner* of the election should usually be at or near the median voter. All of these models then tend to assume that the election winner will subsequently dominate the policy-making process and implement the promised policies.

If some combination of these models proves empirically accurate, then the other (presumed) virtues of majoritarianism will be buttressed by good congruence between the preferences of the electorate and the commitments of the policymakers. The potential problem, of course, is that various empirical studies, and also some theoretical work, show failure of competition to produce consistently a party at the median.[21]

The Proportionate Influence vision gets to a similar prediction of congruence in a very different way. The models and research associated with this vision are not directly oriented to majorities or to control, but rather are oriented to representation and bargaining. This vision is less clearly articulated in its multiple stages. At the electoral level the large literature on proportional representation stresses the fairness of having all voters' voices count in getting officials into office.[22] At the policy-making level, various analysts of accommodative or consociational democracy, most influentially Arend Lijphart, argue that minorities in deeply divided systems will want "grand coalition" arrangements that guarantee them a

[19] See Anthony Birch, *Representation* (London: Macmillan, 1972); and Austin Ranney, *The Doctrine of Responsible Party Government* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962).

[20] See Kollman, Miller, and Page (fn. 5); and Richard D. McKelvey and Peter C. Ordeshook, "Elections with Limited Information: A Fulfilled Expectations Model Using Contemporaneous Poll and Endorsement Data as Sources," *Journal of Economic Theory* 36 (June 1985).

[21] For theoretical results, see, e.g., Alberto Alesina, "Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two-Party System with Rational Voters," *American Economic Review* 78 (September 1988); Peter J. Coughlin, "Candidate Uncertainty and Electoral Equilibria," in James M. Enelow and Melvin J. Hinich, eds., *Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Melvin J. Hinich, "Equilibrium in Spatial Voting: The Median Voter Result Is an Artifact," *Journal of Economic Theory* 16 (December 1977); Donald A. Wittman, "Candidates with Policy Preferences: A Dynamic Model," *Journal of Economic Theory* 14 (February 1977); and idem, "Spatial Strategies When Candidates Have Policy Preferences," in Enelow and Hinich. For empirical results, see, e.g., David Robertson, *A Theory of Party Competition* (London: Wiley, 1976); Ian Budge and Dennis Fairlie, *Voting and Party Competition* (London: Wiley, 1983); and Bernard Grofman, Robert Griffen, and Amihai Glazer, "Identical Geography, Different Party: A Natural Experiment on the Magnitude of Party Differences in the U.S. Senate, 1960–84," in R. J. Johnston, F. M. Shelley, and P. J. Taylor, eds. *Developments in Electoral Geography* (London: Routledge, 1990).

[22] See Douglas Rae, *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967).

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voice in policy-making.[23] In his model of "consensus democracy," Lijphart draws attention to various institutional devices less inclusive than a grand coalition that induce majorities to bargain with minorities.[24] Most of this work assumes that multiparty elections and proportional representation are highly desirable prerequisites for such negotiation.

To convert the Proportionate Influence vision into a more clearly identified model of elections connecting citizens and policymakers, we must spell out the assumptions at each of the two important stages in the process of government formation. At the election stage, the vision assumes multiple parties offering a variety of alternatives, so that all groups of citizens can find compatible parties. The parties do not—must not—converge to the center unless virtually all the voters are located very close to it.[25] At the time of the election, then, the choices of voters and the working of proportionate election laws result in a legislature with parties representing all these groups in their proportionate strength. A critical implication of this fact is that the position of the median legislator (or median party, if parties are in fact the relevant units) should be very close to that of the median voter.

The second stage of the Proportionate Influence vision concerns coalition bargaining. Since an election often creates a legislature with no single-party majority, various coalitions could form among the many parties represented. Naturally, the more diverse the electorate and, consequently, the legislature, the more possible in the abstract to build a coalition that strays from the position of the median citizen. But as in electoral competition, coalition theory predicts that in one-dimensional situations the median party will play a dominant role in government formation,[26] that is, all coalitions should include the median party, although any coalition may incorporate other parties that fall to one side or the other (or both).

Existing research does not, however, provide a clear prediction about whether the median party will dominate policy-making, even in the one-

[23] Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); see also G. Lembruch, "A Non-Competitive Pattern of Conflict Management in Liberal Democracies," in Kenneth McRae, ed., *Consociational Democracy* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974); and Jürg Steiner, "The Principles of Majority and Proportionality," *British Journal of Political Science* 1 (January 1971).

[24] Arend Lijphart, *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-one Countries* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984); see also Dahl (fn. 2), chap. 11.

[25] In Lijphart's empirical analysis of "consensus" systems, the number of effective parties virtually defines one of his dimensions (fn. 24), 214.

[26] For an excellent review of the coalition formation literature, see Michael Laver and Norman Schofield, *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), chap. 5.

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dimensional situation. Laver and Schofield and de Swann argue that the policy position of the median legislator will prevail, but Austen-Smith and Banks, in a model that integrates electoral competition and government formation, find that in equilibrium, final policy outcomes never correspond to the preferences of the median legislator.[27] More generally, in situations where a single party or coalition of parties forms a government and must maintain tight party discipline—which empirically is the case in almost all parliamentary systems—the government might be expected to make policies that correspond to its own internal median, not to the legislative median.

Thus, we have here a potential for connections—through inclusion of the median party in the coalition—without very close congruence. As in the concerns about the failure of party competition to produce at least one party at the median in the majoritarian vision, the processes that connect legislative bargaining to government policy may also lead to consistent policies off the median.

Up to this point, we have considered only the congruence between governments and citizen preferences. That is, we have assumed that the representation process ends with the formation of a government coalition. In practice all governments will probably be somewhat influenced by the issues raised by other parties in the legislature. Even in highly majoritarian systems such as Britain and Fifth Republic France, the ability of the opposition parties in the legislature to use their forum to arouse public interest gives them a nonnegligible influence potential.[28] In some other systems the institutional arrangements are designed to increase the influence of the opposition in policy-making. Most obviously, this is true where a system of strong committees plays a role in policy-making and the chairmanships of the committees are proportionately distributed to all parties, not just to those in the government.[29] Moving beyond the tenuous assumption that governments totally control policy, one finds different expectations from the two visions.

Under the Majority Control vision of congruence (especially in the "mandate" formulations), one would expect that the greater the opposition influence in policy-making, the less the congruence between poli-

[27] Ibid., 111; Abram de Swaan, *Coalition Theory and Cabinet Government* (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1973); and David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey Banks, "Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes," *American Political Science Review* 82 (June 1988).

[28] For a discussion of the Fifth Republic, see Frank Baumgartner, "Parliament's Capacity to Expand Political Controversy in France," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 12 (March 1987); and idem, *Conflict and Rhetoric in French Policymaking* (Pittsburgh, Pa.: Pittsburgh University Press, 1989).

[29] See Kaare Strom, "Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies: The Rationality of Nonwinning Cabinet Solutions," *Comparative Political Studies* 17 (June 1984); and idem, *Minority Government and Majority Rule* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

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cymaker and citizens. In this vision, the selection of a governing party close to the citizen median should already have resulted in good congruence between final policies and the citizen majority. If all other parties have not converged to the median position, however, giving weight to the opposition after a government forms can only move the policymakers away from the median. Moreover, such influence will make it more difficult for voters to make clear retrospective judgments about government responsibility—a fact that decreases the incentives for parties to converge to the median in the first place.

In the Proportionate Influence vision, giving some weight to the opposition may pull policymakers back toward the median citizen if the government includes the median party but extends from it to the right or left. Hence, in contrast to what we would expect in ideal Majority Control systems, giving opposition parties significant weight in policymaking may improve congruence between what citizens want and what policies result in Proportionate Influence systems; but it also may not, depending on the specific positions of the government and the other parties.

Figure 1 summarizes our argument about what could lead to congruence under the two different visions. Each begins with quite different assumptions about electoral competition and follows these through quite different expectations about election outcomes, government formation, and postelection policy-making. Nevertheless, each leads us to expect relatively close congruence between the position of the median voter and the policymakers when their (somewhat conflicting) conditions are realized.

Characteristics of Liberal Democratic Control Systems: Theory and Practice

The two visions of democracy are founded in experience and custom as well as in theory. Figure 1 suggests that we can identify features of electoral competition, electoral outcomes, and legislative bargaining that will enable us to categorize empirically the different systems according to the extent to which they follow one vision or the other. Table 1 presents the data necessary to accomplish this task; the data are used to categorize the systems in twelve industrial democracies for the period 1968–87. Subsequently, we will use data from 1978 to 1985 in order to test congruence.[30]

[30] It would be ideal to be able to analyze congruence for this entire twenty-year span, but since the Castles and Mair expert survey measured party positions in 1982, we have used only the 1978–85 period so that we can rely on the assumption that party positions have not changed much. There are thir-

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Process Stages	*Majority Control Vision*	*Proportionate Influence Vision*
Electoral competition	identifiable alternative governments, one a responsible incumbent, one or both close to the median voter	wide range of party choice; absence of explicit coalition commitments
Election outcomes	party close to median voter wins majority	proportionate legislative representation of all parties and voters
Government formation	election winner forms majority government	bargaining: government coalition includes the median legislator
Policy-making between elections	government dominates all policy-making	coalitions may change but still include median; negotiation with opposition parties may help balance government parties right or left of median party
Congruence prediction	government is the policymaker and is close to the median voter	government includes median legislator, but average weight of all policymakers will be closer to the median voter

FIGURE 1
VISIONS OF DEMOCRACY AND PROCESSES THAT CREATE CONGRUENCE BETWEEN VOTERS AND POLICYMAKERS

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TABLE 1
SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS IN TWELVE DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES[a]

Country	*M.C.* (1) *Identifiability of Future Govt.*	*M.C.* (2) *Past Govt. Status*	*P.I.* (3) *Effective No. of Parties*	*M.C.* (4) *Single Party or PEC Wins Majority*	*P.I.* (5) *Proportionality*	*M.C. & P.I.* (6) *Opposition Committee Influence*
Australia	100	.44	2.5	100	87	No
Belgium	0	0	6.1	14	91	Yes
Denmark	38	0	5.4	0	97	Yes
France	38	.125	3.5	75	79	No
West Germany	100	0	2.7	100	98	Yes
Ireland	33	.33	2.6	50	96	No
Italy	0	0	3.6	0	95	Yes
Netherlands	17	0	5.1	17	96	Yes
New Zealand	100	1.0	2.0	100	80	No
Spain	100	.33	2.6	43	83	Yes
Sweden	29	.125	3.3	83	98	Yes
United Kingdom	100	.67	2.2	67	85	No

[a] See text for descriptions of the measures. Data for columns 1–4 are averages from the period 1968–87. Data for column 5 are from Thomas T. Mackie and Richard Rose, *The International Almanac of Electoral History*, 3d ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1991), 509–10. Column 6 is based on the analysis by Strom (fn. 29, 1990), chap. 3; and Powell and Whitten (fn. 33).

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At the stage of electoral competition, the Majority Control vision stresses that the voters be able to identify future alternative governments and that responsibility for past policy-making by the incumbent government should be clear. The Proportionate Influence vision emphasizes a large number of parties offering a wide range of choices. In Table 1 we see the countries in our study followed, in columns 1–3, by features of their electoral competition.[31]

Columns 1 and 2 show features emphasized by the Majority Control vision. *Identifiability* of future governments, shown in column 1, is based on our reading of accounts of election campaigns (drawn largely from *Keesings Archives*).[32] Our measure reports the extent to which it was believed that voters could identify the government that would form given the election outcome. If voters believed that a single party (as in Britain or New Zealand) or a set of parties that had formed an explicit coalition agreement (as in Germany and Australia) would form a government if they won a legislative majority, then the score is 100. If there was very little idea as to how election outcomes would shape postelection government formation, as in most elections in Belgium and Italy, then the score is 0. Intermediate scores reflect varying types of implicit or partial coalitions, or shifts from election to election, or both (for example, France). Identifiability is, we think, a critical defining feature of majoritarian politics. Without it, citizens cannot directly choose the

ty-eight governments in these twelve countries in this time period. Various readers have suggested that we extend our time period and bring in more cases, but we simply cannot locate a comparable survey of experts at another time period that asks the appropriate left-right question.

[31] Some readers may be troubled by the absence of electoral laws from the analysis. Clearly the electoral law of a given political system shapes many features of electoral competition and government formation that are important to this study, including the effective number of parties, proportionality, identifiability, and the election of single-party majorities. Nonetheless, for the purposes of this study, it would be difficult—if not wrongheaded—to categorize a country as either a Majority Control or Proportionate Influence system on the basis of its electoral laws. One problem is the difficulty of developing an appropriate measure of electoral laws because each one has unique features, with important differences in aggregation rules and in districting. (For example, Spain and the Netherlands both have proportional representation [PR], but the proportionality of electoral outcomes in Spain is much lower than in the Netherlands, as shown in Table 1.) More important for analysis, the nature of electoral competition varies over time within systems having the same election law. In systems with single-member district pluralities, for example, if there is a minority government at the time of an election, clarity of responsibility for past policy-making will be low. In systems with PR, to take another example, there are often cases in which identifiability is high because of the formation of preelection coalitions. As our analysis focuses on election-specific characteristics of party competition, we do not use the election laws directly to classify the various political systems. However, analysis of the indirect impact of election laws on congruence under various conditions, through the features here examined, is an interesting topic for future research.

[32] The measurement of this variable was suggested by the creative work of Strom (fn. 29, 1984, 1990). Unfortunately, we cannot validate our measures with Strom's because we measure identifiability at each election, whereas Strom measures it by decade. However, an impressionistic comparison suggests very similar assessments in countries in which the levels of identifiability were relatively stable over time.

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future policymakers.

Past government status (column 2) measures a second feature of electoral competition that is emphasized by the Majority Control vision: the percentage of elections in which the incumbent government is a single party holding an absolute majority of the seats in the legislature. Single-party majority governments would seem to offer voters the most clear-cut ability to assess the responsibility of the incumbents for government policies, enabling them to reject governments whose policies they dislike and retain those they like. Some validation for interpreting the presence of single-party majority governments in this way is provided by Powell and Whitten, who find that incumbent governments are most likely to lose votes if they are majorities, rather than minorities, and if they have fewer parties in the government.[33] They also find that economic performance has a greater impact on election outcomes (both positive and negative) when responsibility for policies can be more clearly fixed.[34]

Column 3 shows the *effective number of parties* who win legislative representation, a measure developed by Laasko and Taagepera.[35] Obviously, the larger the effective number of parties, the more desirable according to the Proportionate Influence vision. But if the parties do not actually win legislative representation, they cannot offer their voters influence in policy-making. Hence, the measure is based on the number of parties actually in the legislature after the election.

Columns 4 and 5 show two measures related to legislative outcomes. Column 4 shows the proportion of elections in which a *single party* or a *firm preelection coalition* wins a legislative majority. That is, the formation of governments does not depend on postelection bargaining or on the

[33] G. Bingham Powell, Jr., and Guy D. Whitten, "A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context," *American Journal of Political Science* 37 (May 1993), 403. See also Richard Rose and Thomas Mackie, "Incumbency in Government: Asset or Liability," in Hans Daalder and Peter Mair, eds., *Western Party Systems: Continuity and Change* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1983); Martin Paldam, "How Robust Is the Vote Function? A Study of Seventeen Nations over Four Decades," in Helmut Norpoth, Michael Lewis-Beck, and Jean-Dominique Lafay, eds., *Economics and Politics: The Calculus of Support* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991), 23; Strom (fn. 29, 1990), 124 (on lower vote losses for minority governments); and Michael Lewis-Beck, *Economics and Elections: The Major Western Democracies* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1988), 108-9 (on lower vote losses for coalition governments).

[34] Powell and Whitten (fn. 33), 407. In our analysis, we have also examined a scale of the clarity of government responsibility for policy outcomes and considered separately the effects of multiple government parties and majority versus minority governments. However, the most consistent and robust effects are based on the simple distinction between incumbent single-party majority governments and all others. We have therefore used this measure in our subsequent analysis.

[35] See Markku Laasko and Rein Taagepera, "Effective Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to Western Europe," *Comparative Political Studies* 12 (April 1979). Although a party choice measure that specifically considers the ideological location of each party might be more theoretically appropriate, Powell (fn. 1) shows that such measures are closely related to the effective number of parties, which is more intuitively interpretable and widely used.

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formation of a minority government. This feature is obviously desired by the Majority Control vision and is explicitly undesirable from the point of view of the Proportionate Influence vision. Column 5 gives the *proportionality* of legislative representation, a property that is desired by the Proportionate Influence vision. This measure sums the absolute values of the difference between votes and seats for each party, divides by 2, and subtracts from 100. Values in the high 90s, as in Germany and Sweden, show nearly perfect proportionality.

Finally, the last column shows legislative arrangements that guarantee some influence for opposition parties in policy-making between elections. A strong committee system and the distribution of chairmanships to the opposition as well as to the government parties are evidence that the government shares a degree of policy-making power with the opposition.[36] From the Majority Control point of view, opposition influence weakens the role of a government that has been chosen by the citizens and also makes retrospective accountability less clear. But from the Proportionate Influence point of view, opposition influence should pull a government whose average position is some distance from the median legislator toward the median.

In Table 2 we use the measures from Table 1 to classify our political systems into three categories: Majority Control, Mixed, and Proportionate Influence.[37] In the first category we place Australia, New Zealand, and Britain. These systems score high on each of the measures associated with Majority Control systems: voters almost always had a strong sense of the future governments, responsibility for policy was usually very clear (as measured both by past government single-party majorities and by the absence of committee arrangements guaranteeing a role for the opposition), and a single party or preelection coalition nearly always won a majority. At the same time, these systems did poorly on the measure associated with the Proportionate Influence vision: the effective number of parties was near two, proportionality of representation, was relatively poor, and the governments dominated policy-making.

At the other extreme, we place the systems of Belgium, Denmark, Italy, and the Netherlands as most closely approximating the Proportionate Influence systems. In these systems, the effective number of parties was high, giving the voters a wide range of party choice.

[36] This measure also owes a debt to Strom (fn. 29, 1984, 1990), although his work has been adapted and supplemented as described in Powell and Whitten (fn. 33), 400.

[37] Table 2 gives figures for both the larger time period (1968–87) and the narrower time period (1978–85). The data reassure us that system characteristics during the time period that we study below do not differ substantially from the system characteristics during the larger time period.

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TABLE 2

CHARACTERISTICS FOR MAJORITY CONTROL, MIXED, AND PROPORTIONATE INFLUENCE SYSTEMS
1968–87
(1978–85)[a]

	System Type		
	Majority Control: Australia, Great Britain, New Zealand	*Mixed: France, Germany, Ireland, Spain, Sweden*	*Proportionate Influence: Belgium, Denmark, Itlay, Netherlands*
Electoral competition			
identifiability	100 (100)	80 (75)	36 (45)
past government status	.67 (.80)	.17 (.06)	0 (0)
effective no. of parties	2.2 (2.2)	3.1 (3.0)	5.1 (5.4)
Election outcomes			
percentage of elections won by a single party or a preelection coalition	95 (100)	66 (58)	7 (10)
proportionality	85 (83)	92 (93)	95 (96)
Legislative bargaining			
percentage of committee systems that permit opposition influence	0 (0)	60 (60)	80 (80)
Number of elections	29 (5)	29 (12)	27 (10)

[a]The top number in each cell is for the period 1968–87. The figure in parentheses is for the period 1978–85 (the period for which we analyze congruence). The top number in the "Proportionality" row is calculated using the figures in Mackie and Rose, *The International Almanac of Electoral History*, 3d ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1991), 510, which are calculated using only the last election reported in their study.

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Proportionality was also high in these systems, assuring many citizens or groups of representation in the legislature. Finally, the committee systems gave the opposition a strong role in three of the countries, while in Italy the incohesion of the Christian Democrats (DC) and decentralization in the legislature frequently gave the opposition a role in policy-making. Not surprisingly, these systems did poorly on most of the measures associated with the Majority Control vision.

In the middle we find the five cases of France, Germany, Ireland, Spain, and Sweden. A good case can be made for classifying each one way or another—France and Ireland have some notable majoritarian properties, and Sweden has some strong proportional influence properties—but each case also has some features that diminish the fit. France has multiple parties, and in both France and Ireland the key property of high identifiability shifts from election to election. Sweden, in the other direction, offered through preelection coalitions some tight voter-government connections. Germany is an almost perfect mix of the usually conflicting properties of the two approaches (except for substantial power sharing that weakens clarity).

The readers can, of course, use the data in Table 1 to determine their own classification. We shall in any case use multivariate regression analysis below to examine the effects of individual properties to get at which features are most significant. But we think that most analysts would find our classification strongly supported by the theory-based variables in Table 1.

Citizens, Governments, and Ideological Congruence in Majoritarian and Proportionate Influence Systems

We develop two measures, called Government Distance I and Government Distance II, of the congruence between the position of the government and the estimated position of the median voter.[38] For both measures if the government contains only a single party, the expert placement of that party becomes the placement of the government and the measure of congruence is the absolute distance between that party and the median citizen. In the case of multiparty coalition governments, we include all parties holding cabinet seats in the government. Government

[38] Since the left-right scales have discrete boundaries between the different cells, we approximate the location of the median voter using a technique described in Thomas H. Wonnacott and Ronald J. Wonnacott, *Introductory Statistics for Business and Economics*, 3d ed. (New York: John Wiley, 1984), 671.

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Distance I takes the average position of all the parties in the government weighted by the size of the respective parties. This measure seems intuitively reasonable and is consistent with research by Browne and Fanklin, Gamson, and Schofield and Laver, who show that the share of ministry portfolios received by a government party is generally proportional to its share of legislative seats among the parties in the government coalition.[39]

Since the number of portfolios a party receives may not be a good measure of its influence in the coalition, we developed an alternative measure, Government Distance II. This second measure assumes that the left-right position of the government coalition is dominated by the placement of the median party within it. Hence, Government Distance II is simply the left-right position of the median party within the government. Which of these two measures is more appropriate depends, of course, on whatever theory we might have about how policy-making goes on within the government. As we shall see, however, the results for both measures are quite similar.[40]

Comparing Congruence between Citizens and Governments in the Three Types of Systems

Table 3 shows the average distance scores for the three types of systems using our two different measures of the position of the government. The data show that the two measures of distance work quite similarly. It is also clear that the Majority Control and Mixed systems have governments that are on average substantially farther from the median voter than are governments in the Proportionate Influence systems: the average government in the Majority Control and the Mixed system is over 1.5 points from the median; the average government in the Proportional Influence system is about 1 point away. Even with so few cases, the difference between the mean of the Proportionate Influence systems and the mean of the Majority Control systems is statistically significant at .05 (one-tailed test).

In parentheses in Table 3 we show the percentage of voters between the government and the median citizen. This figure depends on both

[39] Eric Browne and Mark Franklin, "Aspects of Coalition Payoffs in European Parliamentary Democracies," *American Political Science Review* 67 (June 1973); Peter Gamson, "A Theory of Coalition Formation," *American Sociological Review* 26 (April 1961); Norman Schofield and Michael Laver, "Bargaining Theory and Portfolio Payoffs in European Coalition Government, 1945–83," *British Journal of Political Science* 15 (April 1985).

[40] The mean scores by country for Government Distance I (II) are Australia 1.35 (1.35), Belgium .74 (.74), Denmark 1.36 (1.46), France 1.96 (2.15), West Germany 1.55 (1.81), Ireland .47 (.84), Italy .92 (1.24), Netherlands .90 (.50), New Zealand .95 (.95), Sweden 1.28 (1.17), Great Britain 2.39 (2.39), and Spain 1.94 (1.94).

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TABLE 3

CONGRUENCE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND CITIZEN LEFT-RIGHT ORIENTATIONS[a]

	System Type		
	Majority Control	*Mixed*	*Proportional Influence*
Government Distance I	1.61 (28%)	1.43 (23%)	.96 (20%)
Government Distance II	1.61 (28%)	1.55 (25%)	1.03 (20%)
N	5	16	17

[a] Government Distance I measures the difference between the weighted mean left-right position of the government and the left-right position of the median voter. Government Distance II measures the difference between the left-right position of the median party in the government coalition and the left-right position of the median citizen. The numbers in parentheses give the percentage of voters between the government and the median citizen. Positions of the parties are taken from Castles and Mair (fn.10).

the absolute distance and the distribution of voters on the left-right scale. If the voters were more dispersed in the Majority Control systems, for example, a larger distance might affect the same number of voters as does a smaller distance in the Proportionate Influence systems. However, we see the same pattern as in the absolute distances. The Majority Control systems find, on average, 28 percent of the electorate between the government and the median, whereas the figures are 23–25 percent in Mixed systems and 20 percent in the Proportionate Influence systems.

The advantage of the Proportionate Influence systems in offering greater congruence between governments and voters is somewhat theoretically unexpected. We expected that governments in the Majority Control systems would be close to the median as the direct result of party competition and voter choices (under either Downsian theory or some of the nonstrategic or partially strategic alternatives). We also expected coalition bargaining in the Proportional Influence systems might result in governments that are often farther away from the median voter. But the converse is true. The reason for the poorer performance of the Majority Control systems is basically that the two main parties in Britain and Australia are far from the median (over 2 points) during the period of our study. The closer of the two large parties does

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come to power, but it is still rather extreme.[41] In New Zealand the Majority Control vision seems to work better; in fact both major parties are fairly close to the median (about 1 point).

A similar problem is evident in the Mixed systems, although it is less theoretically surprising in the multiparty situations. A common pattern here is the formation of formal or informal preelection coalitions that pit right against left. These coalitions frequently fail to converge, but the one that gets a majority forms a government without bargaining with the opposition. In France, especially, both major alternative governments are very far from the median voter. In 1978 the winning conservative coalition was 2.75 from the median—the farthest in our sample. In Germany, Spain, and Sweden, too, the alternatives are rather far apart, each around 1.5 points from the median. Only in Ireland are both of the two alternatives quite close to the median.

A Regression Analysis

While the results in Table 3 are interesting, it is troubling that we have only five cases of pure Majority Control elections. A regression analysis can help us go beyond the typology to illuminate the contribution of various properties of political systems to the degree of congruence. This is especially helpful for making better use of the information from the Mixed systems. The comments in the previous paragraph imply that it is just the key majoritarian property of identifiable future governments in the electoral competition that creates major difficulties for close congruence. A multiple regression analysis can offer a more systematic look at whether this is so. Of course, with only thirty-eight cases and a good deal of multicollinearity (in equations (3) and (6), where we consider both approaches simultaneously), we cannot expect too much in the way of statistically significant results. But, as we shall see, the results are remarkably consistent and do further buttress and clarify the findings.

Table 4 gives the results of six OLS regressions where the formation of a new government is the unit of analysis and the electoral and legislative characteristics described in Table 2 are the independent variables.[42] In

[41] In Britain the closest parties to the median voter were the Liberals in 1979 and the Alliance in 1983, but neither of these parties won as much as a quarter of the votes, and both were heavily penalized by the election laws. The Conservatives were somewhat closer to the median than was Labour, but both large parties were rather far away.

[42] Our theoretical discussion does not suggest what the appropriate functional form should be, so we examined a wide variety of functional forms and a simple linear relationship turned out to be the most appropriate for each variable.

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Table 4

Predicting Distance between the Median Voter and the Left-Right Position of the Government (OLS model of government distance I and II)

	Dependent Variable: Government Distance I			*Dependent Variable: Government Distance II*		
Independent Variables[a]	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Identifiability of future government	.010 (.003)	—	.009 (.003)	.009 (.003)	—	.0073 (.0036)
Past government status	−.52 (.40)	—	−.54 (.38)	−.58 (.42)	—	−.61 (.42)
Majority or PEC wins election	−.17 (.30)	—	−.29 (.29)	−.22 (.31)	—	−.34 (.32)
Effective number of parties	—	−.131 (.070)	−.05 (.07)	—	−.14 (.07)	−.08 (.08)
Proportionality of electoral outcome	—	−.047 (.021)	−.041 (.020)	—	−.038 (.021)	−.036 (.021)
Opposition influence in committees	−.27 (.33)	.44 (.33)	.07 (.37)	−.46 (.36)	.28 (.35)	−.12 (.40)
Intercept	.95 (.36)	5.79 (1.80)	4.83 (1.88)	1.27 (.38)	5.19 (1.87)	4.78 (2.03)
N	38	38	38	38	38	38
Adjusted R^2	.20	.14	.26	.15	.11	.18
Standard error of the regression	.65	.68	.63	.69	.71	.68

[a]The independent variables are described in the text.

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data columns 1–3 Government Distance I is the dependent variable; in data columns 4–6 Government Distance II is the dependent variable. The coefficients are quiet similar for the two dependent variables, so for simplicity we discuss only Government Distance I in detail.

Equation (1) uses the variables from the Majority Control vision to predict the distance of the government from the median voter on the left-right scale. In the regression equation we see clearly the failure of majoritarian electoral competition to produce governments close to the median: the coefficient for identifiability is large, positive, and highly statistically significant. The positive coefficient implies that the difference in identifiability between Britain and Italy would lead to an increase of 1 full unit of distance between the government and the median voter. The kind of electoral competition in which voters can identify the alternative future governments is related to poorer congruence. This variable is extremely robust across various models and specifications in our analysis.

The coefficients for past government status (a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if there was a single-party majority incumbent) and majority wins (a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a single party or preelection coalition wins the election) are both negative, providing some comfort to the Majority Control vision. The government status variable is fairly substantial, implying that, on average, governments forming after an election in which the incumbent was a single-party majority will be about half a point closer to the median citizen. However, the coefficient is only slightly larger than its standard error and thus is not statistically significant. Even if we ignore the large standard error, the coefficient for status is far too small to compensate for the undesirable effect of identifiability on congruence. The coefficient for majority wins is much smaller with a larger standard error (relative to its size). The same is true for the committee influence variable. Thus, the only statistically significant result from the regression is that high levels of identifiability lead to low levels of congruence.

The second column shows the variables identified by the Proportionate Influence vision. The number of effective parties produces negative coefficients that are near or at statistical significance in equations (2) and (5). The effects are fairly substantial; the difference between a two-party and six- or seven-party system (Belgium) would be worth three-quarters of a point in greater congruence for the latter. Proportionality of election outcomes is also helpful for congruence. Again, the difference between worst (New Zealand) and best (Sweden) proportionality is worth over three-quarters of a point and the coefficient

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is statistically significant at .05. Thus, the two main electoral variables associated with the Proportionate Influence vision are both helpful to congruence. The opposition influence variable, however, reverses direction in these models and is associated with less congruent governments; the effects are fairly substantial, although not statistically significant and not as large as the other two Proportionate Influence variables.

The general conclusions from the first two regressions are clear: Majority Control characteristics have mixed effects, which have the net result of moving the government away from the median voter; Proportionate Influence characteristics move the government closer to the median voter.

Equations (3) and (6) show how all the different properties relate to congruence when entered into the same equation. Once again, the results are similar using the two dependent variables. The directional effects of the main variables remain the same, although the magnitudes of some coefficients are reduced, most likely because of the multicollinearity. The key property of identifiability retains a strong and significant effect (greater distance). Past government status and elected majority governments continue to reduce distance, although neither coefficient is statistically significant. If we take these latter two insignificant coefficients as fair (if unstable) estimates, the three majoritarian properties cancel each other out. The effective number of parties continues to reduce distance, although the coefficient is substantially smaller and about the size of the standard error. Proportionality continues to reduce distance significantly. This combination of effective number of parties and proportionality creates a substantial net advantage, about three-quarters of a distance unit, for the Proportionate Influence model, as we expected from Table 3. The committee influence variable is insignificant and trivial in size in these joint equations.

Interestingly, the strong effect of identifiability helps us to understand some "failures" in Mixed and Proportionate Influence systems through the relationship between high identifiability and the formation of minority governments. In the Mixed and Proportionate Influence systems, congruence is much better during majority government than it is during minority government: the average for Government Distance I (II) during majority government is 1.03 (1.13), whereas the average for Government Distance I (II) during minority government is 1.45 (1.54). If we divide our thirty-three governments in the Mixed and Proportionate Influence systems into those in which future government identifiability during the election was less than 50 (N = 16) and more than 50 (N = 17), we find minority governments were much more like-

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ly to form under the latter condition! Of the sixteen governments formed under conditions of low identifiability and postelection bargaining, only three resulted in minority governments. All the governments in Belgium and the Netherlands and all but one in Italy were bargained majority governments. But of the seventeen governments formed under conditions of high identifiability, nine were minority governments. These were almost all situations where, as in the four Danish cases, preelection agreements were honored and although no coalition won a majority, the plurality coalition formed a minority government. In a slightly different variant, in Sweden when the preelection coalition broke up, two of the remaining parties in it formed a minority government rather than bringing in a party outside the initial coalition.

To sum up, when all the variables are entered into the model, the main variables from the Majority Control vision have a mixed effect with identifiability of future governments harmful to congruence; the variables from the Proportionate Influence vision are helpful to congruence.[43] The regression analysis therefore supports and clarifies the simple comparison of system types. Despite the plausibility of Downsian theory and some of the other formulations of majoritarian democracy that predict congruence, when there exist clearly identifiable future governments at election time, the elected governments tend to be far from the median voter. And despite concerns about government formation processes, as the effective number of parties and proportionality of electoral outcomes increase, congruence increases. In fact, this congruence is best when parties do not undertake preelection commitments that may lead to the formation of minority governments. To put the comparison between the two types of systems another way, on average the *failures of electoral competition* in the Majority Control (and Mixed) systems seem more serious for congruence than does the *failure of government formation* in the Proportionate Influence systems.

Coalition Government Reconsidered

Thus far our empirical analysis of the congruence between the positions of governments and the median voter has strongly favored the

[43] Our findings regarding the Proportionate Influence variables are interesting when compared with empirical studies of budget deficits by political economists; for a recent review of this literature, see Alberto Alesina and Guido Tabellini, "Positive and Normative Theories of Public Debt and Inflation in Historical Perspective," *European Economic Review* 36 (April 1992). Roubini and Sachs, for example, find that systems with a high incidence of coalition and minority governments have relatively large levels of public debt; Roubini and Sachs, "Political and Economic Determinants of Budget Deficits in the Industrial Democracies," *European Economic Review* 33 (May 1989). Since the central characteristics of

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Proportionate Influence model. Within the limits of the time period and countries we investigated, we think that the results are relatively robust and even plausible. We need to raise a cautionary flag, however. Our results are based on the assumption that when multiple parties are involved in a coalition government, the outcome of the interparty bargaining process will correspond either to the weighted average of the parties in the coalition or to the position of the median member of the coalition. We have not considered the possibility that coalition bargaining might create a package of policies that favors one party on one issue and another on a different issue. One reason for making this assumption is that when parties form a coalition government, they obviously must distribute ministry portfolios to particular parties. Thus, some scholars interested in coalition formation argue that it is reasonable to assume that when a party controls a particular cabinet ministry, that party controls outcomes on all policies that are in the jurisdiction of that ministry.[44]

Considering the possibility that particular parties have dictatorial control over policy outcomes on particular dimensions leads to a very different method of calculating the positions of governments. Instead of calculating either the weighted mean position of the government parties or the position of the median government party, it is necessary to calculate the weighted mean of the absolute distances between each party and the median voter. If all the bargaining parties are on the same side of the median, it will of course make no difference which method is used to calculate the left-right position of the government. But if the government parties straddle the median, it may make a large difference. In the procedures used to calculate Government Distance I, for example, a coalition that straddles the median will get a good congruence score because the distances on the two sides of the median cancel each other out. If we use the absolute distances independently, however, the scores will not cancel each other out.

Using the weighted mean of the absolute differences between the government parties and the median voter, we obtain average government distance scores of 1.53 for the Majority Control systems, 1.63 for the Mixed systems, and 1.32 for the Proportionate Influence systems. Comparing these distances with those in Table 3, it is immediately apparent that this procedure makes no difference at all for Majority

Proportionate Influence systems lead to coalition and minority governments, it appears that system characteristics which improve congruence between governments and citizens may also be associated with large budget deficits. We are grateful to Bill Keech for pointing this out to us.

[44] See David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey Banks, "Stable Governments and the Allocation of Portfolios," *American Political Science Review* 84 (September 1990); and Michael Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Coalitions and Cabinet Government," *American Political Science Review* 84 (September 1990).

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Control systems—these are single-party governments anyway. It hurts the Mixed systems slightly, but most of these governments are either single party or composed of multiple parties on the same side of the median. However, the Proportionate Influence system scores are notably increased (from .98 to 1.32) by taking the absolute distances. Much of the advantage of these systems has come from multiparty governments that straddle the median voter. Using the absolute differences, their advantage is reduced by 60 percent (from half a point to only .2)

Although we report these results, it is not because we think that taking the absolute distances is the correct way to estimate policy positions: we do not think that it is. Ministries may be divided between parties in a lumpy fashion; major policy directions for the most part are not. Rather, we mention the results because they remind us that measures of congruence ultimately depend on the assumptions that we make about interparty bargaining processes, and these processes are worthy of more serious study by political scientists.

Citizens, Policymakers, and Ideological Congruence

Governments in parliamentary systems are not totally uninfluenced by the opposition in making policy, and the Majority Control and Proportionate Influence visions make different predictions about how the role of opposition parties should affect congruence. Consequently, an exploration of the effectiveness of the two visions in linking policy-making and voters must look beyond the parties that formally share government responsibility. The problem here is that it is much more difficult to measure the relative importance of government and opposition in policy-making than it is to identify the parties of the government. However, we have adopted a plausible weighting scheme (which is in principle subject to detailed empirical research that could test its accuracy) as a first cut at moving beyond the level of governments alone.

Our approach is to create weighted policymaker measures of the left-right position of all the parties in the legislature. We do this two ways.[45] In Policymaker Distance I we compute the position of the government parties by taking the weighted average of the left-right positions of the government parties (as in Government Distance I). In Policymaker Distance II we compute the position of the government by taking the position of the median party within the government coalition (as in Government Distance II). In both measures the net government posi-

[45] This approach is adopted from G. Bingham Powell, "Constitutional Design and Citizen Electoral Control," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 1 (April 1989).

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tion receives a weight of 1.0.

The weights of the opposition parties are calculated the same way for Policymaker Distance I and Policymaker Distance II. The weight of an opposition party in the policymaker measures depends on the proportion of the party's parliamentary seats, the majority status of the government, and the extent to which the opposition can influence legislation in committees. The main idea behind the measures is that the opposition parties have some influence in all situations, especially under conditions of minority government and when the institutional arrangements are conducive to influence in committees. If the government has a majority, then we take the weighted average left-right position of all the opposition parties and multiply it by .1 + CI, where CI is a measure of the extent to which legislative institutional arrangements permit opposition influence in committees (and CI ranges from 0 to .25). We assume that the opposition's weight is always at least .1 because of the opposition's ability to use the legislature as a forum to stimulate public debate.

If the government is of minority status, then the opposition parties are split into three groups: formal support parties, opposition parties with bargaining power, and opposition parties without bargaining power. If there are formal support parties, their average left-right position is weighted by .75 + CI and the rest of the opposition parties are weighted by .1 + CI. If there are no formal support parties, we assume that a minority government has to bargain with the parties that are ideologically proximate and that together with the government can form a majority.[46]

For example, if the government has 45 percent of the seats and there are two parties to its left, Party A and Party B, each with 10 percent of the seats, then only the party that is closest to the government will have bargaining power. So opposition Party A has bargaining power only if A is between the government and Party B. If this is not the case, then Party A does not have bargaining power. We weight opposition parties with bargaining power by .5 + CI and we weight opposition parties without bargaining power by .1 + CI. The precise formula for calculating the measures is given in the appendix.[47]

[46] If we relax our assumption of unidimensionality, we might expect the governing parties to bargain with all the other legislative parties, increasing the weight of all the oppositions. We think that in practice some minority governments bargain only with ideologically proximate parties whereas others face a more open situation. However, our reading is that the former situation is more common and, of course, is the situation that makes the concept of congruence more interpretable.

[47] The mean scores by country for Policymaker I (II) are Australia .65 (.65), Belgium .45 (.63), Denmark .57 (.64), France 1.59 (1.76), West Germany .94 (1.14), Ireland .43 (.72), Italy .49 (.63), Netherlands .51 (.19), New Zealand .73 (.73), Sweden .95 (.95), Great Britain 1.88 (1.88), and Spain 1.28 (1.28).

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Comparing Congruence between Citizens and Policymakers in the Three Types of Systems

Table 5 compares the distance between policymakers and the citizen median in the three types of systems. Before analyzing these results, it is useful to recall the predictions that each of the visions of democracy would make about the effect of upweighting the opposition. According to the connections to citizen preferences emphasized by the Majority Control vision of congruence, upweighting the opposition should decrease congruence because Majority Control systems are designed directly to elect a government party at the median. By contrast, according to the Proportionate Influence vision, upweighting the opposition might increase congruence because the government formation process often does not result in a government that is at the median.

Given these expectations, the results in Table 5 are very interesting. Most strikingly, congruence improves in *all* three types of systems.[48] Across all thirty-eight governments, the average distance between the median voter and the government was about 1.3; the average distance between the median voter and the weighted policymakers was about .85. This decrease was of approximately the same magnitude for all three types of systems. This does not mean, however, that oppositions are closer to the voters than are the governments. They are not. Rather, it means that as long as we continue to weight the governments more heavily than the oppositions in our estimate of policy-making, more congruence is created by giving the oppositions *some* weight than by leaving them out of the process.

Table 5 also shows in parentheses the proportion of voters between the average weighted policymaker position and the position of the median voter. Here, again, we see substantial reductions from the corresponding figures in Table 3, and as our analysis would predict, this reduction is largest in the Proportionate Influence systems, where the number of voters between government and median is cut in half from 20 to 10 percent. We of course expected the improved congruence in these Proportionate Influence systems, but we did not initially expect the policymaker measures to be so helpful to the Majority Control and Mixed systems. Given our analyses in the previous section showing that the winning parties in the Majority Control systems are often not very close to the median, these results are, however, less surprising. When the two

[48] Congruence of policymakers was not greater than that of governments in every case, however. It is not a tautology. In eight of the thirty-eight cases the congruence was less for policymakers on at least one of the two measures, although the differences are usually not very large.

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TABLE 5

CONGRUENCE BETWEEN POLICYMAKERS AND CITIZEN LEFT-RIGHT ORIENTATIONS[a]

	System Type		
	Majority Control	*Mixed*	*Proportionate Influence*
Policymaker Distance I	1.17 (22%)	1.03 (18%)	.50 (10%)
Policymaker Distance II	1.17 (22%)	1.15 (20%)	.59 (12%)

[a]For Policymaker Distance I and Policymaker Distance II, a party's weight is determined by whether it is a government party, a support party, or an opposition party. Policymaker Distance I uses the same measure as Government Distance I to calculate the position of the government. Policymaker Distance II uses the same measure as Government Distance II to calculate the position of the government. Further details are in the text and the appendix. The numbers in parentheses give the percentage of citizens between the Policymakers and the median citizens.

main parties are on opposite sides of the median and at some distance from it, giving some (but not too much) policy-making weight to the opposition will typically increase congruence.

Indeed, the reduction in distance would be even greater in the Majority Control systems if they gave somewhat more weight to the opposition. Many of the governments are quire far away in these systems and have, on average, a good deal to gain in congruence from forces pulling them toward the center. But of course such involvement of the opposition comes at the cost of blurring the responsibility for policy-making (and perhaps even future policymaker identifiability), thus diminishing what are often viewed as among the other (noncongruence) advantages of majoritarian systems.

We should also note that the "failure" of minority governments discussed in the previous section on governments takes on a somewhat different cast when we examine the policymaker results. In the Mixed and Proportionate Influence systems, the average for Policymaker I(II) is .66 (.79) during majority governments and .98 (.79) during minority governments. The difference in congruence between majority and minority governments is therefore smaller for these systems than was the case when comparing the congruence of governments. In Denmark, for example, where virtually all governments were minority governments and where the committee system further helped the opposition, the policymaker scores are only about half of the government scores. We think this is a realistic impression of the policy-making under minority gov-

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ernments. Minority governments must find support from other parties, and if these governments are well off the median, the search for this support is likely to move policy outcomes toward the center. Hence, although the formation of minority governments may seem like a failure in the Mixed and Proportionate Influence systems, the magnitude of this failure is much reduced when we keep in mind that parties outside the government can influence final policy outcomes.

Regression Analysis

Since the results from Table 5 are interesting and somewhat unexpected, it is useful to analyze further the relationship between the system characteristics and the policymaker variables using multivariate regressions. We can replicate the regression analysis of individual variables from Table 4 using the policymaker distances as the dependent variable. We expect that the results from the Government Distance regressions will not be reproduced in as striking a fashion. For one thing, the estimates of all the variables should have smaller coefficients and larger standard errors because the Policymaker Distances are smaller and have less variance than the Government Distances. Moreover, opposition-influencing committee systems and minority government are taken into consideration in the construction of the dependent variable.

The data in Table 6 reproduce the results from Table 4, using Policymaker Distance I and Policymaker Distance II instead of Government Distances I and II as the dependent variables. The two measures give roughly similar results, although the coefficients are generally somewhat weaker (except for opposition influence in committees) and the percentage of variance explained (adjusted R-square) is substantially less with Policymaker Distance II. As expected, most of the coefficients are smaller and less likely to be statistically significant than in the Government Distance analysis. However, we do see the same general pattern appearing: (1) greater identifiability is associated (usually significantly) with larger distances between the median voter and the policymaker position; (2) single-party majority-party incumbents and elected majority governments decrease the distance, although not statistically significantly; (3) more effective parties and, especially, greater proportionality of outcomes are associated with smaller distances. Opposition influence in committees is clearly associated with less distance between policymakers and the median voter, as we expect from our operationalization, although the coefficients are rarely statistically significant.

It is notable that the proportionality effects are nearly as strong for policymakers as for governments and above or near statistical signifi-

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TABLE 6

PREDICTING DISTANCE BETWEEN THE MEDIAN VOTER AND THE LEFT-RIGHT POSITION OF THE POLICYMAKER
(OLS MODEL OF POLICYMAKER DISTANCE I AND II)

	Dependent Variable: Policymaker Distance I			*Dependent Variable: Policymaker Distance II*		
Independent Variables[a]	*(1)*	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(4)*	*(5)*	*(6)*
Identifiability of future government	.0065	—	.0052	.0047	—	.0038
	(.0025)		(.0026)	(.0027)		(.0029)
Past government status	−.48	—	−.51	−.55	—	−.56
	(.32)		(.30)	(.34)		(.34)
Majority or PEC wins election	−.17	—	−.29	−.11	—	−.21
	(.24)		(.23)	(.25)		(.25)
Effective number of parties	—	−.095	−.06	—	−.06	−.04
		(.053)	(.06)		(.06)	(.07)
Proportionality of electoral outcome	—	−.038	−.037	—	−.033	−.032
		(.016)	(.016)		(.017)	(.017)
Opposition influence in committees	−.53	.12	−.21	−.63	−.04	−.37
	(.27)	(.26)	(.29)	(.29)	(.28)	(.32)
Intercept	.92	4.62	4.50	1.17	4.18	4.19
	(.29)	(1.37)	(1.48)	(.31)	(1.48)	(1.64)
N	38	38	38	38	38	38
Adjusted R^2	.19	.21	.28	.14	.15	.18
Standard error of the regression	.52	.52	.49	.56	.56	.55

[a]The independent variables are described in the text.

cance at .05. An additional piece of analysis sheds light on the consistent and impressive power of the proportionality variable. If we examine the distance between the left-right position of the *median voter* and the left-right position of the *median party* in the legislature, we find substantial variation across our systems, from less than half a point in all the Danish, German, and Irish cases to over 2 points in Britain, Spain, and a few assorted governments elsewhere. Proportionality is the strongest and most significant predictor of that distance from median voter to median party: the predicted effect of the range from our least to most proportional systems is about 1.1 scale points. The distortion in party representation affects the location of the median legislative party, to the detriment of congruence.

The most notable difference between Tables 4 and 6 is that the detrimental effects of identifiability are reduced by 40 to 50 percent when we use policymakers as the dependent variable. This reduction presumably follows because of the way that the weighted policymaker positions are pulled to the center by taking some account of the opposition. However, even these lesser effects are still above or near significance for Policymaker I: the Italy-Britain comparison costs about half a scale point for the more identifiable electoral competition.

The regression results help interpret and support the results of the simple comparison of system types. The policymaker measures show reduced distances in all types of systems. However, the Proportionate Influence systems still show a substantial advantage. Identifiability in electoral competition remains costly, although the cost is not as great in absolute terms after we upweight opposition influence on policy-making. Poor proportionality in representation remains highly costly. Single-party majority incumbents before the election seem to be helpful. Yet multiparty systems also remain somewhat helpful, as does opposition influence. The net congruence advantage is to the Proportionate Influence vision.

Concluding Comments

We have attempted to being into more precise focus two general visions of the processes that link citizens and policymakers in contemporary democracies. We should stress that the generality of our results is constrained by our research design: it may be that a different slice of time would reveal majoritarian electoral competition in which the parties are not so extreme and proportionate influence bargaining is less centrist. Moreover, we are well aware that the "commitments" of governments and their actual policy outcomes are not necessarily the same. This dif-

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ference would be especially troubling for our results if policies diverged further from promises in the Proportionate Influence systems than in the Majoritarian ones. The difficulty of identifying clear responsibility for policy in the former creates prima facie grounds for concern.

With these caveats said, the results of our analysis seem clear and consistent. In the simple comparison, contrary to our expectations from the theoretical arguments about creating congruence connections in each approach, the governments in the Proportionate Influence systems are on average significantly closer to their median voter than are governments in the Majority Control and Mixed systems. The regression analysis reassures us on this point. If voters are presented with two clear alternatives (parties or preelection coalitions), these alternatives—and resulting governments—tend to be rather distant from the median voter. If voters are presented with a wide range of choices and electoral outcomes are proportional, governments tend to be closer to the median. It is reassuring that the regression results are supportive because they allow us to take advantage of the mixture of properties in the Mixed systems, rather than relying solely on the number of pure Majority Control cases.

Our analysis of policymakers, although necessarily more speculative because of the weighting problem, is also illuminating because the results in part run counter to our initial theoretical expectations. Taking some account of opposition influence helped congruence with voters in virtually all the systems, with surprisingly large effects in the Majority Control and Mixed systems. However, the net advantage remained with the Proportionate Influence systems, which gained congruence, especially because of the strong weighting of the opposition parties during minority government and because these systems usually permit more opposition influence in committees.

The results with respect to Majority Control, and more generally with respect to high identifiability, raise an important additional question about policy-making. We examine congruence on a government-by-government basis, and do not have a long enough time span to take averages of the governments over several decades. Hence, although each government in Britain and Australia may be quite distant from the median voter, the *average* position over time might be much closer to the center. Of course, the long predominance of such governments as the Conservatives in Britain from 1979 to the present (or the conservative coalition in France from 1958 to 1981) may imply that this oscillation does not redress the balance very quickly (or at all).

The appropriate time frame for congruence is an important issue for future research. The relationships between congruence and other fea-

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tures of democratic government frequently proposed as desirable (stability, efficiency, responsibility) remain another rich area for exploration. The consideration of these questions reminds us again of the challenging empirical, theoretical, and normative issues associated with the study of congruence. For this reason, we see the current results as a contribution, not a conclusion, to our understanding of the fascinating problem of the electoral connection between citizens and policymakers.

Appendix

Government Distance I is calculated as follows:

$$\text{Government Distance I} = M - \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} P_i \cdot w_i}{\sum_{i=1}^{N} w_i}$$

where:

N is the number of parties in the government.
p_i is the left-right position of party i.
w_i is the parliamentary weight of party i.
M is the position of the median voter.

The Policymaker Distance measures (I and II) are calculated as follows:

$$\text{Policymaker Distance} = M - \frac{(G \cdot GWT)+((.75+CI) \cdot SP \cdot SPWT)+((.5+CI) \cdot BP \cdot BPWT)+((.1+CI) \cdot NP \cdot NPWT}{GWT+((.75+CI) \cdot SPWT)+((.5+CI) \cdot BPWT)+((.1+CI) \cdot NPWT)}$$

where:

M is the position of the median voter.
G is the weighted left-right position of the government in Policymaker Distance I and G is the position of the median party in the government in Policymaker Distance II.
GWT is the proportion of parliamentary seats held by all government parties.
CI is the index of opposition influence in committees (and ranges from 0 to .25).
SP is the weighted left-right position of formal support parties.
SPWT is the proportion of parliamentary seats held by all support parties.
BP is the weighted left-right position of opposition parties with bargaining power.
BPWT is the proportion of parliamentary seats held by all opposition parties with bargaining power.

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NP is the weighted left-right position of opposition parties without bargaining power.
NPWT is the proportion of parliamentary seats held by all opposition parties without bargaining power.

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WOMEN AND DEMOCRATIZATION
Conceptualizing Gender Relations in Transition Politics

By GEORGINA WAYLEN*

A VAST literature on democratization has been produced in recent years.[1] There is, however, increasing agreement that much of it fails to take account of the complexity of the process of transition to democracy and instead substitutes empiricism, simplistic voluntarism, and an ahistorical approach, which results in "a plethora of unrelated ad hoc generalisations grounded in macro-level case-studies."[2] What is needed, then, rather than abstracting separate cases, is broadly comparative and theoretically informed work that provides conjunctural explanations within a social, economic, and historical context.[3]

The orthodox political science literature on democratization has so far made very little mention of gender or more specifically women, despite evidence of the significant role women and women's movements have played, for example, in the return to democratic politics in much of Latin America.[4] This is one important aspect of the analytical inadequacy of much of this work. It is clear that any analysis of democratization that fails to incorporate a gendered perspective—that ignores the actions and impact of certain groups—will be flawed. The study of comparative politics can only be improved by creating a framework for analyzing the interplay between gender relations and democratization.

*I would like to thank Paul Cammack, Mike Goldsmith, Elizabeth Harvey, Scott McCracken, and Vicky Randall for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article.

[1] See, e.g., Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Lawrence Whitehead, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy*, 4 vols. (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1986); Enrique A. Baloyra, ed., *Comparing New Democracies: Transition and Consolidation in Mediterranean Europe and the Southern Cone* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987); David Ethier, ed., *Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Southern Europe, Latin America and Southeast Asia* (Basingstoke, England: Macmillan, 1990); Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., *Democracy in Developing Countries*, 4 vols. (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1988); Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

[2] Karen L. Remmer, "New Wine or Old Bottlenecks," *Comparative Politics* 23 (July 1991), 491.

[3] Paul Cammack agrees with Karen Remmer on this point; see Cammack, "Democratization and Citizenship in Latin America," in Michael Moran and Geraint Parry, eds., *Democracy and Democratisation* (London: Routledge, 1993).

[4] See Jane S. Jaquette, ed., *The Women's Movement in Latin America: Feminism and the Transition to Democracy in Latin America* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989); and Sonia E. Alvarez, *Engendering Democracy in Brazil: Women's Movements in Transition Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).

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The present paper therefore begins with an exploration of the orthodox literature to see why this omission occurs. It then examines the general themes and issues involved in developing a gendered analysis of democratization. The paper focuses mainly on women and starts from the premise that popular movements play an important role in the transition to democracy and that a gendered analysis of these movements is essential, as women often participate on the basis of the politicization of their social roles.

Four key questions emerge from the attempt to develop a framework for analyzing, first, the role played by women in the process of transition and, second, the impact of democratization on gender relations. These questions can be used to help explain the very different processes of transition and outcomes in Latin America and Eastern Europe: women's movements played an important role in the former and a minimal role in the latter.

The first three questions address the process of transition itself. The first two focus on the nature and role of women's political activities and women's movements, that is, on the "internal characteristics," and the third is concerned with the "external" context. The first question concerns why women choose to organize or not to organize in different contexts such as Latin America and Eastern Europe. The second question asks about the nature of these movements where they exist. Here the diversity and heterogeneity of women's movements is striking. It is important to find ways of analyzing this complexity, which reflects the absence of a unitary category "woman" undifferentiated by class, race, or nationality. One way of approaching this problem is to divide women's movements into those that organize primarily around what one may term practical gender interests such as economic survival, often "popular movements," and those that organize mainly around what can be categorized as strategic gender interests, epitomized, for example, by "feminist demands."[5] However, it is a mistake to turn this distinction into a rigid dichotomy, as there are links between the different movements, and some movements, such as popular feminism, defy easy classification in these terms.

The third question, which examines the "external characteristics," or context, considers the interaction between women's political activities and the process of transition. Here one must consider not only the different types of women's movements but also the very different processes of transition. What prompts change in coercive regimes and what is the

[5] See Maxine Molyneux, "Mobilization without Emancipation? Women's Interests, the State and Revolution in Nicaragua," *Feminist Studies* 11, no. 2 (1985).

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role of popular movements, particularly women's movements, in promoting that change? Why is it that women's movements appear to play a visible and instrumental role in certain contexts and stages of the process of the opening, transition, and consolidation, but not in others? As will become clear, the second and third questions are very important in the Latin American context but are less relevant in the East European case, where the central question is instead why women's movements played such a minor role. This can shed light on pretransition politics, particularly the nature of previous regimes and civil society, and on the process of transition itself.

The fourth question shifts the focus to the outcomes of transition and asks about the impact of democratization on gender relations. The premise is, first, that institutional democratization does not necessarily entail a democratization of power relations in society at large, particularly between men and women and, second, that there is no necessary connection between playing an important part in any stage of the process of democratization and having any particular role during the period of consolidation. To analyze outcomes, therefore, it is important to begin by determining exactly what is meant by democracy, to see whether the restricted definitions commonly used need to be expanded in order to incorporate a gendered approach. Next, the role of women in the new institutional politics must be explored and the fate of "women's issues" examined, particularly the extent to which these enter the policy agendas. Third, one must examine what happens to women's movements that were active prior to democratization: can they sustain their activities? This done, it is possible to assess the impact of democratization on practical and strategic gender interests in the very different contexts of Latin America and Eastern Europe.

This work thus does two things: it adds to the body of knowledge about the role of women in an important political process, and it helps to "gender" the study of political science.[6] These questions can be used to help explain the very different processes of transition and outcomes in Latin America and Eastern Europe: women's movements played an important role in the former and a minimal role in the latter.

The Orthodox View of Democratization

The political development literature has long been interested both in the conditions necessary for the establishment of democracies and in how

[6] See Helene Silverberg, "What Happened to the Feminist Revolution in Political Science?" *Western Political Quarterly* 43, no. 4 (1990).

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they can be sustained.[7] These concerns, particularly of American social scientists working in the 1950s and 1960s, were confounded by the trend toward authoritarianism in much of the Third World, especially Latin America, evident in the late 1960s and 1970s.[8] However, with the advent of the "third wave" of democratization, which has brought a return to some form of democratic rule in much of Latin America and elsewhere in the Third World, interest has once again focused on democracy and the process of transition from authoritarianism to democracy.[9] Much of the literature of the 1980s evidences many continuities with work of the 1950s and 1960s, leading some analysts to claim that old frameworks are being dusted off to accommodate new facts.[10]

Although the corpus on democratization is now large, it is possible to make some general observations about its defining characteristics. First the focus is unashamedly normative. O'Donnell, for example, writes: "Our project had from the outset a normative bias, coupled and reinforced by an empirical generalization. We have considered political democracy as desirable per se."[11] Similarly, Diamond, Linz, and Lipset assert: "We (along with an increasing proportion of the world's population) value political democracy as an end in itself—without assuming that it is any guarantee of other important values."[12]

As democracy is seen as a good thing, much of the literature of the 1980s also focuses on the process of transition, primarily how to achieve and maintain democracy. While some writers such as Diamond, Linz, and Lipset tend to stress the preconditions necessary for a transition to occur, by examining different variables including political leadership and political institutions in a large number of cases, others such as O'Donnell and Schmitter concentrate on the nature of the process itself, in particular, on the actions of political elites.[13] Diamond also considers "tangible measures to move countries towards democracy" on the

[7] See, e.g., Dankwart A. Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Towards a Dynamic Model," *Comparative Politics* 2, no. 3 (1970). This kind of approach is also reflected in some of the classic works of this literature, e.g., Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of Developing Areas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962); and Leonard Binder et al., eds., *Crises and Sequences in Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).

[8] E.g., Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1978).

[9] See O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead (fn. 1); Samuel P. Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" *Political Science Quarterly* 99 (Summer 1984); Diamond, Linz, and Lipset (fn. 1); Huntington (fn. 1).

[10] See Remmer (fn. 2), 487.

[11] Guillermo A. O'Donnell, "Introduction to the Latin American Cases," in O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead (fn. 1), 2:10.

[12] Diamond, Linz, and Lipset (fn. 1), 4:xxv.

[13] See Diamond, Linz, and Lipset's introductory chapters to their volumes on Asia, Africa, and Latin America in their series (fn. 1); and O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead (fn. 1), esp. vols. 3, 4.

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part of both internal and external actors.[14] The emphasis is on the voluntaristic nature of the process; according to Remmer, "Democratic political outcomes are seen to depend on the choices of particular political elites and specific historical conjunctures."[15] Because of this emphasis on agency rather than structures, the literature concentrates on the nature of pacts and coalitions that need to be made between various elite groups and the military to facilitate a successful transition.[16] The need for effective leadership is stressed, as is the necessity of an opposition willing to negotiate with the authoritarian regime.[17] This top-down focus gives primacy to the actions and decisions of political leaders in the transition.

In contrast to some of the work of the 1950s and 1960s, however, some scholars such as Malloy recognize that "there is no unilinear tendency toward democracy or authoritarian rule. Rather, that the predominant pattern is cyclical, with alternating democratic and authoritarian 'moments.'"[18] Thus, the assumptions about the evolutionary nature of political change so characteristic of modernization theory have been replaced by an emphasis on a "pendular pattern" and the possibility of reversal.[19] These scholars stress the need for prudence and a "sequence of piecemeal reforms," to guard against the possibility of a backlash by hard-liners.[20] There is little concern about wider outcomes, over and above the establishment of a stable competitive party system.

This literature makes no mention of gender issues. Much of the explanation for this omission stems from the most common definition of democracy used in the literature. The majority of scholars working on democratization in the 1980s quite consciously adopted a narrow and restricted institutional definition of democracy. These definitions have a long intellectual history and are indebted to the work of Dahl, and particularly Schumpeter and the school of competitive elitism.[21] These restrictions in the conceptualization of democracy are sometimes justi-

[14] See Larry Diamond, "Beyond Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism: Strategies for Democratization," *Washington Quarterly* 12 (Winter 1989), 151.

[15] See Remmer (fn. 2), 483.

[16] The classic exposition of a structural analysis is Barrington Moore, Jr., *The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (London: Allen Lane, 1967).

[17] See Diamond (fn. 14), 152.

[18] James M. Malloy, "The Politics of Transition in Latin America," in James M. Malloy and Mitchell A. Seligson, eds., *Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime Transition in Latin America* (Pittsburgh, Pa: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987), 236.

[19] See Mitchell A. Seligson, "Democratization in Latin America: The Current Cycle," in Malloy and Seligson (fn. 18), 3–4.

[20] Diamond makes these points, citing O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead in support of his arguments; see Diamond (fn. 14), 145, 153.

[21] Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971); Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1943).

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fied on pragmatic grounds. Huntington, for instance, writing in 1984, argues that broader definitions

> might be relevant to normative political theory, but they are not very useful for comparative political analysis. First, they are often so vague and general that it is virtually impossible to apply them in practice. . . . Second, democracy may also be defined in such broad terms as to make it identical with almost all civic virtues, including social justice, equality, liberty, fulfilment, progress and a variety of other good things. Hence it becomes impossible to analyse the relationship between democracy and other social goals.[22]

Diamond, Linz, and Lipset echo Dahl and define democracy as "a political system, separate and apart from the economic and social system to which it is joined."[23] A political system is defined as democratic insofar as "its most powerful collective decision-makers are selected through periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote."[24] Terry Lynn Karl adds yet another category to Dahl's three essential conditions for polyarchy: (1) contestation over policy and political competition for office; (2) participation of the citizenry through partisan, associational, and other forms of collective action; (3) accountability of rulers to the ruled through mechanisms of representation and the rule of law. To this is added (4) civilian control over the military.[25]

According to David Held, democracy defined in these ways becomes a "political *method*" simply an institutional arrangement to generate and legitimate leadership.[26] Not only does this view sidestep various classical meanings of democracy, but it also sidesteps many of the issues about democracy raised by feminist political theorists.[27] The two that are particularly relevant for this paper center on the definitions and uses of the terms *democracy* and *politics*.

First, the narrow concentration by analysts such as Diamond et al. and O'Donnell et al. on democracy as simply an institutional arrangement means that wider definitions of democracy couched in terms of the real distribution of power in society are considered illegitimate. Furthermore, because any discussion of social and economic inequality is deemed to be irrelevant to political equality and because citizenship is defined simply in terms of a restricted form of political citizenship (if it is mentioned at

[22] Huntington (fn. 9), 195.
[23] Diamond, Linz, and Lipset (fn. 1), 4:xvi.
[24] Huntington (fn. 9), 195.
[25] Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," *Comparative Politics* 23 (October 1990), 2.
[26] David Held, *Models of Democracy* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1987), 164–85.
[27] See the work of Carole Pateman, e.g., *The Disorder of Women: Democracy, Feminism and Political Theory* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1989).

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all), gender issues are effectively sidelined.[28] Only if women were denied the vote, and perhaps not even then, would gender relations become relevant. This excludes an analysis of the outcomes of democratization in any terms other than simply narrow institutional democracy; and as will become clear, democratization at the institutional level does not necessarily entail a more even distribution of power in society, particularly with regard to gender. Clearly, a wider definition of democratization is needed.

Second, within the 1980s model of the political transition to democracy, which has its roots in the competitive elitist view, "politics" is defined narrowly to include only the upper institutional echelons of the public sphere. Politics then becomes a largely male activity, as women are not part of political elites in great numbers and therefore do not appear as politically active.[29] This downplays the significance of exactly those sorts of wider political activities—social movements, for example—in which women are most likely to be involved. O'Donnell and Schmitter comment on the success of the military in depoliticizing society through the destruction of autonomous political spaces where political activity, whether oppositional or not, can take place. These are again defined very narrowly as lying within the arena of conventional politics, thereby allowing many forms of political activity to be ignored. According to O'Donnell and Schmitter, the initial opening is caused by the triumph of the soft-liners over the hard-liners within the controlling elites and not by popular pressure from below. This only pushes the transition further once it has begun. Despite the differences in their approaches, both O'Donnell and Schmitter and Diamond et al. are wary of popular pressure, arguing that it is a destabilizing force that needs to be tamed if the process of transition is to proceed.[30]

This sort of approach clearly limits the ability of orthodox theorists to examine women's activities in transition politics. Even when they do discuss human rights activists, O'Donnell and Schmitter talk of "gestures by exemplary individuals" with no real acknowledgment that many of the human rights campaigners were women often campaigning as mothers. Thus, a more fruitful approach requires wider definitions of politics and political activity that can incorporate the role of popular movements.

[28] See Kathleen Jones, "Citizenship in a Women-Friendly Polity," *Signs* 15, no. 4 (1990); and Carol Pateman, "Feminism and Democracy," in Graeme Duncan, ed., *Democratic Theory and Practice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

[29] See Carole Pateman, "A New Democratic Theory? Political Science, the Public and the Private" (Paper delivered at the plenary session on Democratic Theory Today, IPSA Fifteenth World Congress, Buenos Aires, 1991).

[30] See Guillermo A. O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, in O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead (fn. 1), 4:48–56.

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Some analysts whose work does not fall within the orthodox democratization literature have attributed greater significance to the activities of popular movements in bringing about a return to democratic rule.[31] Scholars are beginning to investigate whether civil society is reconstituted and popular movements begin to emerge *prior* to the transition rather than, as is commonly held, as a result of it.[32] Garretón has argued that while social movements are not the source of change, they can play a critical role and that the recomposition of civil society represented by their activities forms the invisible transition to democracy.[33] Taking a more radical view, James Petras has argued that such social movements have played an important role and provided the signal that the military regime, having failed to create an economic model with a substantial base of support, therefore faced a crisis of legitimacy.[34]

While much of this work on social movements provides a useful corrective to the top-down perspective of the democratization theorists, it also has problems. First, until recently the bottom-up focus meant that links between grassroots political activity and the wider context, particularly the relationship with political parties and the state, were ignored.[35] Second, and crucially important for this paper, the majority of writers fail to discuss gender issues, despite the frequent acknowledgment that the majority of participants in popular movements are women.[36] Because women often participate on the basis of the social roles associated with their gendered identities (for example, as mothers and household providers), the analysis of these movements will be incomplete if this is ignored.

It can therefore be seen how gender relations are rendered invisible and, indeed, marginal and irrelevant in the democratization literature. This is, I believe, inevitable given the framework within which the

[31] See Jean Grugel, "Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Lessons from Latin America," *Political Studies* 39 (June 1991). See also the work of Scott Mainwaring, e.g., "Urban Popular Movements, Identity, and Democratization in Brazil," *Comparative Political Studies* 20 (July 1987).

[32] Philip Oxhorn argues this in the case of Chile. See Oxhorn, "Democratic Transitions and the Democratization Process in Chile" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1989).

[33] Manuel Antonio Garretón, "Popular Mobilization and the Military Regime in Chile: The Complexities of the Invisible Transition," in Susan Eckstein, ed., *Power and Popular Protest: Latin American Social Movements* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).

[34] James Petras, "The Redemocratization Process," in Suzanne Jonas and Nancy Stein, eds., *Democracy in Latin America: Visions and Realities* (New York: Bergin and Garvey, 1990).

[35] See Judith Adler Hellman, "The Study of New Social Movements in Latin America and the Question of Autonomy," *LASA Forum* 21 (1990). This omission is beginning to be rectified; see e.g., Joe Foweraker and Ann Craig, eds., *Popular Movements and Political Change in Mexico* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1990).

[36] For a discussion of the ungendered nature of much of the social movement literature, see Yvonne Corcoran-Nantes, "Female Consciousness or Feminist Consciousness? Women's Consciousness Raising in Community-based Struggles in Brazil," in Sarah A. Radcliffe and Sallie Westwood, eds., *Viva: Women and Popular Protest in Latin America* (London: Routledge, 1993), 138–141.

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democratization theorists work. Since it dictates both their approach and their conclusions about the nature of the process of transition, any consideration of gender issues is rendered impossible. The narrow definitions of democracy, politics, and citizenship, the concentration on the public sphere and the use of simplistic notions of civil society mean that these works are of little use for understanding the place of gender in the processes and outcomes of democratization. Furthermore, even those works that move away from the focus on elites and examine democratization from a bottom-up perspective tend to share this genderless approach and have yet to provide a better approach.

A new approach is therefore needed to address the questions of the role of women in the transition and the way that gender relations have changed as a result of the process. This would illuminate notions of citizenship, democracy, and civil society and the interaction of gender relations and the state. The comparison between the collapse of authoritarianism in Latin America and Eastern Europe can provide some preliminary answers to the question of why and under what conditions women organize and what impact this has in prompting change in coercive regimes. It also illustrates the ways in which a narrow focus on democratization is insufficient for understanding its interaction with gender relations, as institutional democratization does not necessarily entail any wider changes.

Transition Politics in Latin America

The 1980s saw the return to civilian rule in much of Latin America, although the mechanisms and circumstances of the transition varied from country to country. The slow and controlled transition from above in Brazil, for example, contrasts with the speedier move toward civilian rule catalyzed by the defeat of the Argentine military. Despite these differences, it is possible to outline some general themes regarding the role of women in different processes and outcomes of transition in Latin America and its impact upon them.

The first is the nature of women's movements active within the process of transition. The 1980s saw the emergence of a variety of women's organizations operating outside the conventional political arena. These movements have included both groups made up primarily of women and groups of women organizing specifically as women. They have made a variety of different demands on the state and military regimes and have influenced and been influenced by the nature of transition politics in different ways. Several major forms of women's move-

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ments can be identified in the region.[37] To use Maxine Molyneux's distinction, these have organized around both practical and strategic gender interests, that is, to ameliorate immediate conditions and to challenge women's subordination.[38]

The first form is the human rights groups that became active in the late 1970s in countries such as Chile and Argentina and campaigned against the abuses perpetrated by the military regimes in their wars against subversion and communism. Women constitute the majority of their members pressing social demands, that is, advancing practical gender interests. The most famous of these are Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo (las Madres de Plaza de Mayo) who marched every Thursday afternoon around the plaza carrying pictures of their disappeared children and demanding their return.[39] In Chile the Agrupación de Familiares de Detenidos-Desaparacidos is comprised mainly of women campaigning against human rights abuses.[40] These symbolic mobilizations with their strong ethical component posed a direct challenge to dictatorship. It is a pattern repeated in other parts of the continent.[41]

The second form of women's involvement to become important in the 1980s was the popular urban community-based movement focusing on consumption issues. The majority of popular urban movements that emerged primarily in the last decade have included large numbers of women pressing social and economic demands. Corcoran-Nantes estimates that 80 percent of the participants in contemporary Brazilian movements are women.[42] Women's involvement in the "politics of daily life" has taken a variety of forms. They have led campaigns in poor neighborhoods for improved services, and they have organized collective survival strategies in the form of *organizaciones economicas populares*, as they are known in Chile. These have included organizations that focus on consumption such as *ollas comunes* (communal soup pots) common in Chile and Peru, artisanal workshops set up to generate incomes, and groups to provide social services. The cost-of-living movement and the day care campaigns in Brazil and other organizations in Argentina and

[37] Jaquette (fn. 4).

[38] See Molyneux (fn. 5).

[39] Marysa Navarro, "The Personal Is Political: Las Madres de Plaza de Mayo," in Eckstein (fn. 33).

[40] See Patricia M. Chuchryk, "Subversive Mothers: The Women's Opposition to the Military Regime in Chile," in Sue Ellen Charlton, Jana Everett, and Katherine Staudt, eds., *Women, the State, and Development* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989).

[41] See Jennifer Schirmer, "'Those Who Die for Life Cannot Be Called Dead'": Women and Human Rights Protest in Latin America," *Feminist Review*, no. 32 (Summer 1989); and idem, "The Seeking of Truth and the Gendering of Consciousness: The Comadres of El Salvador and the CONAVIGUA Widows of Guatemala," in Radcliffe and Westwood (fn. 36).

[42] Yvonne Corcoran-Nantes, "Women and Popular Urban Social Movements in Sao Paulo, Brazil," *Bulletin of Latin American Studies* 9, no. 2 (1990).

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Peru provide further evidence that these are not isolated examples.[43] By their very nature these movements assume an oppositional form, often making demands on the state for an improvement in well-being.

The third type of women's organization to (re)emerge during the period of authoritarianism has been avowedly feminist in orientation, comprising women organizing as women to press strategic gender-based demands.[44] Argentina, Chile, and particularly Brazil have seen feminist groups made up largely of middle-class, often professional, women campaigning around issues of gender inequality and women's subordination, many of whom had been active in left-wing politics prior to the military takeover.[45] Study groups, such as the Círculo de Estudios de la Mujer, set up in Chile in 1977, have flourished across the continent, and conferences such as the first Paulista Women's congress in 1979 drew nearly one thousand participants.[46]

Why did these women's movements emerge during the period of military rule? In general terms, they are commonly seen as a response both to authoritarian rule and to the economic crisis faced by the continent during the 1980s.[47] The economic problems, for example, those surrounding the debt crisis, have had a severe impact on the poor—and poor women in particular—a situation that has often been exacerbated by the implementation of adjustment programs.[48] In the face of high levels of unemployment and repression, urban popular movements found it easier to operate than did trade unions and political parties; they campaigned to improve living conditions in the face of extreme economic hardship. Feminist groups, in particular, have also made connections between authoritarianism in society generally and authoritarianism within the household and in relationships between men and women; they therefore see their task as a struggle against authoritarianism in all its forms.[49]

[43] See Teresa Caldeira, "Women, Daily Life and Politics," in Elizabeth Jelin, ed., *Women and Social Change in Latin America* (London: Zed Press, 1990); and Maria del Carmen Feijoó, "The Challenge of Constructing Civilian Peace: Women and Democracy in Argentina," in Jaquette (fn. 4).

[44] For a discussion of the development of the feminist movement in Latin America in the 1980s, see Nancy Saporta Sternbach et al., "Feminisms in Latin America: From Bogota to San Bernardo," *Signs* 17, no. 2 (1992).

[45] See Virginia Vargas, "The Feminist Movement in Latin America: Between Hope and Disenchantment," in Jan Nederveen Pieterse, ed., *Emancipations, Modern and Postmodern* (London: Sage, 1992).

[46] See Patricia M. Chuchryk, "Feminist Anti-Authoritarian Politics: The Role of Women's Organisations in the Chilean Transition to Democracy," in Jaquette (fn. 4); and Sonia E. Alvarez, "Politicizing Gender and Engendering Democracy," in Alfred Stepan, ed., *Democratizing Brazil: Problems of Transition and Consolidation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

[47] Helen Safa, "Women's Social Movements in Latin America," *Gender and Society* 4, no. 3 (1990).

[48] For a discussion of this, see the collection of articles in Haleh Afshar and Carolynne Dennis, eds., *Women and Adjustment Policies in the Third World* (Basingstoke, England: Macmillan, 1992).

[49] See the work of Julieta Kirkwood, e.g., "Women and Politics in Chile," *International Social Science*

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In more practical terms, Alvarez has isolated several other factors that helped the birth of these groups, the organization of women as women, and the emergence of a feminist consciousness in Brazil; these also shed some light on the experience in other Latin American countries.[50] Alvarez points first to the important role played by the Catholic church, particularly the Ecclesiastical Base Communities (the CEBs), in beginning the mobilization of poor women initially as citizens. This later developed into mobilization as women, not always with the church's continued support. Through mothers', women's, and wives' groups, women became organized—often for the first time—and campaigned for improved services such as day care.[51] This is the case for Chile, whereas in Argentina the church played a more conservative role. The second important factor identified by Alvarez is the way in which, after the military came to power, left-wing activists moved into the poor areas to organize, facilitating increased politicization. However, the decimation of the Argentine Left in the "Dirty War" meant that this could not happen to the same extent.

For the purposes of the paper, perhaps one of the most significant factors noted by Alvarez and other commentators is the "political space" that the authoritarian governments afforded women. Women found it easier than before to take on unaccustomed roles in the public sphere, contrary to the conservative ideologies espoused by most of the Latin American militaries, which saw women's role as being primarily in the domestic sphere as wives and mothers. This was partly facilitated by the military governments themselves, which often did not see women's activities as dangerous enough to warrant repression. Or as in the case of human rights protests, most notably the Madres, the protests were effective because women were using their traditional roles as the linchpin of the protests. This made it harder for a government that supposedly elevated motherhood to persecute women who argued that they were fulfilling their maternal roles by searching for their missing children.[52]

Clearly the attempts by military governments to abolish "politics" and repress such conventional political activities of the public sphere as political parties and trade unions moved the locus of much political activity from an institutional setting to community-based action. This actually

Journal 35, no. 4 (1983); and idem, *Ser Política en Chile: Los Nudos de la Sabiduría Feminista* (To be a política in Chile: The knots of a feminist knowledge) (Santiago: Editorial Cuarto Propio, 1990).

[50] See Sonia E. Alvarez, "Women's Movements and Gender Politics in the Brazilian Transition," in Jaquette (fn. 4).

[51] Sonia E. Alvarez, "Women's Participation in the Brazilian 'People's Church': A Critical Appraisal," *Feminist Studies* 16, no. 2 (1990).

[52] For a discussion of the nature of women's political protest, see Georgina Waylen, "Rethinking Women's Political Participation and Protest: Chile 1970–90," *Political Studies* 40 (June 1992).

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gave those women's activities occurring outside the traditional arena of politics a greater prominence and significance. It has often been noted that women in Latin America feel so alienated from male-dominated politics such as trade unions and political parties that they do not take part and they see their own activities as by definition somehow not "political."[53]

Thus, contrary to O'Donnell and Schmitter's thesis, authoritarianism did allow one section of the population, women, the space to mobilize, and in the absence of conventional politics allowed them to develop new ways of "doing politics" and achieve greater visibility. In this way, an alternative analysis that looks at social movements from a gendered perspective highlights the mobilization of women under military rule.

What was the role of this mobilization in bringing about transitions to democracy? Women's mobilization appears to function differently at different stages of the process of transition. It was clearly very important in bringing about the initial breakdown and opening, as the political initiative lay outside the conventional political arena.[54] Frequently women's protests formed the first organized and open opposition to authoritarian governments, helping to bring about the "end of fear." The first important protest against the Argentine military government was that of the Madres, and in Chile one of the first mass protests against the Pinochet government was held to celebrate International Women's Day in 1978. The activities of social movements, particularly women's movements, therefore cannot be ignored in any analysis of the process of transition, especially its initial stages, since these activities often seized the political initiative and encouraged the military to begin negotiations with civilian elites.

Once the transition has begun, however, and political parties have reconstituted and are resuming their activities, the focus tends to shift away from women's organizations and social movements in general and toward more conventional forms of institutional politics, particularly when the opening is tightly controlled by the military.[55] Women's groups, in common with other groups operating outside this arena, are faced with a choice that has been summed up as the dilemma of "autonomy versus integration."[56] Should women's movements work with the new

[53] See Caldeira (fn. 43).

[54] For a discussion of these activities, see Jo Fisher, *Out of the Shadows: Women, Resistance, and Politics in South America* (London: Latin American Bureau, 1993).

[55] For a discussion of this in the Chilean context, see María Elena Valenzuela, "The Evolving Roles of Women under Military Rule," in Paul W. Drake and Ivan Jaksic, eds., *The Struggle for Democracy in Chile, 1982–1990* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1991).

[56] For a discussion of this in the Chilean case, see Claudia Serrano, "Chile entre la autonomía y la integración," in *Transiciones: Mujeres en los procesos democraticos* (Santiago: Isis International, 1990).

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institutions and parties and risk being co-opted and losing autonomy, or should they remain outside, preserving their independence but risking marginalization and loss of influence as power shifts toward the political parties?[57] No definitive answer has emerged.[58] The trend of marginalization is evidenced even more clearly once competitive party politics are resumed fully, making clear that playing a key part in the initial opening does not guarantee an important role in the outcome.

Gender Relations in Competitive Party Politics in Latin America

In order to analyze the relationship between gender relations and postauthoritarian rule, it is useful to distinguish between narrowly focused institutional-level democracy and broader conceptions of democracy. Looking at the former, it is important to ascertain the impact of the reconstitution of conventional political activity on women's political participation in the public sphere: have women converted the higher profile they had achieved into institutional representation; or has the end of authoritarianism brought the renewed exclusion of women from the public sphere? Furthermore, does institutional representation inevitably mean the co-optation and deradicalization of "women's demands"? If notions of democracy are expanded to include more diffuse notions of power, this allows for an examination of the mobilization of different groups of women following the return to civilian rule. What is the impact of the reconstitution of conventional institutional politics on the new forms of women's political activity that emerged under authoritarianism? Are these a temporary phenomenon made up of short-term sporadic protest movements? Or are they, as Safa believes, part of a progressive, long-term transformation?[59] One approach to these questions is to look at how gender interests, both practical and strategic, have fared since a return to democratic politics.

Looking first at institutional politics, there is evidence that "gender has become politicized," as Alvarez has described it. As a result of the perceived importance of women's mobilizations under authoritarian rule, it is clear that many political parties, particularly of the center and Left, have tried to gain women's support by placing women's issues on the political and electoral agenda. In Argentina, Alfonsin ended his 1983

[57] For one view of this, see the discussion by Virginia Vargas, "Women: Tragic Encounters with the Left," *Report on the Americas* 25, no. 5 (1992).

[58] Natacha Molina outlines the different policies and strategies adopted by various groups in Chile; see Molina, "La Mujer," in Manuel Antonio Garretón, ed., *Propuestas Políticas y Demandas Sociales*, vol. 3 (Santiago: FLACSO, 1989).

[59] Safa (fn. 47).

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campaign with a speech criticizing machismo, and throughout the election contest the UCR used slogans reminiscent of the Madres.[60] During the long, drawn-out transition in Brazil all the political parties, particularly the opposition, influenced by the feminists working in their ranks, adopted policies expected to appeal to women voters.[61] In Chile and Argentina, too, there were wide-ranging discussions about the possibility of altering discriminatory civil codes, such as Patria Potestad, which limit a woman's control over her children. In Chile all major parties now pay lip service to women's equality, although the "renovated" Right does this in the context of women's special role in the family.[62]

There have also been a number of policy initiatives aimed specifically at women, including the creation in Chile of Servicio Nacional de la Mujer (SERNAM), a national governmental body of feminists from the Christian Democrats and socialists that oversees government policies concerning women and the creation in Brazil of some women's councils at the state and national levels.[63] SERNAM's initiatives have included employment training programs for women and programs directed at female heads of households and at incorporating more women into small businesses (*microempresas*).[64]

Nevertheless, the return to civilian politics has not put an end to the problems typically experienced by women active in the institutional context. There has been no significant increase in electoral representation: in 1987 women constituted only 5.3 percent of the parliament in Brazil, 5.6 percent in Peru, and in 1991 only 5 percent in Chile and 6.7 percent in Argentina. There is also a singular lack of women appointed to top government posts: in 1993 in Chile the only woman at cabinet level was the director of SERNAM, and only three out of the twenty-seven vice ministers are women; and in 1987 there were no women in ministerial positions in Argentina and Peru and only one in Brazil. The old clientalistic ways still act to exclude women. The election of Carlos Menem, a Peronist, was seen as a setback for women in Argentina. Many feminists, believing that they needed to engage with the political system, became active in political parties, particularly those of the center and Left such as the Christian Democrats and socialists in Chile and the new parties such as the left-wing Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) in Brazil, the

[60] Maria del Carmen Feijoó and Monica Gogna, "Women in the Transition to Democracy," in Jelin (fn. 43).

[61] Alvarez (fn. 4).

[62] See Valenzuela (fn. 55), 179.

[63] See Ann Matear, "SERNAM: Women and the Process of Democratic Transition in Chile" (Paper delivered at the Society of Latin American Studies Conference, Manchester, April 1993).

[64] Ibid.

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Humanist Party in Chile, and the Intransigent Party in Argentina.[65] However, there has been resistance to opening up the power structures to women.[66] There is some evidence that women find it difficult to maintain and increase political representation once an institutionalized party system is revived. Moreover, analysts have even disputed whether organizations such as SERNAM represent an advance for feminists or allow for the co-optation of some of the women's movement's less controversial demands. In this way they can be reduced to minor and largely ineffectual bodies that governments can then utilize by superimposing their own aims onto the "women's issues" policy agenda, leaving the outside power structures largely unaltered.[67]

If the vision is extended to include political activities beyond the institutional arena, the return to civilian rule has resulted in a complicated situation. It is clear that some social movements have been excluded and demobilized. This depends partly on the nature of the transition; the Chilean transition, for example, has seen the renewed dominance of rather conventional party and institutional politics and the exclusion of social movements.[68] It is also due in part to the nature of these movements themselves. There is no *one* conclusion as to whether the activities undertaken by women mobilized under authoritarian rule have been maintained and extended, as, if anything, the heterogeneity and diversity of women's movements has become more marked since the return to competitive electoral politics.[69]

Some women's movements, often those organizing around practical gender interests and choosing autonomy, have become increasingly marginalized as the processes of transition have continued.[70] This is particularly true of those popular organizations organized around social and economic demands.[71] Since the failure of more heterodox plans in

[65] See the case studies in *Transiciones: Mujeres en los Procesos Democraticos* (fn. 56).

[66] For a discussion of this in the Chilean context, see María Elena Valenzuela, "Mujeres y política: Logros y tensiones en el proceso de redemocratización," *Proposiciones* 18 (1990).

[67] See Georgina Waylen, "Women's Movements and Democratization in Chile," *Occasional Paper in Politics and Contemporary History* 31 (Salford, England: University of Salford, 1992).

[68] Jenny Pearce, "Disempowering Social Movements: The Chilean Transition" (Paper delivered at a symposium on Social Movements and Democratization, annual conference of the Society of Latin American Studies, Southampton, 1992).

[69] These issues were discussed in many of the papers on Latin America presented at the conference on Women and the Transition from Authoritarian Rule in Latin America and Eastern Europe, Berkeley, December 1992, for example, those by Teresa Caldeira, Maria Elena Valenzuela, Maruja Barrig, and Maria del Carmen Feijoó. See also Veronica Schild, "Struggling for Citizenship in Chile: A 'Resurrection' of Civil Society" (Paper delivered at the Latin American Studies Association congress, Los Angeles, September, 1992).

[70] See Hellman (fn. 35).

[71] See Cathy Schneider, "Mobilization at the Grassroots: Shantytowns and Resistance in Authoritarian Chile," *Latin American Perspectives* 18 (Winter 1991), 110.

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Argentina and Brazil, civilian governments have maintained and implemented conservative economic policies of structural adjustment that have left little space for increasing welfare provision and satisfying the demands of the popular sectors, particularly poor women.[72] It is also true that those organizations concerned with human rights issues, such as the Madres in Argentina and the Agrupaciones in Chile, have had little success in getting civilian governments anxious to remain on good terms with the military to take decisive action on human rights abuses.[73] In contrast, other groups of women have achieved a limited role as members of the political elite. Many of them are middle-class feminist professionals, academics, and party activists who pressed gender-based demands of a more strategic nature and chose "integration." But the return to competitive party politics can also lead to a fracturing of women's movements along party lines, as sectarianism and the attempts by parties to control women's organizations spread.

The experiences of Argentina, Chile, and Brazil exhibit differences as well as similarities in terms of the impact on gender relations. Women's movements played an important role in the early stages of transition in all the countries. In Brazil the longer period of transition and the greater space for organization appear to have allowed women a greater impact on transition politics than was the case in Argentina. There the military's control of society and the rapidity of the transition seem to have militated against women's groups gaining significant influence. Thus, the differences in the nature of the transitions led to different interactions between the various women's movements and the state and political parties, particularly in the latter phases and after the return to civilian rule. Institutional democratization, however, has not made it easy for women to become active in the reconstituted conventional politics, and the reinstitution of political rights has not been accompanied by a widening of social rights.[74] Indeed, some women's movements have become increasingly marginal as the process of transition has continued. But even if the longer-term prospects appear bleak for women in political, social, and economic terms in the postdictatorial period, authoritarianism did leave some space for women's movements. As a result, gender issues have been

[72] See Christian Anglade and Carlos Fortin, "Accumulation, Adjustment and the Autonomy of the State in Latin America," in Anglade and Fortin, eds., *The State and Capital Accumulation in Latin America*, vol. 2 (London: Macmillan, 1992).

[73] See Brian Loveman, "Mision Cumplida? Civil Military Relations and the Chilean Political Transition," *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs* 33 (Autumn 1991).

[74] For a discussion of democratization in terms of rights, see Teresa Caldeira, "Justice and Individual Rights: Challenges for Women's Movements and Democratization in Brazil" (Paper delivered at the Conference on Women and the Transition from Authoritarian Rule in Latin America and Eastern Europe, Berkeley, December 1992).

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placed on the political agenda to varying degrees. Before drawing any conclusions, it is necessary to look at the same questions in the very different context of Eastern Europe.

Transition Politics in Central and Eastern Europe

In many cases, the process of transition in Central and Eastern Europe has been much more rapid and fundamental in its scope than anything that has occurred in Latin America. Countries such as Poland and Czechoslovakia have moved from a form of totalitarianism, not just to a new type of political system, but also to a profoundly different economic and social system. Not only has the political and ideological dominance of the Communist Party been replaced by multiparty systems, but the command economy, too, is being dismantled and the free market substituted. Thus, it is not possible to examine the political changes in isolation from the simultaneous economic liberalization. In addition, both nationalism and external factors have had a profound impact in Central and Eastern Europe.[75] Indeed, the Soviet Union's loss of will to maintain an empire opened the way to the breakup of the Eastern bloc. This makes the Central European experience different from that of both Latin America and the Soviet Union, where the impetus for transition was more internally created and came from above. Despite these important differences, there have already been some attempts to analyze the experiences of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in a comparative framework, often on the basis of the work of the democratization theorists.[76]

There were no appreciable women's movements active in the processes of transition in any of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Why was this so? To understand the constraints on women organizing, the role of women's movements in the transition in Eastern Europe, and the impact of the transition on gender relations requires some discussion of the role of women under the old system. The communist governments were officially committed to equality between the sexes; indeed, they declared the "woman question" to be solved with the emancipation of

[75] See Adam Przeworski, "The 'East' Becomes the 'South'"? The Autumn of the People and the Future of Eastern Europe," *PS* 24 (March 1991), 21.

[76] See, e.g., Russell Bova, "Political Dynamics of the Post-Communist Transition: A Comparative Perspective," *World Politics* 44 (October 1991); Giuseppe Di Palma, "Legitimation from the Top to Civil Society: Politico-Cultural Change in Eastern Europe," *World Politics* 44 (October 1991); Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Joan M. Nelson, "The Politics of Economic Transformation: Is Third World Experience Relevant in Eastern Europe?" *World Politics* 45 (April 1993).

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women under socialism. Following Marx's and Lenin's analysis of women's oppression, governments argued that women would be liberated through their incorporation into the labor market.[77] By 1980 women made up about 50 percent of the workforce in Central and Eastern Europe, but they were concentrated in low-paid, low-status, and gender-segregated occupations. This economistic analysis of the subordination of women did nothing to change men's roles and left family and gender relations within the private sphere untouched. Therefore, despite some important legal gains such as divorce legislation that were instituted as part of the package of what Dölling has termed "patriarchal-paternalistic policies," women were faced with a double (if not triple, if one counts attending meetings and being active in the public sphere) productive and reproductive burden in societies that gave little priority to providing the population with consumer goods.[78] As Einhorn has argued, the rights that women enjoyed in these societies were "given" rather than won through struggle and therefore were taken for granted.[79] In the face of "emancipation from above," which made entering the labor market almost obligatory for women, the family and the private sphere were often seen as a haven from the demands and interference of the state and a site of resistance, a place of autonomy and creativity in the absence of a full-fledged civil society.

The control that the Communist parties exercised over the political systems extended into civil society and further constrained the emergence of women's movements. Few autonomous organizations were allowed and other institutions of civil society such as the church were seriously restricted in their activities. No independent women's organizations were tolerated, and those women's organizations that did exist were essentially part of the Communist Party apparatus. Indeed, it has been claimed that a large number of women's organizations that had flourished in the interwar period in countries such as Poland were suppressed when the communists came to power.[80] Hence, claims of equality and quota systems that gave women considerable numerical representation were often important for symbolic purposes only (such women were often known as "milkmaid" politicians)—there were very few

[77] There are many analyses of women under socialism. See, e.g., Sharon L. Wolchik and Alfred G. Meyer, eds., *Women, State, and Party in Eastern Europe* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1985); Sonia Kruks, Rayna Rapp, and Marilyn Young, eds., *Promissory Notes: Women in the Transition to Socialism* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1989).

[78] See Irene Dölling, "Between Hope and Helplessness: Women in the GDR after the 'Turning Point,'" *Feminist Review* 39 (Winter 1991).

[79] See Barbara Einhorn, "Where Have All the Women Gone? Women and the Women's Movement in East Central Europe," *Feminist Review* 39 (Winter 1991).

[80] See Malgorzata Fuszara, "Legal Regulation of Abortion in Poland," *Signs* 17 (Autumn 1991), 128.

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women in the top decision-making ranks of the party.[81] While women made up 35 percent of ordinary members of the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED) in the GDR, women comprised only 13 percent of central committee members in 1986, and no woman ever entered the politburo.[82]

Despite the attempts of the Communist parties to minimize dissent, opposition to the regimes did emerge prior to the late 1980s and women were active within it. Barbara Jancar has analyzed the role of women in two very different opposition movements, Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia and Solidarity in Poland in the 1970s: the former was made up predominantly of intellectuals and writers, and the latter was a mass movement of both workers and intellectuals. According to Jancar, despite the very different character of both movements, "women in the opposition appear more marginal to the organizational structure of the opposition movements, with visibility in leadership depending on male endorsement."[83] Jancar also notes that women were less likely than men to get elected to leadership positions. Although they constituted about half the rank-and-file members of Solidarity, women made up only 7 percent of the delegates attending the first Solidarity conference in 1981.

None of the women involved saw themselves as feminists, however. Rather, as Jancar notes, they saw themselves as protesting about social and human rights issues. Hence, among the women active in the opposition movements, few organized primarily as women or as feminists around gender issues. There are some notable exceptions to this. In 1979 an independent feminist group in Leningrad published a samizdat, *The Almanac: Women and Russia*, but the group was soon accused of producing anti-Soviet propaganda and forced to disband. Perhaps more successful was the women's peace movement that emerged in East Germany in 1982. These were exceptions, however; in the fifteen years up to 1985 there was in general no widespread emergence of feminist organizations.[84]

Although mass opposition movements were prevented from emerging in most of the Soviet bloc until the end of the 1980s, there was nonetheless a growing perception that these societies were in the throes of eco-

[81] For a discussion of this process in Poland, see R. Siemienska, "Polish Women and Polish Politics since World War II," *Journal of Women's History* 3 (Spring 1991).

[82] Barbara Einhorn, "Emancipated Women or Hardworking Mums? Women in the Former German Democratic Republic," in Chris Corrin, ed., *Superwoman and the Double Burden* (London: Scarlet Press, 1992).

[83] Barbara J. Jancar, "Women in the Opposition in Poland and Czechoslovakia in the 1970s," in Wolchik and Meyer (fn. 77).

[84] See Maxine Molyneux, "Marxism, Feminism and the Demise of the Soviet Model," in Rebecca Grant and Kathleen Newland, eds., *Gender and International Relations* (Milton Keynes, England: Open University Press, 1991).

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nomic and social crisis. This had a number of consequences, not least being the adoption of perestroika and glasnost in the Soviet Union and the subsequent pressure placed on the Eastern bloc as a whole to liberalize.[85] The woman question was also reopened in the Soviet Union in hopes of solving more general problems.[86] Rising rates of alcoholism, divorce, and abortion and the falling birthrate were attributed in part to a crisis in family life, and in much of Eastern Europe measures were introduced to make it easier for women to spend longer periods at home with children and to strengthen the family. In addition, Gorbachev lamented the absence of women at the top of the party hierarchy, and attempts were made to revive the women's councils in the Soviet Union.[87] Despite this and the liberalization associated with glasnost, few feminist groups were among the large number of unofficial groups that emerged in the late 1980s as part of the "resurrection of civil society."[88]

Despite the presence of large numbers of women in the demonstrations, the lack of feminist and women's groups organizing in the late 1980s meant that women were not in a good position to influence the state and the newly active political parties during the very rapid collapse of the old order that has taken place in much of Eastern Europe.[89] Women's movements therefore never played a significant role in bringing about the transition, nor were they poised to play an active role in the postcommunist period. This does not mean that the transition and subsequent events have not had a huge impact on gender relations.

What, then, are the outcomes of democratization? Viewed from a narrow institutional perspective, it can be seen that the political changes have had several implications for women. Overall, the crude numerical role of women in institutional politics has been reduced. First, the elimination of quota systems has led to a huge decline in the number of women elected to representative bodies. Across the region as a whole, this had led to a decline from an average of 33 percent to about 10 percent, often with further falls where second elections have been held. This masks quite wide discrepancies between countries. In mid-1990 women constituted only 3.5 percent of elected representatives in Romania, 8.6

[85] For a discussion of this process, see Stephen White, *Gorbachev in Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

[86] Mary Buckley, "The 'Women Question' in the Contemporary Soviet Union," in Kruks, Rapp, and Young (fn. 77).

[87] Carol Nechemias, "The Prospects for a Soviet Women's Movement: Opportunities and Obstacles," in Judith B. Sedaitis and Jim Butterfield, eds., *Perestroika from Below: Social Movements in the Soviet Union* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991).

[88] For a description of the groups that did exist then, see Laurie Essig and Tatiana Mamonova, "Perestroika for Women," in Sedaitis and Butterfield (fn. 87), 107.

[89] See, e.g., Yudit Kiss, "Women and the Second 'No': Women in Hungary," *Feminist Review* 39 (Winter 1991).

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percent in Czechoslovakia, 7 percent in Hungary, and 13.5 percent in Poland. The largest drop has occurred in Romania (and Albania), and the smallest in Poland. There are also important variations between different types of parties. With the exception of Romania, the former Communist parties often tend to have relatively high numbers of women representatives; for example, women constitute 15.1 percent of the elected members of the Hungarian Socialist Party, as they do some of the smaller issue-based parties such as the Romanian Ecology Party. By contrast, some the more right-wing and nationalist parties tend to have fewer women members.[90] There is also evidence from Poland and Hungary that more women are active in local politics.

In addition, recent opinion polls in the former Soviet Union have shown that "being a man" is considered a desirable characteristic by many voters, making it hard for women to get elected. Although there are limited numbers of women in high office, it can be argued that those women who are involved in politics in the postcommunist period have more genuine influence than women in top positions had under communist regimes. However, on the whole it is the men and not the women who have moved from the dissident opposition groups into high-ranking office in the public sphere in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Slovenia, leading Peggy Watson to argue that Eastern Europe is witnessing the rise of masculinism and the political empowerment of men in the public sphere and civil society.[91]

Second, there is evidence that even on the occasions where women have tried to influence the outcome of the transition in the formal arena, they have met with resistance. The most concerted attempt to do this took place in the GDR in December 1989, after the Berlin Wall had come down, with the establishment of the UFV, the Independent Women's Organization.[92] Ina Merkel, a founder of the UFV, described how the women hurriedly formed an organization in order to get some representation on the roundtable then being set up. Even then, the host, an official of the Lutheran church, argued that if they let women in they might have to let in the pet breeders associations, too![93] The women managed to gain seats at the roundtable but then found it difficult to make themselves heard.[94]

[90] For figures, see Mira Janova and Mariette Sineau, "Women's Participation in Political Power in Europe: An Essay in East-West Comparision," *Women's Studies International Forum* 15, no. 1 (1992).

[91] See Einhorn (fn. 79), 17; and Peggy Watson, "The Rise of Masculinism in Eastern Europe," *New Left Review* 198 (March–April 1993).

[92] For a discussion of this, see Dorothy J. Rosenberg, "Shock Therapy: GDR Women in Transition from a Socialist Welfare State to a Social Market Economy," *Signs* 17 (Autumn 1991), 140.

[93] Unpublished interview by Patricia Harbord with Ina Merkel, April 5, 1990.

[94] For a discussion of this whole episode, see B. Schaeffer-Hegel, "Makers and Victims of Unification: German Women and the Two Germanies," *Women's Studies International Forum* 15, no. 1 (1992).

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The political parties have certainly not felt it necessary to court women voters by advocating policies seen as furthering strategic gender interests as part of a feminist agenda. The opposite, if anything, is the case. Some of the strongest resistance to ideas associated with feminism came from Civic Forum.[95] The only mention of women in its initial manifesto was in the section on social policy, which read as follows: "A differentiation of incomes will gradually help to reduce the disproportionate economic activity of women, a rehabilitation of the family and the creation of better conditions for raising children."[96] Many male candidates in the 1989 Soviet elections were campaigning for "a return of women to their maternal duties."[97]

If organized women's movements have not had much impact on the new political systems or policy agendas to further women's practical or strategic interests, what has been the impact of the changes on gender relations? To answer this question it is necessary to broaden the notion of democratization and examine social and economic equality and the distribution of power within society. It can then be seen that changes introduced so far have important and often negative implications for gender relations.[98] The search for new values to replace those associated with the discredited communist system has led to a resurgence of the "old values" of family, God, and nationalism.[99] Therefore, policies enacted to reinforce these have an important impact on women. Perhaps the clearest example of this is the resurgence of the power of the Roman Catholic church and, despite a lack of public support for such measures, the concomitant attacks on abortion rights, particularly in Poland but also in Hungary.[100] A long-running dispute over abortion rights has also occurred in the reunified Germany. This has been accompanied by widespread encouragement of women to return to the home. National and ethnic identities, with their particular vision of women's roles, are likely to remain key determinants in political events in Central and Eastern Europe for the foreseeable future. The resurgence of "traditional" values is in some ways complemented by the economic changes taking place.

Market liberalization is proceeding in much of Eastern Europe, particularly Poland. Included in the rollback of the state is much state pro-

[95] See Einhorn (fn. 79), 29.

[96] Quoted in Mita Castle, "Our Woman in Prague," *Catalyst* 4 (July–September 1990).

[97] See Cynthia Cockburn, "Second among Equals," *Marxism Today* (July 1989).

[98] See, e.g., Barbara Einhorn, *Cinderella Goes to Market: Gender, Citizenship and the Women's Movement in Eastern Europe* (London: Verso, 1993).

[99] Barbara Einhorn, "Women in Eastern Europe" (Paper delivered at the British Sociological Association/Political Studies Association conference on Women and Citizenship, London, February 1991).

[100] See Jacqueline Heinen, "Polish Democracy Is a Masculine Democracy," *Women's Studies International Forum* 15, no. 1 (1992); and Fuszara (fn. 80).

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vision of child care.[101] The removal or reduction of food subsidies and the high rates of inflation hit women hard in their roles as household managers and providers. Enterprises are being privatized or simply going bankrupt, and there is evidence that women form a high and in some places disproportionate number of the unemployed in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania, as textile factories and other employers of women go out of business and as state bureaucracies are drastically reduced.[102] However, women are already active in the informal sector in Hungary, and there is speculation that perhaps with the expansion of consumption in the restructured economies of the future, new "women's" jobs might be created in a burgeoning service sector.[103] Another result of the new economic and social liberalization, perhaps more a reflection of Westernization than of a return to "traditional values," is the development of a sex industry. In what was Czechoslovakia, for example, sex shows and pornography are now readily available on the streets, and in Hungary, a country with a population of ten million, an estimated one million copies of pornographic magazines are produced each month.[104] Alongside increasing overall levels of crime, there is also evidence of a rising incidence of rape and violence against women in many parts of Central and Eastern Europe.[105]

So far therefore women's movements have not played a significant role in the destruction of the old communist order, nor have they influenced the policies of the new governments, either in terms of numerical representation or policies. There are several explanations for why this is so. The answer lies in part in the nature of the previous regimes. Because rights had been granted from above, women had no tradition of grassroots activism—of struggling to achieve or defend rights—on which to fall back. Feminism and notions of women's emancipation are now associated with the discredited old order, as Maxine Molyneux argues: "Ironically it seemed that socialist state policy on women, which had not achieved their emancipation, succeeded instead in alienating the population from any serious commitment to a feminist programme."[106] The

[101] Much of the new literature discusses the impact of these changes, particularly in the former GDR. See, e.g., Hanna Behrend, "Women Catapulted into a Different Social Order: Women in East Germany," *Women's History Review* 1, no. 1 (1992); and Marina Beyer, "The Situation of East German Women in Post-Unification Germany," *Women's Studies International Forum* 15, no. 1 (1992).

[102] For figures, see Watson (fn. 91), 78.

[103] See Julia Szalai, "Women and Democratization: Some Notes on Recent Trends in Hungary" (Paper delivered at the Conference on Women and the Transition from Authoritarian Rule in Latin America and Eastern Europe, Berkeley, December 1992). For an analysis that disagrees with this argument, see Ruth Pearson, "Questioning Perestroika: A Socialist Feminist Interrogation," *Feminist Review* 39 (Winter 1991).

[104] Kiss (fn. 89), 51.

[105] See figures published in the *Guardian*, January 26, 1993, p. 8.

[106] Molyneux, "The 'Woman Question' in the Age of Perestroika," *New Left Review* 183

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small group of active Russian feminists must find new language not tainted by the old order.[107] This association of feminism with the old order, combined with the control over civil society exerted by the old regime for so many years, which eliminated almost all political space, has clearly helped to inhibit the growth of significant feminist movements or large-scale women's movements organizing around practical gender interests. However, there is evidence that in Poland, Hungary, and what was Czechoslovakia there are now emerging small-scale women's organizations that do not call themselves feminist, as well as small feminist groupings, comprised mainly of academics and intellectuals.

The speed of the transition in most of Central and Eastern Europe, spurred on as it was by outside events, has also worked against the emergence of organized women's movements. It is too early to speculate whether those countries experiencing longer, more drawn-out processes of liberalization, such as Poland and Hungary, will exhibit differences in this respect or whether the picture will be significantly different in the so-called southern tier, that is, Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania. The general trends have also been exacerbated by the domination by men of much of the already existing opposition, which often focused on narrow political rights rather than on social and economic rights. There is perhaps more room for optimism in the Russian Republic.[108] Evidence of this can be seen in the submission by some feminist academics of a policy document to the Supreme Soviet in 1990 and the Dubna Women's Forum held in March 1991.[109] The more drawn-out nature of the transition in the Russian Republic, if that is what it turns out to be, may allow autonomous women's movements more time to organize, gain representation, and influence the policy agenda, despite the forces arrayed against them.[110] So far, however, democratization has not brought increased political representation for women and indeed has coincided with a reduction in social and economic rights for the majority of women.

(September–October 1990), 53.

[107] Seminar given by Anastasya Posadskaya, "Women and Perestroika," Manchester, September 1990.

[108] See Valentina Konstantinova, "The Women's Movement in the USSR: A Myth or a Real Challenge," in Shirin Rai, Hilary Pilkington, and Anne Phizacklea, eds., *Women in the Face of Change: The Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China* (London: Routledge, 1992).

[109] "Concept of Government Program for the Improvement of the Position of Women and the Family and the Protection of Mother and Child" (Manuscript, Moscow, 1990).

[110] See Mary Buckley's preliminary discussion of the development of women's organizations in the former USSR in "Gender and Reform," in Catherine Merrivale and Chris Ward, eds., *Perestroika: The Historical Perspective* (London: Longman, 1991).

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Conclusions

A gendered analysis of democratization gives a fuller understanding of the processes involved and their impact on gender relations, whereas the orthodox work on democratization simply cannot provide this, due to its limited definitions of democracy and virtual exclusion of those activities in which women play an important role. The narrow focus on institutional democratization and the (re)establishment of political rights favored by analysts such as Huntington, who use an "elitist" perspective on democracy, cannot help the analysis of the relationship between gender relations and transitions. Also needed is a wider analysis that considers social movements and civil society, as well as a notion of democratization that includes social and economic rights in addition to political ones.

A preliminary analysis of the role of women in transition politics has demonstrated that in some contexts women's movements have played a significant role in bringing about the transition. Any explanation of why women's movements appear in some contexts and not in others must take account of important external factors, such as the relationship of state and civil society. In Latin America the absence of conventional politics under authoritarian regimes gave different groups of women a certain space from which to press both practical and strategic gender-based demands. Despite repression, heterogeneous women's movements were able to emerge and play an important short- and medium-term role in the transition—in contrast to the arguments of the democratization theorists. Women's movements were therefore among the first protesters to play a significant part in the resurrection of civil society and the initial breakdown of authoritarian regimes. The Catholic church, in particular, aided this process.

In Central and Eastern Europe several factors worked against the emergence of women's movements organizing around either strategic or practical gender interests. The more concerted suppression of civil society by the state meant that the same degree of political space did not exist in Eastern Europe. The church has also played very different roles in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Only parts of the Lutheran church in the GDR allowed women's groups, such as lesbians, to operate under its auspices. However, while the Catholic church in Central and Eastern Europe is much more clearly associated with the return to "traditional" values, it must be remembered that in most of Latin America the support of the church has important limits. Because of the influence of Catholicism, feminist groups have felt that some measures, such as the decriminalization of abortion, are an almost impossible

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dream. In addition, the emergence of autonomous women's movements in Central and Eastern Europe was hampered by the history of rights granted from above and the apparent identification of feminism with the old order rather than as an oppositional movement. So far, the speed of much of the transition and the role of external catalysts also appear to have worked against the development of women's movements.

Even in Latin America—despite the role that women played in transition politics—it is clear that participation, particularly in the early stages of the transition, does not guarantee any particular role in the outcome. Indeed, the development of the process itself may limit their ability to influence subsequent events. From a narrow focus on instrumental politics, there is evidence that women find it hard to convert their activities into political representation once conventional political activity resumes. Relatively few women are active in institutional politics, partly because democratization has not been accompanied by moves toward the wider social and economic equality that would enable women to participate in greater numbers. Indeed, looking at more broadly defined political activity, it is clear that some women's movements, particularly popular movements organizing around practical gender interests, have become increasingly marginal as the transition continues. At the same time, some, often middle-class, feminists do appear to have gained limited entrée to the political elite and some influence during the period of consolidation. Again, the speed of the transition appears to be a factor: a slow transition allows women's movements more opportunities to organize and influence outcomes, as, for example, in the Brazilian context. But Safa argues that, despite the problems, the emergence of the women's movements represents the breakdown of the traditional divisions between the public and the private and that fundamental changes in gender relations are therefore taking place in Latin America.[111]

It is perhaps too early to make judgments about the processes of change in Eastern Europe and their impact on gender relations, but several trends are clear. In narrow institutional terms the restoration of political rights has led to a "masculinization" of the public sphere and a decline in the numerical representation of women in institutional politics. The wider changes associated with democratization, such as market liberalization and the assertion of "traditional" values of God, family, and nation, often have a negative impact on women, particularly in terms of their strategic gender interests. This is particularly marked in the sphere of reproductive rights, child care, and women's role in the private sphere.

[111] Safa (fn. 47), 355.

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Support for these changes is in part a reaction to emancipation from above, the double (if not triple) burden, and anything associated with the old order. Unlike Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe have not yet seen the emergence of mass movements organized around consumption issues that have allowed the politicization of women's domestic roles. But perhaps the erosion of social and economic rights such as abortion, which were taken for granted for so long, and widespread disillusionment with the harsh social and economic implications of market liberalization will catalyze future mass protest movements around both practical and strategic gender interests. Some women's organizations are emerging, and it appears that the attack on abortion rights has produced a wide coalition opposing it and is proving a spur to nascent feminist movements in Poland and in other Eastern European countries.[112] Indeed, Watson believes that "the development of feminism in Eastern Europe is simply a matter of time."[113]

As the very different cases of Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe have demonstrated, a narrow political focus is entirely insufficient for any meaningful analysis of the relationship between gender relations and democratization. Social and economic dimensions of citizenship and democracy must also be considered. In none of the cases considered above, for example, has institutional democratization extended to the democratization of relations between men and women.

[112] See Hanna Jankowska, "Abortion, Church and Politics in Poland," *Feminist Review* 39 (Winter 1991), 176.

[113] Watson (fn. 91), 82.

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ORGANIZATIONAL POLITICS AND CHANGE IN SOVIET MILITARY POLICY

By STUART J. KAUFMAN*

AS the attempted coup of 1991 dramatically illustrates, civil-military relations in Russia matter. For a decade before the coup attempt, scholars had studied civil-military relations in the Soviet Union by asking how the military participated in politics, rather than how civilians controlled the military.[1] While this approach turns out to be fruitful for explaining the coup attempt,[2] it neglects an important issue: civilian control over military policy. The issue matters because whoever controls military policy can profoundly affect Russian (or in the past, Soviet) foreign relations. An offensive military strategy, for example, can provoke or alarm one's neighbors and thereby undermine attempts to establish cooperative relations.[3] Because military bureaucracies often have an interest in offensive military strategies—as the Soviet military did and as parts of Russia's military do—the ability of civilian leaders to control military strategy may be essential for establishing cooperative relations with neighboring countries.

The key questions addressed in this article are (1) how and (2) under what circumstances military policy can be changed to ensure its integration with a state's overall foreign policy. To the second question—when military policy is integrated with foreign policy—Barry Posen suggests two alternative theoretical answers. The first is that policies tend not to be integrated: Posen's "organization theory" model suggests that militaries tend to resist innovation out of bureaucratic inertia, even if the

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[1] This approach was first proposed by Timothy Colton. See Colton, *Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979).

[2] See, e.g., John W. R. Lepingwell, "Soviet Civil-Military Relations and the August Coup," *World Politics* 44 (July 1992); and Stephen M. Meyer, "How the Threat (and the Coup) Collapsed: The Politicization of the Soviet Military," *International Security* 16 (Winter 1991–92).

[3] For an excellent theoretical discussion of this point, see Charles L. Glaser, "Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models," *World Politics* 44 (July 1992).

World Politics 46 (April 1994), 355–82

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result is poorly integrated policy.[4] Posen's second explanation, based on neorealist international relations theory, suggests that sometimes the international environment forces change in military policy. Posen's starting point is that one way states can balance against external threats is by increasing their own power, for example, by improving strategy.[5] Therefore, according to Posen, a balance-of-power model suggests that when states face serious external threats (or when they are contemplating aggression), they tend to adjust their military policy to make sure their grand strategy is integrated and effective.[6]

The question of *how* leaders can change military policy generates another debate. Posen suggests that when the balance-of-power model applies—when a state is under serious threat or when it is contemplating aggression—civilian leaders intervene in military policy to force the military to jettison obsolete strategies and develop new and better ones that are well integrated into the state's grand strategy. A major competing view suggested by Stephen Peter Rosen holds that civilian intervention alone cannot cause real innovation in military strategy. If a military service is to implement a "new way of war," the service or branch chief must first alter the service's organizational structure to create career incentives for his subordinates to carry out the innovation.[7] Without such change from within, Rosen suggests, civilian intervention cannot be effective.

Studies of Soviet military policy before Gorbachev produce a parallel but separate debate on these issues. On one side are the military-mission theorists, who argue that Soviet military strategy was set by the military leadership but was kept in line with Soviet grand strategy. Like Posen's balance-of-power model, the military-mission model contends that policy was integrated; like Rosen's model, it locates the source of change in operational policy in the military bureaucracy. On the other side of this debate is the organizational model, which asserts that Soviet military policy was the result of pulling and hauling among competing bureaucracies with divergent interests. This approach, which shares the key assumptions of Posen's organization theory model, suggests that Soviet national security policy may have been neither integrated nor innovative.

Because these debates parallel each other so closely, examining the models of Soviet military policy has the added benefit of providing a test for the competing general theories about how and when military poli-

[4] Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), 58.
[5] Kenneth Waltz makes the same point. See Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 118.
[6] Posen (fn. 4), 74–75.
[7] Rosen, *Winning the Next War* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991).

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cies change. The test in this study is how well the competing models explain a pair of puzzles in Soviet military policy under Brezhnev. The first puzzle concerns Soviet military strategy. During most of the Brezhnev era the Soviet plan in case of a European war was to launch a large conventional ground and air offensive against NATO forces in Western Europe. Although both civilian and military leaders preferred that any war remain a conventional one, their military strategy was, they knew, highly likely to provoke NATO into using nuclear weapons. Why did they choose such a self-defeating strategy?

The second puzzle, the Soviet decision to sign the Treaty on Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Systems, presents the opposite question. Throughout the 1960s Soviet military leaders insisted that an effective ABM defense was essential to their nuclear war-fighting strategy. Yet in 1972, at the behest of Soviet civilian leaders, the USSR agreed to strict ABM limits, and Soviet military strategy changed accordingly. Why were Soviet civilian leaders able to change military strategy on this issue while they failed on the other?

Brezhnev's Soviet Union is theoretically interesting because it presents at the same time an easy case and a hard case for the models hypothesizing innovation and integration. On the one hand, the Brezhnevist state—with its official ideology, cohesive leadership group with a clear leader, top-down bureaucratic controls, and a clear enemy—was a likely candidate to behave as a unitary rational actor, and indeed it claimed to be one. It should, therefore, have behaved as the balance-of-power model hypothesizes—innovating in strategy to keep up with changing doctrine. On the other hand, Brezhnev's rule was later appropriately described as an "era of stagnation" in which bureaucratism ran rampant. This combination of the prerequisites for innovation and an absence of significant change is intriguing.

This study asks two questions about the cases examined. First, which theory about Soviet military policy best explains the divergent outcomes? Second, what can be learned from the different outcomes about what it takes to achieve change in military doctrine? The next section of this article specifies the alternative models and proposes hypotheses based on each. The following two sections examine Soviet behavior in the two cases and evaluate the competing explanations of each case. The last two sections examine (1) the implications of the findings for theories of change in military policy and (2) the relevance of those conclusions for contemporary Russia.

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The Competing Models

MILITARY-MISSION MODEL

According to Posen's theory, the balance-of-power model should be applicable to the Soviet Union in the late 1960s and early 1970s.[8] One motivation for civilian intervention in military policy is fear, and Soviet civilian leaders in the late 1960s repeatedly told domestic and allied audiences that "it would be an enormous mistake to underestimate the danger of war."[9] Even as the Soviet fear of war diminished with progress in détente in the early 1970s, it never completely disappeared. Significantly, Soviet fears of war focused not only on possible Western aggression but also on the possibility of an accidental outbreak of war.[10] As Posen notes, Soviet isolation—especially in the wake of the Sino-Soviet split—further motivated the Soviet leadership to make sure military doctrine accorded with political priorities.[11]

Using the balance-of-power model to explain Soviet behavior is problematic, however. In order to make the model useful for explaining military doctrine, Posen smuggles in assumptions about state goals and priorities, such as whether a state desires conquest or the status quo and whether it is willing to fight a preventive war. Thus, there is not one balance-of-power model of Soviet military policy; rather, there are several, representing different views of Soviet aims and priorities.

The most prominent interpretation of Soviet military policy is the military-mission model.[12] In this view, Soviet military policy was founded on military doctrine—the basic assumptions of the *political* leadership about the nature and goals of a possible future war.[13] On the basis of the doctrine, the model suggests, the general staff formulated Soviet military

[8] Civilian incentives to alter military policy were even higher in the Khrushchev period (1954–64); as the model would predict, Khrushchev was infamous for his "interference" in strategic planning. See Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964). The current study focuses on the Brezhnev period because there is less agreement on the role of the civilian leadership in setting military policy in that period.

[9] Leonid Brezhnev, "For Strengthening the Solidarity of Communists, for a New Upswing in the Anti-Imperialist Struggle" (Speech to International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties, *Pravda*, June 8, 1969, trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* 21 [July 2, 1969]).

[10] William D. Jackson, "Soviet Images of the U.S. as Nuclear Adversary, 1969–1979," *World Politics* 33 (July 1981), 625.

[11] Posen (fn. 4), 75.

[12] Prominent works by military-mission theorists include Robert P. Berman and John C. Baker, *Soviet Strategic Forces: Requirements and Responses* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1984); David S. Yost, *Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense and the Western Alliance* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988); and Stephen M. Meyer, *Soviet Theater Nuclear Forces*, Adelphi Papers no. 187–88 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1984), pts. 1, 2.

[13] The Soviet use of the term "doctrine" was significantly different from Western definitions. In Western usage, doctrine refers to a strategic or tactical approach; in Soviet usage, it referred to fundamental issues of grand strategy.

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strategy.[14] Most military-mission theorists assume, often implicitly, a consensus of civilian and military leaders based on their shared experiences: Brezhnev, for example, had had military experience in World War II. As a result of this consensus, the thinking goes, the general staff could set military strategy and keep it in accord with doctrine without detailed civilian oversight.[15] This view differs, of course, from Posen's hypothesis that policy integration requires civilian intervention.[16] Both hypotheses will be tested against the evidence from the two cases.

According to the military-mission model, the content of Soviet military strategy changed in the mid-1960s: after that time Soviet military strategy dropped its assumption that any European war would be an all-out nuclear war and instead increasingly emphasized the possibility of a conventional or limited nuclear war.[17] According to the military-mission view, this change was a response to changes in NATO strategy that seemed to make such a conflict possible;[18] furthermore, Soviet military calculations suggested that it would be preferable. The military-mission model therefore incorporates Rosen's theory of change in military policy: innovators at the head of the Soviet military are presumed to have driven the shift in strategy.

That view of Soviet strategy has not gone unchallenged. Some theorists, promoting what might be called the "nuclear victory model," have argued that Soviet military strategy never really shifted from a focus on nuclear war.[19] Evidence that came to light in the late 1980s discredited

[14] On the role of the general staff, see Kenneth Currie, "Soviet General Staff's New Role," *Problems of Communism* 33 (March–April 1984); and Stephen M. Meyer, "Civilian and Military Influence in Managing the Arms Race in the U.S.S.R.," in Robert J. Art, Vincent Davis, and Samuel P. Huntington, eds., *Reorganizing America's Defense* (London: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985).

[15] In principle, most military-mission theorists argue that organizational constraints are included in the military-mission model. In practice, however, consideration of these organizational constraints is usually limited to recognition of Soviet technological limitations. See, e.g., Berman and Baker (fn. 12).

[16] Raymond Garthoff suggests a model of the Soviet military policy process very similar to the process of the balance-of-power model, with its emphasis on the role of the political leadership in policy change and on the importance of foreign developments as the motivation for such policy change. See Raymond L. Garthoff, "Mutual Deterrence, Parity and Strategic Arms Limitation in Soviet Policy," in Derek Leebaert, ed., *Soviet Military Thinking* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1981). Garthoff's model is not discussed here because his interpretation of the content of Soviet strategy is incompatible with actual Soviet policy. For a complete discussion, see Stuart Kaufman, "The Politics of Soviet Strategic Defense: Political Strategies, Organizational Politics, and Soviet Strategic Thought" (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1991).

[17] Regarding the change in Soviet strategy, see John G. Hines, Phillip A. Petersen, and Notra Trulock III, "Soviet Military Theory from 1945–2000: Implications for NATO," *Washington Quarterly* 9 (Fall 1986); and Michael McGwire, *Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987).

[18] Kimberly Marten Zisk, "Soviet Reactions to Shifts in U.S. and NATO Military Doctrine in Europe: The Defense Policy Community and Innovation" (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1991).

[19] Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviets Think They Can Fight and Win a Nuclear War," *Commentary*, July 1977. Another prominent presentation of the nuclear victory model is William T. Lee and

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this view, however. It shows that even confidential Soviet sources, such as secret lectures from the Soviet General Staff Academy, expressed a clear preference for conventional over nuclear combat and a determination to plan for either eventuality.[20]

A balance-of-power model might suggest that the apparent contradictions in Soviet strategy constitute evidence of another element of Soviet policy—public diplomacy. Soviet spokesmen may have taken the public position that they were planning only for nuclear war in order to undermine NATO strategy and gain coercive leverage in diplomacy.[21] Discussion of their actual planning for conventional combat was usually kept quiet because it was less effective as propaganda. Any rhetoric from civilian leaders asserting the peaceful and defensive intentions of the Soviet Union (which might appear to contradict the offensive military strategy) can also be viewed as propaganda intended to prevent the adversary from being provoked by the aggressive military rhetoric.[22]

Military-mission theorists argue that the decision to sign the ABM treaty had to have been a military, and particularly a general staff, decision, made on military-technical grounds. The general staff, they argue, was delegated the authority to accept or reject the ABM treaty on the basis of the answer to the technical question: would ABMs help or hinder execution of the Soviet strategic plan? Since the Soviets signed the treaty, the military-mission argument obviously must be that Soviet military leaders calculated that signing the ABM treaty would enhance their strategic position.[23]

The Organizational Model

According to the organizational model, the behavior of Soviet military services was aimed primarily at defending their organizational interests.[24] Most importantly, the model suggests, military services were concerned

Richard F. Starr, *Soviet Military Policy since World War II* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1986). A nuclear victory model of Soviet strategic defense is Michael J. Deane, *Strategic Defense in Soviet Strategy* (Miami, Fla.: Advanced International Studies Institute, 1980).

[20] Hines, Petersen, and Trulock (fn. 17) remains the best summary of that evidence. The General Staff Academy lectures are published in Ghulam Dastagir Wardak, *The Voroshilov Lectures*, vol. 1, ed. Graham Hall Turbiville, Jr. (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1989).

[21] See Robert Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 234–35; and George H. Quester, "On the Identification of Real and Pretended Communist Military Doctrine," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 10 (June 1966), 172–79.

[22] For an argument that war prevention was an important element in Soviet foreign policy, see David Holloway, "Military Power and Political Purpose in Soviet Policy," *Daedalus* 109 (Fall 1980).

[23] See, e.g., Berman and Baker (fn. 12), 149–50.

[24] Some classic discussions of organization theory include Graham T. Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *American Political Science Review* 63 (September 1969); Richard Cyert and James March, *A Behavioral Theory of the Firm* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963); and James March and Herbert Simon, *Organizations* (New York: John Wiley, 1958). Some studies that emphasize the organizational explanation of Soviet military policy are Edward L. Warner III, *The*

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with protecting their "essential cores"—their most valued missions and the plans and forces for carrying out those missions.[25] To this end the services pursued other goals as well, for example, increased budget share, improved morale, or increased autonomy: budget share lets the services procure and maintain the forces necessary to carry out essential core missions; high morale is important for carrying out any function effectively; and autonomy makes it easier to protect essential core plans and procedures.

The key implication of this model is that when organizational interests differed from the dictates of military doctrine or strategy, the organizations generally protected their own interests, rather than following externally imposed requirements. Thus, military leaders devised military strategy in accordance with their organizational interests, regardless of any contrary doctrinal requirements set by their civilian superiors. As Posen explains, military organizations usually have an interest in offensive military strategies.[26] Since civilians are likely to have different interests, the likely result is (using the Soviet terms) poorly integrated military strategy and doctrine.

In broad terms, this model suggests that while the Soviet general staff was nominally in charge of the services, in practice it acted more as a broker among the services than as a dictator to them. Knowing that any attack on the services' essential core missions and capabilities would have entailed high costs in declining morale and reduced efficiency, general staff leaders usually felt obligated to protect those vital service interests. The decision-making process would therefore have resembled the process so vividly depicted for the American military by Samuel Huntington, a process of pursuing consensus amid conflicting service interests.[27]

Also as in the American system, political leaders would not have won political battles against their generals on issues of doctrine or strategy unless they had the necessary political support and bureaucratic tools.

Military in Contemporary Soviet Politics (New York: Praeger, 1977); Samuel B. Payne, *The Soviet Union and* SALT (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1980); and Dale Herspring, *The Soviet High Command, 1967–89: Personalities and Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).

[25] The "essential core" of an organization is defined as the plans, procedures, and capabilities that are part of both the "organizational essence" and the "technical core," so generalizations about both are valid concerning the "essential core." On organizational essence, see Morton H. Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1974). Technical core is discussed in James D. Thompson, *Organizations in Action* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967). For further elaboration, see Kaufman (fn. 16), chap. 3.

[26] Posen (fn. 4), 47–50.

[27] Huntington, *The Common Defense* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961). For a roughly analogous discussion of Soviet military policy, see Jack Snyder, "The Gorbachev Revolution: A Waning of Soviet Expansionism?" *International Security* 12 (Winter 1987–88).

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The key bureaucratic tool is what might be called a *policy handle*: a way to redefine the nature of a policy decision and force change on a subordinate organization by removing the policy decision from the organization's exclusive area of expertise. The redefinition of the issue legitimizes the sustained outside pressure that organization theorists suggest operates as a route to innovation.[28] More significantly, it allows leaders to institutionalize supervision of the policy by another organization, which enables them to monitor policy implementation and ensure that the change takes place. As James Q. Wilson argues, the ability to monitor responsiveness effectively is necessary to make change happen.[29]

Budgets sometimes act as policy handles for changing military policy: since budget decisions are based on economic and political as well as military factors, the military cannot claim sole expertise over military budget decisions. Hence, budgets fall within the authority of the civilian leadership, not the military; the decisions are handled by political bodies and monitored by budgeting organizations. Nevertheless, the budget is not always an effective policy handle. On military issues, it can be used to shape force structure by directing funds toward desired programs, but it cannot directly affect the military's plans for how to use the forces (that is, strategy). When an appropriate policy handle is available to civilian leaders, they can force change in military doctrine, as Posen's model suggests. When civilian leaders lack a policy handle, as the Soviets did on the issue of military strategy, then the implementation of doctrinal requirements needs a high-ranking innovator within the military organization, as Rosen's theory contends.

Use of a policy handle also requires a favorable political environment. Dennis Ross suggests that the Soviet polity under Brezhnev can be modeled as a "competitive oligarchy." The model's key principle is that decisions usually required unanimity, which typically resulted in lowest-common-denominator policies.[30] The coalition was maintained, according to this model, out of "the actors' fear of the alternative": open disagreement would have violated the legitimating myth of the leaders' "monolithic unity" and threatened the entire elite's most basic interest—the power to rule over a society most of whose interests they did not represent.

In order to function at all, such a decision-making system requires a leader. George Breslauer suggests that leadership was supplied by the general secretary, whose job was to act as an "artful synthesizer," bal-

[28] Anthony Downs, *Inside Bureaucracy* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), 200–201; and James Q. Wilson, *Bureaucracy* (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 224–25.

[29] Wilson (fn. 28), 225.

[30] Ross, "Coalition Maintenance in the Soviet Union," *World Politics* 32 (January 1980), 259–62.

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ancing competing interests and integrating them into policy decisions.[31] Thus, according to this model, the decision to force an innovation, for example, by signing the ABM treaty, required the construction of a bureaucratic coalition, with General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev probably playing a leading role in putting it together. That coalition would have been able to use the arms control process as an effective policy handle.

Model Summaries

The military-mission and balance-of-power models offer unitary rational-actor explanations of Soviet military policy that reinforce each other on most points. The main propositions of the models are:

1. Military doctrine as set by political leaders was the foundation of Soviet military policy. Military leaders set strategy in accordance with the requirements of doctrine. Military policy was therefore integrated.
2. According to the military-mission model, policy was integrated due to a civilian-military policy consensus; according to Posen's model of policy change, it was due to civilian involvement in setting military strategy.
3. The content of Soviet military doctrine and strategy after the mid-1960s was increasingly concerned with conventional and limited war. Civilian and military statements not compatible with doctrine or strategy were part of a separate policy of public diplomacy.
4. According to the military-mission model, the Soviets signed the ABM treaty because the top military leadership expected ABM limitations would be more of a help than a hindrance for Soviet strategy.

The assumptions and hypotheses of the organizational model of Soviet military policy can be summarized as follows:

1. Military leaders tried to design military strategy to protect the essential core missions of their institutions, even where those institutional interests conflicted with military doctrine as established by civilian leaders.
2. Since Politburo decisions were typically made by logrolling, organizations frequently succeeded in defying the requirements of higher policy (doctrine or strategy). Thus, doctrine and strategy were not always integrated.
3. The prerequisites for forcing policy integration are a bureaucratic coalition in favor of the policy change and an effective policy handle to enforce it. Both existed on the ABM issue, so ABM policy was integrated; neither existed on the military strategy issue, so strategy and doctrine were not integrated.

[31] Breslauer, *Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1982).

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The main question, and the one addressed next, is which model best explains what the Soviet Union actually did.

Changes in Military Doctrine and Strategy

The key question about Soviet military strategy and doctrine under Brezhnev is integration: was Soviet military strategy integrated with the doctrine (and grand strategy) established by political leaders? According to Marshal Andrei Grechko, Soviet defense minister from 1967 to 1974, the Politburo made all key decisions on military policy.[32] In practice, "the Politburo" in this case probably meant the core decision-making group for security policy—the Politburo members who were also members of the Defense Council.[33] In either case, the relevant issue is whether the Politburo's oversight was effective: did civilians succeed in ensuring that military strategy followed the doctrinal principles they set? If they did, Soviet military doctrine and strategy were "integrated," as the military-mission model suggests. But if instead Soviet military leaders devised strategy in accordance with their own bureaucratic interests, then the organizational model is more accurate.

There is substantial evidence that the military's strategy in the late 1960s and the 1970s did not follow the principles of military doctrine set by the Politburo. Instead, military leaders had their own assumptions—which sometimes contradicted doctrine set by the Politburo—on which they based military strategy. The most important civil-military disagreements concerned whether and how an East-West conflict could remain nonnuclear and what the Soviet Union's goals in such a war would be.

The split began in the late 1960s, when Politburo doctrine on the possibility of limited war shifted dramatically. The old line of the early 1960s was last authoritatively stated in 1966, at the Twenty-third Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). According to General Secretary Brezhnev's report, the Soviet Union and her allies would, if necessary, "deal a crushing blow to any aggressors."[34] Defense Minister Rodion Malinovskii's speech at the Congress amplified the message: "Should the imperialists try to unleash a war against the Soviet Union and the other Socialist states, there can

[32] Grechko, "Report by Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko, USSR Minister of Defense," *Krasnaia Zvezda*, March 28, 1973, trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* 25 (April 25, 1973).

[33] See, e.g., Dimitri K. Simes, "The Politics of Defense in the Soviet Union: Brezhnev's Era," in Jiri Valenta and William Potter, eds., *Soviet Decisionmaking for National Security* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1984), 77.

[34] Brezhnev, "Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the Twenty-third Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," *Pravda*, March 30, 1966, trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* 18 (April 13, 1966), 6.

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be no doubt that our blow will prove annihilating for the organizers of the war."[35] Since all Soviet enemies were "aggressors" in Soviet terms, these formulations assumed that any Soviet enemy would have to be "crushed" or "annihilated"; the policy, that is, left no room for limited war.

The political leadership began changing the line on limited war as early as 1967, when Brezhnev told East European leaders: "Starting in Europe, a new war can become thermonuclear and involve the whole world."[36] The implication was that although a European war *could* become a world nuclear war, it would not necessarily do so.[37] In the same year Soviet premier Aleksei Kosygin suggested the mission of the Soviet Armed Forces was "to call any instigator of war to order and to compel respect for the boundaries of our great homeland."[38] Clearly, "to compel respect" or "to call [an enemy] to order" can involve less than the complete destruction of that enemy. Some of those statements were obviously aimed at the military: for example, Brezhnev told military academy graduates in 1968 that the Soviet military could "deal a fitting rebuff [not necessarily a 'crushing rebuff'] to any aggressor."[39]

The logic of the new political line was that any future war had to be kept limited in order to avoid *nuclear* war—an explicit, high-priority Soviet goal. According to the CPSU program, "nuclear war CANNOT AND SHALL NOT SERVE AS A MEANS OF SETTLING INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES." Therefore, Brezhnev argued in 1967, "the struggle to prevent the threat of a new world war has now become one of the most important conditions for successfully fulfilling the tasks of building socialism and communism."[40]

Even before the shift in civilian views in 1967, military leaders had begun considering the possibility that an East-West war might begin as a conventional war.[41] Most of them flatly disagreed, however, that such a war could remain limited. The 1968 edition of Marshal V. D.

[35] Malinovskii, "Speech by Comrade R. Ya. Malinovskii," *Pravda*, April 3, 1966, trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* 18 (May 18, 1966), 12.

[36] Speech reprinted in Leonid I. Brezhnev, *Leninskim Kursom* (On a Leninist course) (Moscow: Politizdat, 1970), 2:9.

[37] This implication is noted by Herspring (fn. 24), 58.

[38] Aleksei N. Kosygin, "On a Leninist Course," *Pravda*, March 7, 1967, trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* 19 (March 29, 1967), 3.

[39] Brezhnev, "Loyalty to the Homeland, the Party and the People," *Pravda*, July 9, 1968, trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* 20 (July 31, 1968), 11.

[40] Both quotations are from A. S. Milovidov and V. G. Kozlov, eds., *The Philosophical Heritage of V. I. Lenin and Problems of Contemporary War*, trans. U.S. Air Force (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1972), 36–37; emphasis in translation.

[41] For good discussions of the shift in military thinking, see Hines, Petersen, and Trulock (fn. 17); and Zisk (fn. 18).

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Sokolovskii's influential book *Military Strategy* argued that "the acute class nature" of a "war between the socialist and imperialist camps" would "predetermine the extreme decisiveness of the political and military aims of both sides."[42] Further, he argued, "any armed conflict will inevitably escalate into a general nuclear war if the nuclear powers are drawn into this conflict."[43] Defense Minister Andrei Grechko agreed with this view, asserting in the party journal *Kommunist* as late as 1971 that "rocket-nuclear weapons *will be* decisive"—that a major war would certainly be an all-out nuclear war and that conventional operations would be limited to the actions of isolated small units.[44]

In the same month in which Grechko's article was published, Brezhnev's authoritative political report to the Twenty-fourth CPSU Congress officially announced the new, limited-war line. The report averred: "Our glorious armed forces are prepared to repel an enemy attack, no matter what its origin. Any possible aggressor knows that if there is an attempt at a nuclear missile attack on our country, the aggressor will receive an annihilating blow in return."[45] Again, the implication is that both means and ends can be limited: all attacks will be "repelled," but only a "nuclear missile attack" will trigger "an annihilating blow in return." Defense Minister Grechko acquiesced, enunciating a similar line to the Congress: "Our Armed Forces are always ready to punish an aggressor on any territory from which he might dare to violate the borders of our homeland."[46]

But Grechko's capitulation on the "crushing rebuff" formula did not cause Soviet military leaders to concede the real issue at stake—that the means and goals in a future war could realistically be kept limited. One 1972 text written by military officers, *Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army*, put it this way: "Because of this sharply pronounced class character [of an East-West war] the political and military aims of the sides at war will be decisive and the use of nuclear weapons will lend it an unprecedentedly destructive character."[47] Thus, even after Brezhnev affirmed the new, limited-war doctrine at the Twenty-fourth CPSU Congress, this text reiterated the old doctrine that any war would esca-

[42] Sokolovskii, ed., *Soviet Military Strategy*, 3d ed. (1968), trans. and ed. Harriett Fast Scott (London: Macdonald and Jane's, 1975), 187.

[43] Ibid., 195.

[44] Grechko, "KPSS i vooruzhennie sily," *Kommunist*, no. 4 (March 1971), 45–46; emphasis added.

[45] Brezhnev, "The Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the Twenty-fourth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," *Pravda*, March 31, 1971, trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* 23 (May 4, 1971), 5.

[46] Grechko, "Speech by Comrade A. A. Grechko, USSR Minister of Defense," *Pravda*, April 3, 1971, trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* 23 (May 18, 1971), 23.

[47] S. Tyushkevich and N. Sushko, eds., *Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972), 73, 116.

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late to a nuclear war with "decisive" goals—that is, an all-out nuclear war.

At first glance, the balance-of-power model seems sufficient to explain this behavior. The model suggests that an offensive declaratory strategy and force posture are useful in creating leverage for coercive diplomacy. This, according to David Finley, was precisely the Soviets' intention.[48] At the same time, regardless of their true beliefs, the Soviets had incentives to deny that war in Europe could be kept limited, in order to undermine NATO's Flexible Response strategy and to maximize the effect of deterrent threats against any use of force by NATO in Europe. Simultaneous insistence that Soviet goals were not aggressive may have been intended as reassurance aimed at avoiding war. Finally, if a conventional war had occurred in Europe, a lightning offensive might have offered the Soviets their best chance of victory in spite of the risks: as Michael MccGwire argues, a purely defensive strategy would have allowed NATO to mobilize its superior industrial capacity to overwhelm the Warsaw Pact in a long war.[49]

These arguments, though powerful, cannot fully explain Soviet policy. First, Soviet statements about their desire to avoid nuclear war, their offensive military strategy, and the unlikelihood of preventing escalation to nuclear war were all made to internal audiences, often in classified settings. These were all genuinely held views, not propaganda or public diplomacy. Second, to the extent that military strategy changed in the same direction as doctrine set by civilians, the strategy changed first. Thus, the process of civilian-led change hypothesized by Posen could not have occurred.

The most direct evidence about the offensive nature of Soviet operational plans comes from the archives of the East German army. According to Lothar Ruhl, the primary Warsaw Pact war plan until 1989 involved a five-pronged attack from East Germany and Czechoslovakia, with the objective of reaching the French Atlantic coast in fourteen days. Ruhl notes that as late as 1988, exercises showed that the East German army (certainly as a result of Soviet orders) was well prepared for offensive operations but totally unprepared—that is, having neither the training nor the engineering equipment—for defensive operations.[50] Obviously, the Warsaw Pact had a one-variant war plan that called for a decisive offensive against NATO. A look at the Soviet military

[48] Finley, "Conventional Arms in Soviet Foreign Policy," *World Politics* 33 (October 1980).
[49] MccGwire (fn. 17), 76.
[50] Ruhl, "Offensive Defence in the Warsaw Pact," *Survival* 33 (September–October 1991), 442–50.

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literature of the time corroborates that Soviet planners gave the lion's share of their attention to offensive strategy.

Regarding the likelihood that a conventional war in Europe would lead to nuclear use, the mid-1970s view of lecturers at the General Staff Academy is illustrated by their name for such a war: "War between Several Capitalist and Socialist Nations with the Use of Conventional Weapons and Subsequent Initiation of Limited Use of Nuclear Weapons." They ruled out limited aims: "The war will assume a decisive character by virtue of the intensified struggle to seize the strategic initiative, inflict massive losses on the enemy forces, and expand efforts continuously by moving their reserves from the depth."[51] In other words, these Soviet officers admitted that their plan of conduct for a future war would make it impossible to keep the war limited. And they fully expected that the result would be nuclear use by NATO: "At a crucial and decisive point, when the enemy is about to lose its territory," they stated, "the enemy will resort to using nuclear weapons."[52]

Soviet officers were aware of the dilemma posed by this strategy. Indeed, they conceded the politicians' point that the focus of Soviet policy should be "on preventing nuclear war."[53] Since Soviet military doctrine declared that a world nuclear war must be avoided and that a war in Europe need not escalate into one, the logical conclusion is that Soviet strategy ought to have been aimed at preventing such escalation. The balance-of-power model would reach the same conclusion: the distribution of nuclear weapons technology should have been a strong factor in favor of at least a defensive military option.

The Soviet generals did have an alternative conception open to them: that a war in Europe might be a "local war" (in Soviet terminology), having limited goals and employing limited means. This assumption would have yielded a strategy of starting a war on the defensive, which would minimize the threat of nuclear escalation by minimizing the threat to vital NATO interests and which would allow for attempts to settle the war diplomatically. The military risk could have been contained by limiting the duration of this defensive phase: if negotiations seemed fruitless, an offensive could have been launched before Western industrial power could be brought to bear. Such a plan would have been particularly appropriate given the Soviet fear of a war beginning "accidentally." Especially before 1971, for example, there was always the possibility of an armed clash over Berlin escalating out of control. The Soviets referred

[51] Wardak (fn. 20), 1:72–73.
[52] Ibid., 1:74.
[53] Tyushkevich and Sushko (fn. 47), 73.

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to careful conflict management in such cases as a policy of frustrating the adversary's attempts at "provocations." This is the meaning of the civilian leaders' suggestions about limited war: in case of a limited armed clash in Europe, the enemy should be "rebuffed," not destroyed.

But there is no evidence that Soviet military plans included such an option. In fact, the General Staff Academy lectures explicitly rule out the possibility that a war in Europe could be anything but a major war.[54] The Soviet generals insisted that the only way to end a war was through a "decisive offensive."[55] Thus, in spite of Soviet fears of "accidental" war, Soviet military strategy did nothing to reduce the probability of inadvertent war.

The strong offensive bias of Soviet military planning, in combination with the Soviets' interest in preemption and their belief in the aggressiveness of their adversaries, also created crisis instability at the conventional level. If NATO had taken some apparently threatening action in the context of a European crisis—if, for example, NATO had even partially mobilized during the 1968 Czechoslovak crisis—the Soviet leadership might have convinced itself that war was likely. In such circumstances, Politburo leaders might have allowed themselves to be convinced by military arguments that their best chance, given their strategy, was a preemptive conventional attack (the Soviet army was, after all, already mobilized). In this sense, Soviet strategy was aptly described by Richard Ned Lebow as "the Schlieffen Plan revisited"[56]—a strategy that, if implemented, would have dragged the Soviet Union into a war the political leaders would have preferred to avoid.

In sum, while Soviet theory demanded that the goals of a war be determined by political leaders and set out in military doctrine, in practice Soviet military leaders made their own assumptions literally without reference to the views of the political leaders. Military strategy was based on the generals' views and remained based on those views in spite of their growing rift with the military doctrine expressed by Politburo leaders.

In the late 1980s the Soviet foreign and defense ministers confirmed this rift. According to then Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, speaking in 1988, "One of the most unfavorable phenomena of the period of stagnation . . . was the lack of agreement between our military and

[54] Wardak (fn. 20), 1:77.

[55] S. N. Kozlov, *The Officer's Handbook* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1971), trans. U.S. Air Force (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1972), 65.

[56] Lebow, "The Soviet Offensive in Europe: The Schlieffen Plan Revisited?" *International Security* 9 (Spring 1985).

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political directions."[57] Defense Minister Dmitrii Yazov elaborated on this view a year later in the party theoretical journal, *Kommunist*:

> A certain disjunction between the political and military-technical aspects of military doctrine was permitted [under Brezhnev]. While in the political dimension [our] military doctrine was defensive, . . . on the military-technical plane stress was placed on decisive offensive operations in case of the unleashing of war against the USSR and its allies. . . .
>
> In other words, in effect the defensive thrust of the political aspect of doctrine was in definite contradiction with the tenet of its military-technical aspect on offensive actions.[58]

As Yazov notes, the source of the "contradiction" was a military strategy more offensive than the doctrine on which it was supposedly based.[59]

This contradiction is a classic case in which "where you stand depends on where you sit." Civilian leaders, focusing on the political goals of a possible war, apparently recognized that nuclear war would destroy at least the prize (Western Europe) if not the combatants as well. Hence, they pushed for limiting the stakes of a war. For military leaders, in contrast, an offensive strategy maximized a number of military values, even if it made escalation more likely. As Jack Snyder points out, an offensive strategy affords the military greater autonomy from political interference. In defensive fighting, by contrast, "the whole point of fighting is to negotiate a diplomatic solution . . . [so] political considerations—and hence politicians—have to figure in operational decisions." An offensive strategy also justifies a larger military budget for all military services and offers the military heightened prestige and an enhanced self-image. In addition, it simplifies the planning process: seizing the initiative means imposing one's own plan on the situation without having to worry about endless variants that depend on enemy action.[60]

In this case, Soviet military doctrine and strategy are best explained by the organizational model, which hypothesizes the discrepancy in policy. The military-mission model, by contrast, assumes that military leaders accepted Politburo doctrine;[61] it therefore cannot explain why the

[57] Quoted in David Holloway, "Gorbachev's New Thinking," *Foreign Affairs* 68 (*America and the World, 1988–89*), 72.

[58] Quoted in Raymond L. Garthoff, *Deterrence and the Revolution in Soviet Military Doctrine* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1990), 160.

[59] Both Yazov and Shevardnadze clearly made these arguments in order to defend the new thinking about foreign affairs, which eliminated this contradiction. Nevertheless, they would not have made that particular argument in favor of the new thinking unless they also believed it.

[60] Snyder, *The Ideology of the Offensive* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), 25–30.

[61] One can hypothesize a cross between the military-mission and organizational models that asserts that the military, led by the general staff and the Defense Ministry, acted as a single organizational interest, maximizing military interests at the expense of civilian control. Such a model would explain the outcome of this doctrinal dispute, but it could not explain the ABM case.

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political leadership wanted a strategy designed to keep a war limited while the military planners insisted on a strategy that would ensure escalation. And the civilian intervention expected by Posen's model did not take place.

Further, organizational process can explain how the discrepancy lasted. Inside the military, Rosen's model applies: military leaders innovated precisely as much as they wished, resisting civilian calls for further changes. While the concept of civilian-set doctrine was useful as the conceptual part of a policy handle, civilian leaders lacked an organization capable of monitoring and enforcing change in military strategy.[62] The process of building consensus prevented them from creating one. Fedor Burlatskii, who was a Central Committee staff member in the mid-1960s, explains the consensus-building process: "It was under [Brezhnev] that the practice of very complicated agreements flourished so abundantly, requiring dozens of signatures on documents, which brought the decisions adopted to a standstill or entirely distorted their meaning."[63] In the case of military doctrine, political leaders were apparently willing to accommodate to a military strategy that "entirely distorted the meaning" of their preferred doctrine because maintaining peace in their ruling coalition was more important. The military presumably insisted on such autonomy as a reaction against what it considered Khrushchev's "harebrained" meddling in military strategy.[64]

High Politics and the ABM Treaty

According to the military mission-model, the Soviet Union signed the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty in 1972 because Soviet military leaders believed it would improve the Soviet strategic position. The Soviet logic, in this view, was that restricting American missile defenses would help the Soviet Union in its strategy of preempting American strategic nuclear forces. Essential to the military-mission argument is the presumption that the Soviet *military leadership* accepted this logic. The organizational model hypothesizes that a bureaucratic coalition in favor of the ABM treaty was assembled but that the military leadership would not have joined the coalition, since most parts of the Soviet military had interests opposing any arms control.

The evidence suggests that the Soviet military leadership did in fact vigorously oppose the treaty. Grechko, by most accounts, strongly

[62] Meyer (fn. 2); Currie (fn. 14), 39.

[63] Burlatskii, "Brezhnev and the End of the Thaw," *Literaturnaia Gazeta*, September 14, 1988, in FBIS-SOV, September 19, 1988, 71.

[64] The classic account is Wolfe (fn. 8).

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opposed the entire SALT enterprise.[65] He was still publicly defending the ABM mission as late as 1970—that is, after the Soviet delegation to SALT had agreed to ABM limitations—so his opposition to arms control clearly extended to the ABM treaty.[66] The Soviet military press was as unsupportive of SALT as censorship allowed, generally remaining silent about the talks throughout the 1970s, and occasionally deleting positive references to SALT when quoting speeches by such figures as Foreign Minister Gromyko.[67] Grechko and General Staff Chief Viktor Kulikov did each make a statement to the Supreme Soviet (the old rubber-stamp Soviet parliament) in support of the SALT I accords. But those statements, made during the one-sided "debate" over ratifying the treaty, appear to have been grudging acquiescence.[68] Grechko, in fact, never repeated the arguments he made to the Supreme Soviet.

The positions of these and many other key actors accord perfectly with their organizational interests. Grechko's opposition to SALT makes sense in terms of defending his organization's autonomy: he did not want civilians meddling in military policy. The military's Main Political Administration, charged with defending ideological purity, had an institutional interest in doubting the trustworthiness of the "imperialists," so it supplied some of the most vociferous Soviet opponents of any arms control.[69]

The most vigorous opponent of ABM limitations was Pavel F. Batitskii, chief of the National Air Defense Forces (or, in the Russian abbreviation, PVO). This is as the organizational model would predict, since part of the PVO's essential core was at stake: before the ABM treaty, the PVO defined its essential core mission as defense against "air-space attacks," that is, defense against aircraft and ballistic missiles.[70] Batitskii continued to defend his service's ABM mission against the treaty into 1969—well after most discussion of ABM had been shut off.[71] Indeed, even in 1976, after the ABM treaty had been signed and the issue settled, Batitskii endorsed a call to pursue the ABM mission.[72]

[65] See Herspring (fn. 24), 75.

[66] Andrei A. Grechko, "In Battle Born," *Pravda*, February 23, 1970, trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* 22 (March 24, 1970), 23.

[67] Payne (fn. 24), 64.

[68] See Thomas W. Wolfe, *The SALT Experience* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1979), 21.

[69] Payne (fn. 24), 7.

[70] See Batitskii, "Development of the Tactics and Operational Art of the Country's Air Defense (PVO) Troops," trans. Central Intelligence Agency, *Military Thought*, no. 10 (October 1967), 28–40.

[71] Batitskii, "Rukovodstvo voiskami—na prochnuiu nauchnuiu osnovu," *Vestnik protivovozdushnoi oborony*, no. 7 (July 1969), 2–10; Raymond L. Garthoff, "BMD and East-West Relations," in Ashton B. Carter and David N. Schwartz, eds., *Ballistic Missile Defense* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1984), 299–300.

[72] Preface in G. V. Zimin, ed., *Razvitie Protivovozdushnoi oborony* (Development of antiair defense) (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976).

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Other military leaders were less hostile to limitations on ABMs. Strategic Rocket Forces chief Krylov hinted that he opposed arms control generally,[73] in keeping with his interest in avoiding limitations on ICBMs, which his service controlled. But, in keeping with his interest in promoting the effectiveness of ballistic missiles, Krylov claimed that missiles were "practically invulnerable in flight."[74] This claim disputed the PVO's assertions that ABM defenses were effective, and it thereby undercut the PVO's reason for opposing ABM limitations. Civil defense chief Chuikov also argued that ABM could be of only limited effectiveness, in order to argue that civil defense was necessary.[75]

Significantly, the key institution charged with military policy analysis—the general staff—was split on the issue of ABMs. Those who favored limits had a wide range of reasons for doing so. One general wrote that an ABM race could lead to crisis instability (without using the term); another basically argued that ABMs were not cost effective at the margin.[76] Some general staff officers (and scientists) worried privately about the technical capabilities of the Soviet system, especially after a series of tests in 1968 in which their system failed to intercept simulated targets obscured by decoys and chaff. Others feared that the Americans had a lead in exotic technologies for ABM.[77] What they had in common was an interest in using their organizational strength in military policy analysis to expand their power over a subordinate institution, the PVO.

Those officers associated with the general staff who opposed ABM limitations generally had a different function: they were less analysts than war planners, concerned about Soviet war-fighting capability. The clearest example is former general staff chief Sokolovskii, who wrote in the 1968 edition of his famous *Military Strategy*: "Without the effective conduct of [ABM] operations, successful conduct of modern war . . . [is] impossible."[78] Some of them never changed their minds: as late as May 1972 the general staff journal *Military Thought* published a book review

[73] See Warner (fn. 24), 236.

[74] Nikolai Krylov, "Raketnye voiska strategicheskogo naznacheniia," *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal*, no. 7 (July 1967).

[75] Marshal of the Soviet Union V. Chuikov, "V interesakh zashchity rodiny," *Pravda*, February 23, 1968, p 3.

[76] V. I. Zemskov, "Wars of the Modern Era," *Military Thought*, no. 5 (May 1969), makes the argument about crisis instability; I. I. Anureyev, *Oruzhie protivoraketnoi i protivokosmicheskoi oborony* (Weapons of antirocket and antispace defense) (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1971), discusses cost effectiveness.

[77] Based on interviews with former Soviet general staff officers who worked on ABM issues, Moscow, June–July 1992.

[78] Sokolovskii (fn. 42), 284–85.

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clearly unsympathetic to ABM limitations.[79]

Thus, on the issue of the ABM treaty, the difference between the balance-of-power and military-mission models becomes important. Posen's balance-of-power model is correct: in a tense international situation the civilian leadership simply forced a policy change on the military. The military-mission explanation is clearly incorrect: while some Soviet officers were supportive of ABM limitations, the Soviet military leadership as a whole was not.

The organizational model provides the best overall explanation of the opposing views.[80] For it to explain the decision fully, however, the model must show how a political coalition in favor of ABM limitations could have been constructed—a coalition willing and able to deprive the PVO of an essential core mission. It must also explain the nature of the policy handle used to enforce the decision. At first glance, an organizational explanation seems impossible: where were the organizations with an interest in the ABM treaty?

The important prior question is which organizations mattered. According to one participant in the process, the Soviet government set up a special commission to determine arms control policy. Chaired by Dmitrii Ustinov (the Central Committee secretary who supervised military industry), the commission had as members the chiefs of the Defense Ministry (A. Grechko), the Foreign Ministry (A. Gromyko), the KGB (Yu. Andropov), the Academy of Sciences (M. Keldysh), the Military-Industrial Commission of the Council of Ministers (L. Smirnov), and the Central Committee's Department for Military Industry (I. Serbin). According to the participant, the Politburo generally accepted the decisions of the commission.[81]

Two of these organizations clearly supported ABM limitations. The first was the Foreign Ministry, which had a strong interest in expanding the role of its essential core mission of international negotiations into the heart of national security policy. Indeed, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko was an early and vigorous advocate of arms control.[82] The other organization with some interest in arms control was the Academy

[79] K. Provorov, "Missile and Space Offensive Weapons and the Problems of Countering Them," trans. Central Intelligence Agency, *Military Thought*, no. 5 (May 1972), 119–25.

[80] Of course, the model cannot explain the views of every actor. Marshal Bagramyan, the commander of Rear Services, for example, expressed optimism about the prospects for ABM, whereas Marshal Moskalenko, the inspector general (and former PVO officer), was more pessimistic. Neither stand clearly accords with any bureaucratic interest. See I. Kh. Bagramyan, "Bagramyan Speech," in FBIS-SOV, February 23, 1967, CC5; K. S. Moskalenko, "Prazdnik pobedy," *Trud*, May 9, 1968.

[81] Interview with former senior civilian official involved in the process, Moscow, July 1992.

[82] See, e.g., Andrei A. Gromyko, "On the International Situation and the Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union," *Pravda*, June 28, 1968, trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* 20 (July 31, 1968), 12.

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of Sciences. Academicians expected arms control to give them an opportunity to influence national security policy, while the détente associated with arms control would have afforded them new opportunities for foreign travel and expanding their international contacts.[83] According to one participant, Academician Keldysh's role was crucial in the first respect: he used his scientific credentials as a rocket scientist to persuade key commission and Politburo members that ABM limitations were in the best interests of the Soviet Union.[84]

All of the other institutions represented on the commission were more ambivalent about arms control. The Defense Ministry, as noted above, was split, though the defense minister was hostile. This fact led to some interesting situations, including some in which military officers leaked Grechko's objections on particular issues—along with information designed to refute those objections—to the Foreign Ministry.[85] Military industry also had mixed interests: the construction bureaus and ministries connected with making ABM components may have opposed limitations so they could continue to get ABM-connected orders, while those not so connected probably had a budgetary interest in supporting limits. Similarly, arms control negotiations presented the KGB with both clear opportunities to collect information and clear risks that the Americans might collect some.

Thus early on, two commission members favored ABM limits, one opposed them, and the rest—the KGB and military-industrial representatives—were open to persuasion. Given the deep splits in the one organization opposing ABM limits, including military officers' support against their own minister, it is not surprising that the forces favoring limitations turned out to be more persuasive.

Furthermore, Politburo members had the deciding voice on these issues: they influenced the commission's recommendations and their approval was required. As it turns out, the three Politburo members most concerned with national security issues before 1973—Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgornyi—also became the core of the pro–arms control coalition in the Politburo, which seems to have formed around 1970. Brezhnev was then publicly arguing that "practical steps in the direction of disarmament are possible and must be taken."[86] Indeed, as early as 1968 Brezhnev was impressing even on military audiences that "our country will continue to advocate limitations on the arms race."[87]

[83] See Payne (fn. 24) for a discussion of the role of academicians in general.
[84] Interview (fn. 81).
[85] Ibid.
[86] Brezhnev (fn. 36), 1:541.
[87] Brezhnev (fn. 39), 11.

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Kosygin, the premier, was arguing in similar terms in 1970, saying, "It is now very important for the nuclear powers . . . to do every thing possible to stop the build-up of nuclear arms."[88] The third member of the ruling troika, Nikolai Podgornyi, chairman of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet, was also one of the most vigorous advocates of arms control in the Politburo.[89]

But where are these Politburo leaders' bureaucratic interests in ABM limitations? They had none per se; but the ABM treaty was essential to détente, which key Politburo leaders had a strong interest in pursuing.[90] For Kosygin and Brezhnev, the bureaucratic advantage was the transfer of technology from the West. According to Bruce Parrott, both Kosygin and Brezhnev were pessimistic about the Soviet Union's ability to compete technologically with the West—either militarily (as on ABM) or in industrial matters.[91] Running the economy was Kosygin's bureaucratic responsibility, and technological innovation was his biggest headache, so access to Western technology could clearly serve his interests. Brezhnev's interest was to prove his ability as an "artful synthesizer" who could create a policy that would address the problem of technological innovation. Thus, détente and the associated arms control served the interests of both men.

Arms control also provided the policy handle for enforcing the Politburo's decision on ABM. First, the arms control process provided the Soviet leadership with an opportunity to move some decision making about force structure out of the military's exclusive domain. The trick was to turn arms control into a diplomatic issue on which other diplomatic interests—those connected with détente—depended. Hence, the leadership could comfortably overrule military hesitation. Further, the verification provisions in arms control guaranteed that implementation would remain a diplomatic issue. Most significantly, the commission on arms control and its successor organizations provided an effective institutional mechanism to ensure bureaucratic compliance. Once the force structure decision not to build more ABM systems was implemented, the military leadership had to adjust its strategy accordingly.

On balance, then, the organizational model provides a sufficient explanation of the ABM decision, and a more accurate one than that

[88] Reprinted in Alexei N. Kosygin, *Selected Speeches and Writings* (New York: Pergamon, 1981), 66.

[89] Peter M. E. Volten, *Brezhnev's Peace Program* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982), 227.

[90] Jack Snyder (fn. 27) argues that such a "logrolled coalition" best explains détente under Khrushchev and Brezhnev.

[91] Parrott, *Politics and Technology in the USSR* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983), 186–89, 233–35; and idem, *The Soviet Union and Ballistic Missile Defense* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press/Foreign Policy Institute, 1987), 31.

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offered by the military-mission model. To be sure, it does not explain everything: there are some details that can only be explained in psychological terms. Kosygin, for example, did not seem to understand the logic of ABM limits in 1967 but subsequently came to advocate such limits. This development fits the learning theory model of increasing "cognitive complexity."[92] But as Jeff Checkel points out in explaining Gorbachev's "new thinking"—when much more learning occurred than in the ABM case—learning theory is only useful as a complement to organizational and balance-of-power type theories; alone they explain very little.[93] In the ABM case, learning and other psychological theories explain a few interesting details; the organizational model explains what happened.

Theoretical Conclusions and Implications

In the late 1970s and 1980s military-mission theorists gave the impression that the Soviet system had produced a national security policy that was better integrated than the compromised and logrolled Western policies. That impression was false: Soviet military policy at that time failed to integrate doctrine and strategy effectively. The doctrine set by the political leadership was aimed at avoiding nuclear war, but Soviet military strategy made war in Europe more likely and would have virtually ensured nuclear conflict had such a war broken out. Soviet military policy, in short, was not just somewhat incoherent; military strategy was aimed at a secondary objective (the conquest of Western Europe) at the expense of the primary objective of military doctrine (minimizing the likelihood of the nuclear devastation of the Soviet Union).

Only the organizational model can explain this contradiction, as the result of bureaucratic interest and logrolling in the process of making military policy. The military-mission model, with its assumption that the communist system of political control largely obviated bureaucratic distortions, is simply too credulous about Soviet claims that their system was monolithic and integrated. Even in the area of military security, Soviet policy-making is better understood as the result of political compromise than of rational calculation.

Posen's balance-of-power model—which holds that in the face of severe external threat states can force innovation in military doctrine—

[92] For a discussion of Kosygin's early view, see Garthoff (fn. 71), 295–96. For definitions of different kinds of learning, see Philip E. Tetlock, "Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy: In Search of an Elusive Concept," in George W. Breslauer and Philip E. Tetlock, eds., *Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991).

[93] Jeff Checkel, "Ideas, Institutions, and the Gorbachev Foreign Policy Revolution," *World Politics* 45 (January 1993).

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also fails in this case. The stakes facing the Soviet Union in case of war were ultimate, yet its military doctrine (or strategy, in Soviet parlance) did not change to minimize the likelihood of the ultimate disaster, nuclear war. Furthermore, the fact that even the highly authoritarian Brezhnev regime was unable to effect doctrinal change in the tense predétente cold war environment is a serious blow to Posen's theory of civilian-led doctrinal change.

Nevertheless, in line with Posen's model, civilians did succeed in forcing a change in doctrine to accommodate the ABM treaty. Rosen's theory is too pessimistic in this case: leadership from a top-ranking innovator in the military was not required. At the same time, the continuing hostility of military leaders to arms control illustrates the weakness of the military-mission explanation: organizational interest was a better predictor of the positions of most leaders, whether civilian or military.

The concept of a policy handle can explain why Posen's model is accurate in one case but not in the other. Political leaders were successful in forcing policy integration on the ABM issue because they had an effective policy handle—arms control. They failed on the limited war issue because they lacked an effective policy handle. Budget cuts would not work, because the leadership probably wanted an offensive military capability; leaders therefore had no way of forcing a more defensive strategy on the military. The concept of military doctrine provided the intellectual basis for a policy handle, but the Soviet system lacked an institutional mechanism to wield it: there were no civilians in the Soviet Defense Ministry, and the Defense Council lacked the staff support necessary to enable it to act as an institutional counterweight to the Defense Ministry.

Implications for Russian Military Policy

Because Russia's military leadership and government structure were largely carried over from the Soviet system, many processes and expectations have been carried over as well. Thus, Russia has kept the Soviet definition of military doctrine, and the debate over the content of that doctrine shows the same kinds of divergence between political and military considerations that characterized Soviet doctrine. On the civilian side, President Boris Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev call for "partnership and allied relations with the Western countries."[94] The

[94] Kozyrev, "In the Republic's National Interests," *Rossiiskiye vesti*, December 3, 1992, trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* 44 (December 30, 1992), 15; Boris Yeltsin, "Speech by B. N. Yeltsin," *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, October 7, 1992, trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* 44 (November 4, 1992), 5.

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draft Russian military doctrine includes a similar statement, but it characterizes the main security threat to Russia as the kind of large-scale, high-technology conventional offensive that only NATO could launch, and it labels the maintenance of NATO's military forces as a "source of military danger."[95] Marshal Yevgennyi Shaposhnikov, the former commander in chief of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) strategic forces and later secretary of Yeltsin's Security Council, goes even further, explicitly arguing that the CIS should not align with the West but rather should act as a counterweight to it.[96] Thus, as in the Soviet case, military plans are based on goals that run counter to the preferences of civilian leaders.

Meanwhile, the draft Russian military doctrine ignores the threats considered most significant by the political leaders. Foreign Minister Kozyrev argues that the main threats to Russian security are from "regional conflicts," that is, ethnic conflicts in the former Soviet Union.[97] Some reform-oriented military officers have come to similar conclusions.[98] The draft doctrine, however, says nothing about doctrine or strategy in such conflicts, in spite of the fact that Russian military forces were and are involved in several of them. While the generals' insistence on paying some attention to large-scale war makes sense—a falling-out with NATO is certainly possible—the Russian military's stubborn resistance to thinking seriously about low-intensity conflict is obviously inappropriate.[99] That resistance can be attributed to organizational interest: the Russian military does not want to be diverted from its essential core mission of large-scale, high-technology war. This behavior conforms to a pattern among military organizations: as Andrew Krepinevich has shown, as a way of defending its preferred doctrine, the United States Army in the Vietnam era also resisted developing a counterinsurgency doctrine.[100]

Another way in which the Russian draft doctrine undermines Russian foreign policy is by retaining the option of preemptive conventional attack in the event Russia is threatened. Further, it implies that the stationing of NATO troops on Russia's border—for example, in the Baltic

[95] "Fundamentals of Russian Military Doctrine," *Voennaia Mysl'*, special edition, May 1992, trans. U.S. Joint Publications Research Service UMT-008-L. For further discussion of the debate over military doctrine, see Stuart Kaufman, "Lessons from the Gulf War and Russian Military Doctrine," *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 6 (September 1993).

[96] "Military and Security Notes," *RFE/RL Research Report* 1 (October 16, 1992).

[97] *RFE/RL Daily Report*, January 7, 1993.

[98] A. S. Sinaiskii, "Geopolitika i natsional'naia bezopasnost' Rossi," *Voennaia Mysl'*, no. 10 (October 1992), 10.

[99] An example of this Russian argument is in M. A. Gareev, "O nekotorykh voprosakh voennoi doktriny," *Voennaia Mysl'*, no. 11 (November 1992), 4.

[100] Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

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states—might be sufficient to provoke such an attack. As a result, were a crisis to break out between Russia and the West, Russian military doctrine would undermine crisis stability by encoding in Russian military thinking the perception that Russia could gain by striking first.

The difference between military behavior on these issues and on strategic arms control is striking. The institutionalized processes of arms control decision making seem still to be in operation, acting as an effective policy handle for civilian control. At the same time, the process ensures that military views are considered, and so military leaders can accept the result even where they do not agree with it. As a result, even though the START II agreement is extremely controversial in Russia, Russian military leaders such as Defense Minister Grachev and Chief of the General Staff Kolesnikov have steadfastly supported it.[101]

Civilian control over military operations in the newly independent republics may be much weaker: while Yeltsin insists that "we must coordinate our policy among the [CIS] states purely on the basis of treaties,"[102] Russian military leaders in Moldova and the Transcaucasus have been intervening in local ethnic conflicts without or contrary to civilian orders. For instance, General Alexander Lebed, commander of the Fourteenth Russian Army, openly supplies Russian separatists in Moldova's "Dniester Republic" region while advocating that the region expand its territory and be annexed by Russia.[103] Yeltsin's policy, by contrast, is supposedly based on the principle of maintaining Moldova's territorial integrity, and there is even evidence that Yeltsin opposed Lebed's appointment.[104] Meanwhile, the Russian Army also refuses to leave Georgia despite repeated Georgian charges that it is interfering in Georgian internal affairs (especially through aid to armed separatists in the Georgian region of Abkhazia) and despite repeated Georgian demands that it withdraw.[105] None of these actions is compatible with the main thrust of Russian foreign policy, which is ostensibly aimed at accommodation with the other former Soviet republics and with the

[101] "Russia's Security Will Be Enhanced by Deep Cuts in Strategic Offensive Arms," *Izvestiia*, June 22, 1992, p. 7, trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* 44 (July 22, 1992), 19–20; Pavel Felgengauer, "The Russian Army's General Staff Supports START II," *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, January 11, 1993, trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* 45 (February 3, 1993), 15.

[102] Yeltsin (fn. 94).

[103] Andrei Kozyrev, "The War Party Is on the Offensive," interview in *Izvestiia*, June 30, 1992, p. 3, trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* 44 (July 29, 1992), 4; *RFE/RL News Briefs*, supplement to *RFE/RL Research Reports* 2 (January 25–29, 1993), 10.

[104] "Russian-Moldovan Dialogue in Moscow Proves Fruitful," *Izvestiia*, February 11, 1993, trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* 45 (March 11, 1993), 20; John Lough, "The Place of the 'Near Abroad' in Russian Foreign Policy," *RFE/RL Research Reports* 2 (March 12, 1993), 24.

[105] Besik Urigashvili, "Parliamentary Opposition Demands Radical Actions," *Izvestiia*, February 25, 1993, p. 2, trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* 45 (March 24, 1993), 15.

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West. These problems of operational control illustrate the value and the limits of the organizational model for Russian military policy. Its value is to highlight the organizational interests at stake. Russian military leaders do not want their troops withdrawn from Moldova and the Transcaucasus, because there is no housing for them in Russia. Commanders in Moldova are also worried about the morale of locally recruited soldiers who wish to defend their communities. Commanders in both places are grabbing for as much autonomy—among the highest of organizational interests—as possible.

Nevertheless, these considerations do not fully explain the army's behavior. The reason for the military leaders' policy is not only their bureaucratic interest but also their policy preference—the reconstruction of the Soviet empire. Moreover, the policy process is no longer a purely bureaucratic matter. In authoritarian societies such as the former Soviet Union, the only interests with power are those represented in the Party and government bureaucracies, so policy is made in a bureaucratic tug-of-war. In open societies such as Yeltsin's Russia, however, there are powerful opposition interests—political parties, social movements, and (in the past and probably in the future) in parliament—that operate outside government bureaucracies. Thus, while a pure organizational model is sufficient for explaining military politics in bureaucratized, authoritarian systems, military policy in open systems must be explained in a broader context, using what Robert Art refers to as a "first wave" or "policy via politics" approach.[106]

In Yeltsin's Russia dissident hard-line military leaders—some in formal organizations such as the banned Officers' Union—are more powerful than they had been in Brezhnev's USSR because they can look for support from powerful, like-minded groups outside the government. The coalition of hard-line officers and opposition leaders is capable of preventing the government from exerting effective civilian control. Many of the opposition groups, for example, call for expansion of Russia's territory, especially to Abkhazia in Georgia, Ukraine's Crimea, and the Dniestr region of Moldova. The military has policies aimed at gaining control of these territories; opposition propaganda can deter civilian control over those policies.

Some of these Russian military policies—an anti-NATO doctrine that allows preemption and open interference in ethnic conflicts outside Russia—are significant because they are so objectionable to the West. If

[106] Robert J. Art, "Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique," reprinted in G. John Ikenberry, ed., *American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays* (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1989).

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Western countries begin to find Russian military policy sufficiently obnoxious, Russia will lose the outside support on which Yeltsin's reform strategy depends. At the same time, the opposition gains from military aggressiveness no matter what the government does. If the government accepts the opposition's expansionist agenda—and there is evidence that it may be doing so[107]—its pro-Western policy will be discredited by the Western reaction. If Russian foreign policy works at cross-purposes with the military's actions, it will be ineffective and can be attacked as weak. And again the government is discredited. Thus, the future of Russian reform may well depend on the government's ability to establish firm civilian control over military strategy and operations.

To establish such control, Russia will have to create institutions capable of using military doctrine as an effective policy handle. The most obvious alternatives are for Russia to create a civilian-run defense ministry or national security council system, or both. In any case, the requirement is that the system combine military expertise and authoritative control by top-level civilian officials. To date, such a system does not exist: while Russia has established a security council, it does not seem to have the institutional muscle to be effective.

The ABM case shows (and the evidence on START II suggests) that arms control agreements can contribute to the solution. From the perspective of the West, continuing arms control negotiations have the benefit—regardless of whether any agreements are reached—of maintaining the arms control process as an effective policy handle for civilian control in Russia. The West might be able to help the Russian government create a policy handle to control military operations by beginning detailed negotiations on Russian military behavior in such places as Moldova and Georgia. While diplomatic pressure might put President Yeltsin in an awkward political position, the negotiating process would create a policy handle, redefining the issue and forcing the creation of an institutionalized Russian policy process for dealing with it. Yeltsin might then be able to use that process to improve his control over Russia's military.

[107] See, e.g., Thomas Goltz, "Letter from Eurasia: The Hidden Russian Hand," *Foreign Policy*, no. 92 (Fall 1993).

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WHAT MAKES RATIONAL PEASANTS REVOLUTIONARY?
Dilemma, Paradox, and Irony in Peasant Collective Action

By MARK I. LICHBACH*

If class domination is a process of systematic appropriation, then the measures devised to thwart that appropriation constitute a form of resistance. All class struggle must necessarily join self-interested material needs with conflict.

—James C. Scott

If I am not for myself, who will be for me? And if I am for myself only, what am I? And if not now, when?

—Hillel

Introduction

AN orthodox explanation of agrarian revolution assumes that peasants[1] resist the commercialization of agriculture.[2] The growth of

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[1] Discussions of the problems in defining "peasants" may be found in Henry A. Landsberger, "Peasant Unrest: Themes and Variations," in Landsberger, ed., *Rural Protest: Peasant Movements and Social Change* (London: Macmillan, 1974), 6–18; and Teodor Shanin, "Introduction: Peasantry as a Concept," in Shanin, ed., *Peasants and Peasant Societies: Selected Readings*, 2d ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 2–9.

[2] These explanations are reviewed in many places. See Landsberger (fn. 1); John Wilson Lewis and Kathleen J. Hartford, "Introduction," in Lewis, ed., *Peasant Rebellion and Communist Revolution in Asia* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1974); Richard K. Horner, "Agrarian Movements and Their Historical Conditions," *Peasant Studies* 8 (Winter 1979); Bruce Cumings, "Interest and Ideology in the Study of Agrarian Politics," *Politics and Society* 10, no. 4 (1981); Forrest D. Colburn, "Current Studies of Peasants and Rural Development: Applications of the Political Economy Approach," *World Politics* 34 (April 1982); J. Craig Jenkins, "Why Do Peasants Rebel? Structural and Historical Theories of Modern Peasant Rebellions," *American Journal of Sociology* 88 (November 1982); Scott Evan Guggenheim and Robert P. Weller, "Introduction: Moral Economy, Capitalism, and State Power in Rural Protest," in Weller and Guggenheim, eds., *Power and Protest in the Countryside: Studies of Political Unrest in Asia, Europe, and Latin America* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1982); Theda Skocpol, "What Makes Peasants Revolutionary?" in Weller and Guggenheim; Robert H. Bates, "Some Conventional Orthodoxies in the Study of Agrarian Change," *World Politics* 36 (January 1984); idem, "Lessons from History, or the Perfidy of English Exceptionalism and the Significance of Historical France," *World Politics* 40 (July 1988); Susan Eckstein, "Power and Popular Protest in Latin America," in Eckstein, ed., *Power and Popular Protest: Latin American Social Movements* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, *Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes since 1956* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Raj Desai and Harry Eckstein, "Insurgency: The Transformation of Peasant Rebellion," *World Politics* 42 (July 1990). The title of this article is a play on Skocpol (1982).

World Politics 46 (April 1994), 383–418

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the market, it is said, promotes self-interest by violating such basic notions of human welfare as the norm of reciprocity and the right of subsistence.[3] The result is a decrease in the economic security of peasants and a weakening of the foundation of rural communities. Rural radicalism follows.[4] A growing market then forces landlords to extract more surplus from their peasants. These higher levels of exploitation in turn lead traditional strata to rebel.[5] Finally, it is suggested, the market's diffusion creates new social strata that are particularly prone to revolution.[6] Some seek the roots of such processes in imperialism and global capitalism.[7] Others look mainly at the individual state's local responses to global modernization.[8] Still others look to the politics of the peasants' situation, focusing on the interimperialist military rivalries that lead to the breakdown of imperial and colonial regimes.[9] Whatever the specific mechanisms involved and whatever the roots of those mechanisms, peasant struggles are rebellions against the market's destabilization of peasant communities. Rural upheavals are violent reactions against the relentless commercialization of agriculture, which causes the disintegration of formerly cohesive social units. In short, capitalism and imperialism make peasants revolutionary.

Rational-actor theorists have criticized such arguments. The counter-microperspective is agnostic on whether the rise of the market generates peasant grievances against market forces.[10] It maintains, however, that aggrieved peasants are neither necessary nor sufficient for peasant rebellion. Mancur Olson's seminal work, *The Logic of Collective Action*, was the first to challenge the truism that peasant grievances against market forces eventually lead to peasant rebellion.[11] Samuel Popkin's *Rational Peasant* is the most widely cited application

[3] James C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976).

[4] Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1959): Eric J. Wolf, *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1969); Joel S. Migdal, *Peasants, Politics, and Revolution: Pressures toward Political and Social Change in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton Univertsity Press, 1974); Daniel Chirot and Charles Ragin, "The Market, Tradition and Peasant Rebellion: The Case of Romania in 1907," *American Sociological Review* 40 (August 1975).

[5] Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966); Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

[6] Jeffrey M. Paige, *Agrarian Revolution: Social Movements and Export Agriculture in the Underdeveloped World* (New York: Free Press, 1975).

[7] Wolf (fn. 4); Migdal (fn. 4); Paige (fn. 6).

[8] Moore (fn. 5).

[9] Skocpol (fn. 5).

[10] A counter-macroperspective—summarized by Bates (fn. 2, 1984, 1988) and Desai and Eckstein (fn. 2), 444–45—disputes even this claim.

[11] Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979).

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of Olson's argument to peasant struggles.[12]

This paper explores the connections between theories of collective action and problems of peasant resistance and examines, more specifically, the selective incentives solution to Olson's problem.[13] I focus on selective incentives because the idea is so controversial: some believe that selective incentives often solve collective action problems, whereas others minimize their significance. This controversy is addressed by examining evidence about three different forms of peasant upheavals: everyday forms of peasant resistance, unorganized rural movements, and organized peasant rebellions. The evidence demonstrates that selective incentives are widespread in peasant struggles.

Two questions then become relevant. The first relates to the origins of selective incentives: under what conditions are material selective incentives rather than nonmaterial altruistic appeals emphasized? I argue that the level of selective incentives in any peasant upheaval is a function of demand and supply considerations. Peasants demand selective incentives. The suppliers include one or more dissident peasant organizations, the authorities, and the allies of both. A political struggle ensues as suppliers compete and try to monopolize the market.[14] The second question relates to the outcomes of selective incentives: under what conditions does the pursuit of material self-interest hurt rather than help the collective cause of the peasantry? I argue that selective incentives supplemented by ideology can be effective; selective incentives alone are counterproductive.

The theme of this paper, therefore, is that the selective incentives solution reveals much more about peasant upheavals than simply that peasants are often concerned with their own material self-interest. Selective incentives affect the strategies and tactics of various actors,

[12] Popkin, *The Rational Peasant* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).

[13] For a discussion of the related idea of selective disincentives, see Mark Irving Lichbach, *The Rebel's Dilemma* (forthcoming), sec. 6.5.4.

[14] A market may exist in a more or less formal sense. The existence of a "selective incentives market" thus does not necessarily imply a formal market with distinct producers (such as rebel entrepreneurs or the state) who "offer" selective incentives to distinct consumers (that is, peasant followers). Moreover, market strategies always operate within the context of a set of structural factors that determine the underlying functions of supply and demand. As in any social-choice problem, opportunities/constraints plus strategies produce outcomes. These two clarifications can be best understood in the context of two forms of peasant struggles. In spontaneous peasant struggles a formal market will hardly exist. Under such circumstances, selective incentives are self-offered in that peasants take advantage of some situation, such as a peasant jacquerie, to rent seek. Structural factors, such as the nature of the state and the form of property and wealth, affect the demand and supply of selective incentives and hence drive peasant behavior. In organized peasant struggles a more formal market can be located. Under such circumstances, selective incentives *are* actually offered by rebel entrepreneurs to their peasant followers. Structural factors, however, still affect demand and supply considerations and hence drive market strategies and ultimately peasant behavior.

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including peasants, peasant entrepreneurs, allies of the peasantry, landlords, and the state. Peasant upheavals thus have particular causes, take particular courses, and hold particular consequences *because* selective incentives are employed. The selective incentives answer to the "what makes peasants revolutionary" question deserves close scrutiny.

The article is organized as follows. The next section discusses the collective action approach to peasant struggles. I then examine arguments both for and against the selective incentives explanation of peasant collective action. These claims and counterclaims are then explored in three different forms of peasant upheavals: everyday forms of peasant resistance, unorganized rural movements, and organized peasant rebellions. The following section examines the causes and consequences of selective incentives. The paper concludes with an attempt to reconcile a peasant's pursuit of material self-interest with the peasantry's attainment of revolutionary class action.

Collective Action in Peasant Upheavals

Three related models of collective action challenge the thesis that absolute and relative deprivations, institutional and structural strains, or threats to subsistence and moral indignation eventually lead peasants to rebel. Public goods models maintain that most protest is about a public good (that is, one that is nonrival and nonexcludable). Peasants will enjoy the benefits of such a good even if they do not join the protest. Why, therefore, should they pay a cost rather than free ride? Expected utility models maintain that the probability of one peasant making a difference to the outcome of a protest is quite small. If, then, a single peasant will not affect the result, why should he or she protest rather than pursue private interests? Prisoner's Dilemma models combine both perspectives. A rational peasant is said to reason that "if others protest, they do not need me and I will get the benefits anyway." The same rational peasant is also said to reason that "if others fail to protest, I am not enough and will get no benefits anyway." In short, a rational peasant need not even think about his or her colleagues' behavior. He or she always gains by not protesting.

Thus, the cards seem stacked against large-scale peasant rebellion. On the benefit side (1) a successful outcome of a revolt is a low-probability event and hence rebellion is a risky undertaking; (2) a successful outcome is almost independent of any one peasant's participation; (3) the benefits of a successful outcome are also independent of any one peasant's participation. On the cost side (1) rebels face many social causes with which to become involved; (2) rebels have many personal demands on their

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time that have priority—their opportunity costs include, for example, forgone wages; (3) participation is often quite costly and dangerous, since governments maim and murder their enemies. In short, rebels confront possibly disastrous private costs and uncertain public benefits. Moreover, the benefits provide no incentive to act, and the costs provide every incentive not to act. Unless this collective action problem is somehow overcome, rational peasants will never rebel—even though all peasants stand to gain by rebellion. I call the general tragedy confronting all dissidents the Rebel's Dilemma.[15] I shall call the specific tragedy confronting peasants the Peasant's Dilemma.

These provocative ideas have attracted much attention. The challenge to Olson's line of reasoning is obvious: if all peasants thought as Olson says they do, none would ever rebel; history reveals, however, that peasants do rebel, sometimes in large numbers. The paradox of peasant rebellion is thus that rational peasants do choose to participate in peasant struggles. The question then is, what explains the logic of collective action (rather than "collective inaction"); that is, "why so much cooperation"[16] (rather than defection) or "why free rides are spurned"[17] (rather than taken)? The attempt to explain why *rational* people would participate in collective action has already produced over two dozen different types of solutions to the free-rider problem.[18] The literature on peasant struggles now includes arguments about entrepreneurs,[19] patronage,[20] Tit-for-Tat,[21] the probability of winning,[22] selective disincentives,[23] and opportunity costs.[24]

Many of these solutions to the collective action problem offer important insights into peasant (non)rebellions and deserve theoretical elaboration and empirical study. In this paper I explore the selective incentives solution to the peasant's collective action problem, a focus that has both analytical and empirical justification. First, the selective incentives solu-

[15] Lichbach (fn. 13).

[16] Gordon Tullock, "Why So Much Stability?" *Public Choice* 37, no. 2 (1981).

[17] Albert O. Hirschman, "Rival Interpretations of Market Society: Civilizing, Destructive, or Feeble?" *Journal of Economic Literature* 20 (December 1982), 1482.

[18] Lichbach (fn. 13).

[19] Samuel L. Popkin, "Political Entrepreneurs and Peasant Movements in Vietnam," in Michael Taylor, ed., *Rationality and Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

[20] Migdal (fn. 4), 205.

[21] Michael Taylor, "Rationality and Revolutionary Collective Action," in Taylor (fn. 19).

[22] William Brustein and Margaret Levi,"The Geography of Rebellion: Rulers, Rebels, and Regions, 1500–1700," *Theory and Society* 16 (July 1987).

[23] T. David Mason, "Nonelite Response to State-Sanctioned Terror," *Western Political Quarterly* 42 (December 1989); T. David Mason and Dale A. Krane, "The Political Economy of Death Squads: Toward a Theory of State-Sanctioned Terror," *International Studies Quarterly* 33 (June 1989).

[24] James Tong, "Rational Outlaws: Rebels and Bandits in the Ming Dynasty, 1368–1644," in Taylor (fn. 19).

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tion has been subjected to more criticism than has any other solution to Olson's problem. Both scholars who dislike rational-actor reasoning and scholars who accept rational-actor principles have criticized the selective incentives idea. This paper refutes the received wisdom by offering new ideas and perspectives. Second, the extensive evidence of material rewards in peasant struggles provides the empirical justification for studying selective incentives. The numerous accounts of peasant struggles occurring at different places and in different times all appear to reflect the same two truths: that selective incentives are *a* (albeit not *the*) major basis by which peasants are mobilized into collective action; and that selective incentives are *a* (albeit not *the*) major factor in the etiology, conduct, and outcome of peasant struggles.

Selective Incentives in Peasant Rebellion

This section considers the argument that selective incentives are central to collective action and then looks at the counterargument that selective incentives are irrelevant. A subsequent section attempts to resolve the controversy by examining evidence from three different types of peasant struggles.

The Argument: The Centrality of Selective Incentives

The collective action research program teaches us that situations characterized by collectively supplied benefits[25] and privately incurred costs will not motivate participation in collective endeavors. The collective action problem thus arises whenever the goods sought by peasants are exclusively public; in such situations additional incentives are needed to move peasants to action. The idea is simple, elegant, and powerful. Each peasant's self-interest prevents collective action and thus works against the peasantry. Why cannot each peasant's self-interest promote collective action and thus work for the peasantry?

The Peasant's Dilemma can therefore be overcome and peasant rebellion made likely under three conditions. First, some benefits are available to peasants as private goods. Second, peasants are affected differently depending on whether they choose to participate in collective action or whether they choose not to participate. Third, the specific rule by which private goods are distributed is that a special reward is contingent upon actual participation. Participation, in short, is a necessary and sufficient

[25] In collective action parlance, collectively supplied benefits are referred to as "public goods," which are characterized, as indicated above, by nonrivalness and nonexcludability. The term thus covers objectives that are both reformist (e.g., having the existing government supply a new road) and revolutionary (e.g., taking over the government and supplying your own road).

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condition for receiving an extra private good: extra benefits flow to a peasant who joins collective action; a peasant who does not join receives no extra benefits. Selective incentives are consequently defined as private goods or side payments that are available to peasants who participate in collective dissent. Peasants thus receive multiple payoffs for their contributions: divisible and excludable private goods as well as nondivisible and nonexcludable public goods.

Selective incentives often successfully motivate collective action. Public television appeals to everyone's altruism but offers magazines and tote bags only to its contributors. Museums and zoos appeal to everyone's civic spirit but offer free admissions and newsletters and gift shop discounts only to their members. The Nature Conservancy appeals to everyone's consciousness about the environment but offers guided tours of its wilderness preserves only to its hundred-dollar sponsors. Farmers' groups appeal to the plight of all farmers but provide agricultural assistance only to their supporters. Finally, the American Political Science Association purports to represent all political scientists but offers journal subscriptions and discounted convention admission only to its members.

Students of peasant upheavals thus recognize several truths. Peasants are unconcerned with broad purposes, philosophical systems, political theories, and revolutionary organizations.[26] Peasant grievances are specific and well-defined, limited and local. Peasant actions are correspondingly designed to satisfy material self-interests. Thus, peasants will join a dissident group or participate in collective dissent because of particularistic benefits.[27]

The Counterargument: The Irrelevance of Selective Incentives

Others argue that selective incentives never motivate rebels. These critics contend that selective incentives cannot overcome the Rebel's Dilemma because of its logical flaws.

One basic counterargument runs as follows. Public goods are not sufficient for collective dissent. This is the basic conclusion of the Peasant's Dilemma. The selective incentive argument implies more, however: public goods are not necessary for collective dissent either. As Tillock

[26] Lyford P. Edwards, *The Natural History of Revolution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927), 71–74.

[27] There are other examples of this argument in addition to the ones cited below. See Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966), 166; Gil Carl AlRoy, *The Involvement of Peasants in Internal Wars*, Research Monograph Series, no. 24 (Princeton: Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1966), 27; Jeffrey Race, *War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 183; and Philip G. Roeder, "Rational Revolution: Extensions of the 'By-Product' Model of Revolutionary Involvement," *Western Political Quarterly* 35 (March 1982), 6.

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and Morrison put it, "Private goods are, in fact, *sufficient* (to get collective dissent); in the extreme instance contributions can simply be 'bought' by private goods, even if no utility is attached to the public good in question."[28] One can thus reduce Olson's argument *ad absurdum*: public goods are neither necessary nor sufficient for collective action; private goods are both necessary and sufficient for collective action. Fireman and Gamson draw the appropriate—and absurd—conclusion: "Evidently it is a waste of time for organizers to demonstrate to potential constituents that their goals are worthwhile and their strategies viable. Consciousness-raising cannot move actors whose pursuit of self-interest is unflagging. It seems that movement propagandizing should advertise selective incentives rather than justify program strategy."[29]

A second basic challenge to the selective incentives solution is summarized by Hechter: "If selective incentives have to be produced in order to assure production of the joint good, then they are merely another kind of joint good, one whose production must also be regarded as costly and therefore problematic."[30] In short, an entrepreneur may indeed create a system of rewards and punishments, but because this system is simply another public good, collective action theorists must account for it, too. The selective incentives solution has merely pushed the explanation for collective action one stage farther back. As Elster puts it, "To assume that there is a central authority offering incentives often requires another collective action problem to have been solved already."[31]

The selective incentives solution has a third logical flaw: dissident groups are at a comparative disadvantage in providing selective incentives. Many have echoed this early criticism of Wagner's.[32] For example, Blumel, Pethig, and Hagen point out that "if the public good has a private good complement, then a firm can sell the public good as a 'byproduct'. . . to the private good. However, this arrangement cannot work if other firms should find it advantageous to provide the private good more cheaply.[33]

[28] Harriet Tillock and Denton E. Morrison, "Group Size and Contributions to Collective Action: An Examination of Olson's Theory Using Data from Zero Population Growth Inc.," *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts, and Change* 2 (1979), 133.

[29] Fireman and Gamson, "Utilitarian Logic in the Resource Mobilization Perspective," in Mayer N. Zald and John D. McCarthy, eds., *The Dynamics of Social Movements: Resource Mobilization, Social Control, and Tactics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop, 1979), 11.

[30] Michael Hechter, *Principles of Group Solidarity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 35–36.

[31] Jon Elster, *The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 40.

[32] Richard E. Wagner, "Pressure Groups and Political Entrepreneurs: A Review Article," *Papers on Nonmarket Decision Making* 1 (1966).

[33] Wolfgang Blumel, Rudiger Pethig, and Oskar Von Dem Hagen, "The Theory of Public Goods: A Survey of Recent Issues," *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics* 142 (June 1986), 260.

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Competition among suppliers of selective incentives is particularly acute in the case of collective dissent. Migdal suggests that peasants compare the material inducements and risks offered by different private organizations and by the regime.[34] Compared to other private groups, however, dissident groups are at a disadvantage. As Fireman and Gamson suggest, "Social movements . . . are actually at a competitive disadvantage in providing selective incentives compared to businesses, social clubs, and the Mafia, for example. None of these organizations is saddled with the burden of diverting resources for the provision of collective goods. They can offer better deals in the selective incentives market."[35] Dissident groups are also in a less advantageous position than the regime. A dissident group's offer of selective incentives may produce a regime's counteroffer of selective incentives. In that case, as Holstrom argues, "the ability of revolutionary movements to offer bribes or coercive incentives is negligible compared to the ability of their opposition to do the same."[36] Similarly, Osanka maintains that "guerrilla leaders have been traditionally reluctant to [engage in a bidding war] because financial incentives are always subject to outbidding by the enemy."[37]

Dissident organizations have only a fixed amount of resources available. A final logic flaw in the selective incentives idea is thus easily understood: privatizing public benefits merely turns public goods into rival goods. Given that minimum winning coalitions will emerge to distribute rival goods (that is, rivalness works against inclusive membership), group size becomes limited. Moreover, politics in minimum winning coalitions is characterized by factionalism and schisms over the distribution of resources. The result is internal bickering, which can only hurt the prospects for group success. As Blalock puts it, private "rewards provided to some members may also alienate others."[38] In short, privatized benefits cannot build organizations that are large and cohesive.

The problem of limited resources is also particularly acute in the case of collective dissent, since dissident groups usually possess, at best, only a limited—insufficient—amount of selective incentives to distribute. As Olsen et al. observe, many dissident groups "are unable to offer any tangible selective incentives to their members, since they lack the

[34] Migdal (fn. 4), 233.

[35] Fireman and Gamson (fn. 29), 12.

[36] Nancy Holstrom, "Rationality and Revolution," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 13 (September 1983), 310.

[37] Franklin Mark Osanka, "Social Dynamics of Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare," in Roger Little, ed., *Handbook of Military Institutions* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1971), 411.

[38] Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., *Power and Conflict: Toward a General Theory* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1989), 143.

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resources necessary to do this."[39]

In sum, the selective incentives idea holds four quite negative implications for the prospects of peasant collective action: public goods are irrelevant to group mobilization; mechanisms to provide selective incentives are themselves a public good; dissident group suppliers of selective incentives are at a comparative disadvantage in providing such goods; offering selective incentives creates rival goods, minimum winning coalitions, and factionalism.[40] Given that these difficulties appear insurmountable, many argue that focusing on selective benefits hurts rather than helps revolutionary organizations. Thus, Skocpol advises dissident entrepreneurs not to fall into the trap of becoming just like their opponents: "Yet compared to nonrevolutionary politicians, revolutionaries may offer distinctive kinds of benefits to peasants and they certainly demand more costly kinds of support from peasants in return. Nonrevolutionary politicians are well advised to offer modest, economic benefits to particular individuals and subgroups, playing them off against others *within* the peasantry. Revolutionaries must attempt to stimulate demand for, and supply, more *collective* benefits (even if just at local levels)."[41]

Peasant Struggles and Selective Incentives: Evidence

These charges against the selective incentives idea deserve close scrutiny. I begin by testing the hypothesis that selective incentives underlie many peasant conflicts. The selective incentives solution implies that material self-interest drives peasant struggles. The counterargument is that material self-interest plays a limited part in peasant struggles. The approach offered here presents compelling evidence that dissident peasants often pursue their pecuniary self-interests. Three types of peasant struggles are examined: everyday forms of peasant resistance, unorganized rural protest, and organized rural rebellions.

Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance

Everyday forms of peasant resistance, or "weapons of the weak," are subtle Brechtian or Schweikan forms of resistance.[42] Peasants often

[39] Marvin Olsen et al., "Participation in Neighborhood Associations," *Sociological Focus* 22 (February 1989), 3.

[40] Besides these four logical gaps, several inherent limitations of using selective incentives to induce participation in collective dissent also exist. See Mark Irving Lichbach, *The Cooperator's Dilemma* (forthcoming), sec. 6.5.3.

[41] Skocpol (fn. 2), 171.

[42] James C. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).

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resort to these strategies when they are involved in a conflict with either landlords (for example, over wages, equipment, labor, rents, irrigation systems) or the state (for example, over taxes, the forced contribution of property, the forced requisition of labor). The strategies thus originate in perceived exploitation and injustice.

In using everyday forms of peasant resistance, a peasant seeks to manipulate the system to maximize his or her material benefits. Colburn refers to "the rational but self-interested maximization of welfare by the rural poor"[43] and suggests that peasants "work the system to their maximum advantage (or minimum disadvantage, per Hobsbawn), ever testing the limits of the possible."[44] He thus maintains that "the weapons of the weak are employed whenever and to the extent conditions permit the augmentation of meager earnings, the seizure of any possible windfall, and—most importantly—for deflating exactions.[45] Esman agrees: "These weapons [of everyday forms of peasant resistance] can be material or ideological. If material, they attempt to reduce the labor required or increase the share of the produce available to workers, their families, and kinfolk."[46] Many everyday forms of peasant resistance involve the receipt of material selective incentives by peasants.

One type that offers selective incentives is called "opportunism," or "moral hazard," in the economics literature.[47] These techniques involve such activities as shirking, foot dragging, slacking off, working slowly, showing up late, and taking long lunch breaks. The techniques also include false compliance, dissimulation, and feigned ignorance or stupidity. A final set of techniques entails the careless performance of one's obligations. Examples here are eating the grain instead of feeding it to livestock and using the worst tools or animals for manor work.

Robbery, another everyday form of peasant resistance, offers obvious selective incentives. Examples of pilfering landlord's property include the theft of wood in forests and poaching (for example, fish from ponds, game birds, and fruit from trees).[48] Among the economic crimes against government are smuggling, selling animals that are soon to be requisitioned, illegal land clearing, underreporting of land, misreporting of crop

[43] Forrest D. Colburn, "Foot Dragging and Other Peasant Responses to the Nicaraguan Revolution," in Colburn, ed., *Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1989), 194.

[44] Forrest D. Colburn, "Introduction," in Colburn (fn. 43), x.

[45] Colburn (fn. 43), 177.

[46] Milton J. Esman, "Commentary," in Colburn (fn. 43), 22.

[47] Thrainn Eggertsson, *Economic Behavior and Institutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

[48] Jacek Kochanowicz, "Between Submission and Violence: Peasant Resistance in the Polish Manorial Economy of the Eighteenth Century," in Colburn (fn. 43), 46.

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patterns and yields, making exaggerated claims about the theft and spoilage of grain, and hoarding grain for personal consumption.[49] The more dramatic examples here involve squatting and land invasions.

"Exit"[50] is a final everyday form of peasant resistance that holds out the promise of selective incentives. Via desertion, defection, flight, and escape, the peasant hopes to trade a situation that offers few material rewards for a situation that offers greater material advantage.

Unorganized Rural Protest

Some peasant protests and rebellions occur without the assistance of preexisting dissident organizations. Tilly characterizes the findings on these types of peasant struggles as follows: "In contrast with an older picture of rural rebellions as unfocused reactions to hardship or to rapid social change, the last two decades' work on the subject has revealed a general pattern of response to specific violations of well-established rights."[51] Scott thus proposes that the aims of the peasantry are typically limited and concrete,[52] suggesting that "to ignore the self-interested element in peasant resistance is to ignore the determinate context not only of peasant politics, but most lower-class politics."[53] Colburn agrees: "The political apathy in rural Nicaragua seems largely a matter of selfish calculations about benefits and costs: the benefits are reckoned to be for 'government' and the costs are personal."[54] More specifically, several forms of unorganized rural protest often involve selective incentives. These forms, including peasant jacqueries, food riots, social banditry, charivari, and preindustrial crowds, are discussed in the following paragraphs.

Peasant jacqueries often involve three types of activities. Peasants invade, seize, and occupy commons (for example, forests). They also seize private property. And finally, they renounce manorial dues and burn manor houses, with the goal of destroying deeds and archives that show who owes payments to whom. For example, Landsberger and Landsberger report that peasants tried to tear up and burn manor rolls, court records, and tax lists during the English Rising of 1381: "It seems correct to say that there was not a county where any action occurred—and this included a majority of counties of England—where manor rolls

[49] Nathan Brown, "The Conspiracy of Silence and the Atomistic Political Activity of the Egyptian Peasantry, 1882–1952," in Colburn (fn. 43), 106.

[50] Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).

[51] Charles Tilly, *The Vendée* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), vii.

[52] Scott (fn. 42), 342–45.

[53] Ibid., 295.

[54] Colburn (fn. 43), 192.

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and court records were not destroyed. Almost everywhere sheriffs, escheators, justices and tax collectors were sought out for threat and actual punishment."[55] Even though all peasant jacqueries involve some type of plunder, what peasants want most is land: once they think they have obtained title to their land, their jacqueries grind to a halt. Pettee thus reports that "after the burning of the chateaux in France by the peasants, for instance, destroying documents on which many of the privileges and abuses rested, the peasants never again had as much interest in the revolution, and never really supported the Jacobins."[56]

Food riots are another type of unorganized rural protest in which private motives lie behind dissident actions. Lefebvre observes that during food riots peasants would often assemble, seize grain, and sell it at a "fair" price.[57] Rudé thus refers to food riots as "taxation populaire" or "unofficial price control by collective action."[58] Sometimes peasants did not compensate owners by paying for the food. Mousnier reports, for example, that food riots among peasants in seventeenth-century France sometimes involved "taking bread without paying for it."[59] The key point is that, regardless of the particular type of food riot, food is available *only* to the riot's participants.

Social banditry is a third form of unorganized rural protest in which peasants seek both public goods and private profit.[60] In cases in which social bandits lack political ambition and emphasize private goods at the expense of public goods, social banditry shades into robbery. The roving bandit is one example. Mousnier provides an instance from seventeenth-century Ming China: "It seems that we see here men in arms to assuage their hunger by way of plunder. They appear all to have become professional bandits."[61] The fixed bandit is another example. Mafia-type organized robbery is the classic instance here. Sometimes, however, social bandits become more than mere plunderers and assume the role of Robin Hoods, agents of social protest who right social wrongs. Such social banditry succeeds, as Mousnier reports of seventeenth-century

[55] Betty H. Landsberger and Henry A. Landsberger, "The English Peasant Revolt of 1381," in Henry A. Landsberger, ed., *Rural Protest: Peasant Movements and Social Change* (London: Macmillan, 1974), 120. Destruction of documents, of course, has a public good component to it: it is not possible to exclude a taxpayer from the benefits of a fire. Selective incentives thinking would thus have us expect more looting and fewer fires, and fires that are preceded by looting.

[56] George Sawyer Pettee, *The Process of Revolution* (New York: Howard Fertig, 1971), 62.

[57] Georges Lefebvre, *The Coming of the French Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947), 147.

[58] George Rudé, *The Crowd in the French Revolution* (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), 23.

[59] Roland E. Mousnier, *Peasant Uprisings in Seventeenth-Century France, Russia, and China* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), 43.

[60] Hobsbawm (fn. 4), chap 2.

[61] Mousnier (fn. 59), 283.

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Russia, because of implicit and explicit support by peasants: "The people saw these bandits as their avengers. The peasants refused to cooperate with the authorities against them. On the contrary, they acted as guides and scouts for the bandits, gave them shelter, and harbored their stolen goods for them. Sometimes an *ataman* would become a popular hero, and his legendary feats would be celebrated in songs."[62]

Charivari, or "rough music," was an eighteenth-century form of unorganized rural protest. Peasants typically directed it against public officials who engaged in familial, sexual, or marital immorality. It too had a selective incentive component. Tilly reports that people "assemble in the streets outside a house; make a racket with songs, shouts and improvised instruments such as saucepans and wash tubs; require a pay off from the people inside the house, then leave if and when the people pay."[63]

Preindustrial crowds are a final form of unorganized rural protest in which peasants were often motivated by selective incentives. Rudé notes "the remarkable single-mindedness and discriminating purposefulness of [pre-industrial] crowds, even those whose actions appear to be most spontaneous."[64] Rudé further observes that preindustrial crowds "rioted for precise objects and rarely engaged in indiscriminate attacks on either property or persons."[65] Preindustrial rioters thus chose their targets and means carefully, for example, breaking into prisons to find and release supporters, leaders, and friends.[66]

Even more interestingly, preindustrial crowds often rioted because someone—often dissident entrepreneurs—paid them to riot. They were hired in effect as mercenary revolutionaries.[67] While such compensation might horrify contemporary academics, Rudé argues that preindustrial crowds fully expected to be rewarded for their efforts: "The people might also expect to be paid for carrying out such duties even if they were morally justified and performed as a kind of solemn public duty."[68] Rudé points out that "this was the well known device of 'raising a mob.'"[69] Several instances of preindustrial rioters who were directly compensated for their activities come to mind. Many late-eighteenth-century British mobs were "hired bands operating on behalf of external interests."[70] One

[62] Ibid., 179.
[63] Charles Tilly, *The Contentious French* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1986), 30.
[64] George Rudé, *The Crowd in History, 1730–1848* (New York: John Wiley, 1964), 253.
[65] Ibid., 227.
[66] Prison break-ins also have a strong public good component. See fn. 55.
[67] Thomas Ireland, "The Rationale of Revolt," *Papers on Nonmarket Decision Making* 3 (1967).
[68] Rudé (fn. 64), 227.
[69] Ibid., 217.
[70] E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), 75–76.

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example is the antirevolutionary "Church and King" mobs, employed from 1792 onward to terrorize wealthy and prominent English Jacobins and reformers. These mobs were operated legally, financed by local authorities and conservative gentry. They were provided, in effect, with "bribery and license."[71] Rudé[72] offers three additional examples from England: "Swing" rioters charged a fee for smashing threshing machines; Gordon rioters collected money "for the poor mob"; and the Rebecca Riots eventually "tended to fall into the hands of professionals who charged a price for their services." Thompson offers a final English example: "According to other accounts, this final phase of Luddism was the work of one or two almost 'professional' gangs, who were called in and paid by lodges of the now-underground union."[73] Examples also come from eighteenth-century France. The September "massacres" in Paris, for example, "extracted their reward in terms of food and drink."[74] Brown reports a modern version of this very direct use of selective incentives: Egyptian villagers hired professional criminals to do the dirty work of rebelling for them.[75]

Organized Rural Rebellion

Some peasant struggles involve fairly high levels of organization. One form of organized rural rebellion involves guerrilla armies. It is well known that guerrillas are often brigands and pirates. Thus, peasants involved in guerrilla armies often seek booty, captives, and the other spoils of victory. Peasant armies are often built around raiding, marauding, looting, pillaging, and sacking. The more organized the peasants, it often seems, the more organized the plunder and the rape, as in the following examples.

One comes from the Philippines. Walton reports the following of a peasant rebellion in the Philippines: "In December 1897 Aguinaldo [the rebel] agreed to peace terms that included vague words about reform and the very concrete sum of 800,000 pesos, which Aguinaldo and nineteen associates took with them in exile to Hong Kong."[76] China, too, provides examples of mobilization. In Ming China pecuniary motives and demands were behind provincial revolts against imperial clansmen, bondservant revolts against masters, and tenant revolts against lords.[77] In

[71] Ibid., 113.
[72] Rudé (fn. 64), 162, 227.
[73] Thompson (fn. 70), 574.
[74] Rudé (fn. 64), 574.
[75] Brown (fn. 49), 101.
[76] John Walton, *Reluctant Rebels: Comparative Studies of Revolution and Underdevelopment* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 48.
[77] Tong (fn. 24), 141.

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twentieth-century China warlords established patron-client ties, or a patronage system, to distribute plunder. A warlord thus "had to reward his officer-followers with money, weapons, and control over military units and territorial bases.[78] Russia offers another set of mobilization examples. Mousnier offers the following description of the "second Dmitri," part of the Russian peasant revolts during the "Time of Troubles" in the seventeenth century, as follows: "A small army gathered round the 'Brigand'—Cossacks, vagrants, and Polish adventurers, including several generals. These men had no illusion about their figurehead, any more than he had himself: the Brigand was an imposter whom his soldiers treated as a joke. The name of Dmitri provided cover for the operations of a band of plunderers."[79] The importance of plunder to Russian peasant upheavals is also well documented by Avrich. He writes that "Bulavin appealed to all who wanted to roam the open fields with him, to go in style, to drink sweetly, eat well, and ride fine horses."[80] He reports of one peasant upheaval that "the overriding objective was plunder. In every Volga district granaries were pillaged, livestock confiscated, timber felled and manor houses burned. In the towns, treasuries were emptied and the houses of the wealthy sacked and burned."[81] Of another occasion, Avrich recounts, "officials were executed, property confiscated, prisons thrown open, taxes abolished, records (title deeds) destroyed."[82] Avrich indicates further that "once in [their] hands the towns were given over to plunder. The rebels confiscated the government treasury and pillaged the cathedral, the bazaars, and the houses of the wealthy; then, in accordance with cossack tradition, they divided up the loot in equal shares."[83]

Rural guerrilla warfare thus mixes politics and crime, the pursuit of public goods and the pursuit of private goods, the search for social justice and the search for selective incentives. Avrich concludes that in less developed states the line between robbery and rebellion, the brigand and the dissident, is a fine one. He points to "that peculiar mixture of brigandage and revolt which characterized all the mass uprisings of the period. At first, to be sure, piracy was the dominant element; but the latent force of insurrection started to emerge, so that what began chiefly as an expedition of plunder was soon to be transformed into a full scale rebellion."[84]

[78] Skocpol (fn. 5), 237.
[79] Mousnier (fn. 59), 189.
[80] Paul Avrich, *Russian Rebels, 1600–1800* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972), 156.
[81] Ibid., 232.
[82] Ibid., 89.
[83] Ibid., 87.
[84] Ibid., 70.

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The modern form of organized rural rebellion involves revolutionary organizations. Selective incentives may be found here, too. Goodwin and Skocpol maintain that "in addition to collective goods, revolutionary organizations may also offer selective incentives to encourage participation in various sorts of activities, particularly dangerous ones like actual guerrilla warfare. Such incentives for actual or potential cadres and fighters and their families may include extra tax or rent reductions or an additional increment of land beyond that allocated to supporters in general. In any event, it is the ongoing provision of such collective and selective goods, not ideological conversion in the abstract, that has played the principal role in solidifying social support for guerrilla armies."[85] Migdal suggests that "like the other types of political organizations that peasants join, revolutionary movements must trade-off inducements of individual peasants in return for their participation and support."[86] Thus, he reports, peasants joined organizations in exchange for cigarettes, bath towels, soap, lines of credit, party or government jobs, and agricultural assistance.[87] Peasants also joined to gain assistance in pleading their case for special government favors, such as subsidies and tax exemptions, before officials of the state. Popkin argues that peasant organizations with excludable benefits, or benefits restricted only to contributors, are self-enforcing; that is, "when a member fails to pay or do his share, he loses his benefits." Hence, such organizations are more likely to succeed.[88] Popkin thus reports the following account of a Vietnamese communist peasant: "[Before joining] I thought about my grandmother. I worried that she would live in misery if I went off and joined the army because no one would be left to look after her. I brought these apprehensions up with the cadres and they said that they were certain that the village authorities would take care of my grandmother. After I left my grandmother was given 0.6 hectare of ricefield."[89]

Peasant Struggles and Selective Incentives: Implications

Given the fact of material selective incentives in peasant upheavals, two sets of questions become relevant. The first questions address causes: Under what conditions are material selective incentives central to peasant struggles? Where and when are nonmaterial altruistic appeals

[85] Jeff Goodwin and Theda Skocpol, "Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World," *Politics and Society* 17 (December 1989), 494.
[86] Migdal (fn. 4), 233.
[87] Ibid., chap 9.
[88] Popkin (fn. 12), 255.
[89] Ibid., 240.

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emphasized? The second questions address consequences: Under what conditions are material selective incentives effective in mobilizing peasants and achieving reform or revolution? Where and when are they counterproductive and harmful to the cause of the peasantry?

The Causes of Selective Incentives: Politics

The level of selective incentives in any peasant upheaval is a function of demand and supply. Peasants demand selective incentives. Potential suppliers include one or more dissident peasant organizations, the authorities, and the allies of both. The selective incentives market faces cutthroat competition, as each supplier bids for peasant support with selective incentives and tries to become a monopoly. This fight over alternative sources of supply helps define the politics of peasant struggles.

I will first consider how each of the relevant actors—peasants, dissident peasant organizations, and the authorities—influences the selective incentives market. I will then consider the political implications of this market.

PEASANTS

A peasant's interest in material selective incentives is a function of his or her income. Richer peasants can better afford to be motivated by nonmaterialistic considerations. They have the luxury of responding to appeals that solely emphasize political rights, social justice, public morality, and economic fairness. Middle[90] and poorer peasants are forced by their economic position to demand material selective incentives in return for their support of dissident peasant movements.[91]

Since the vast majority of peasants are middle and poor, the search for private benefits in exchange for participation influences most peasants' political activities. Their particular demands are affected, as are the quality, quantity, timing and direction of contributions.

First, peasants demand compensation for any personal costs they incur while participating in rural protests. Few peasants make sacrifices will-

[90] Wolf (fn. 4) stresses the vulnerability of middle peasants to market fluctuations. Such peasants often rebel to protect their economic positions.

[91] Two related observations follow. First, middle and poorer peasants are also likely to demand material selective incentives in exchange for their support of conventional political parties. Hence, there is a parallel here to the "neoclassical theory of patronage" that appears in the political parties literature. Martin Shefter summarizes the argument that immigrants, the poor, and displaced peasants are especially likely to demand patronage in exchange for their votes; see Shefter, "Party and Patronage: Germany, England, and Italy," *Politics and Society* 7, no. 4 (1977), 405. Second, material selective incentives are likely to be more prominent in poor people's movements than in rich people's movements. This is one reason why discussions of material selective incentives appear more often in accounts of peasant movements than in accounts of the New Social Movements; see Lichbach (fn. 13), sec. 6.5.3.2.

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ingly. Few accept short-run private costs without short-run private benefits. Most such potential dissidents are just like the one who exclaimed to Colburn, "I don't get involved in politics unless I get something out of it."[92]

Second, the availability of selective incentives determines whether or not peasants decide to join rural protests. Peasants are more likely to protest when public benefits are accompanied by private rewards. The many examples of selective incentives cited earlier are evidence of this point.

Peasants, third, will time their participation in rural protests to the availability of selective incentives; that is, they will join a protest movement only after the movement can offer selective incentives. Given that movements that succeed and become the government have more resources available than movements that have not yet succeeded, one expects rural movements to experience their greatest growth *after* the revolution. This proposition holds for the Bolsheviks after 1917 and the Spanish fascists after 1936;[93] it is also true of the successful peasant revolutions in China and Vietnam.

Finally, peasants chose to participate in certain types of actions and not others because of the relative selective incentives available. For example, some everyday forms of peasant resistance do not offer material selective incentives. Symbolic or ideological resistance occurs when peasants reject demeaning labels and withdraw deference. Verbal attacks on village elites involve gossip, slander, the use of nicknames, and character assassination. The use of force includes attacks on village elites (for example, beatings and murder) as well as attacks on their property (for example, arson and sabotage against crops, livestock, and equipment). One expects peasants to participate more frequently in those everyday forms of peasant resistance that yield selective benefits than in those everyday forms of peasant resistance that yield none. Thus, peasants employ symbolic resistance, a war of words, and the use of force less frequently than shirking, false compliance, and poaching. In short, peasants would rather steal than destroy property: everyday forms of peasant resistance will involve more theft than arson, more extortion than murder, more foot-dragging than slander. As Brown reports, "Resistance to the state through attacks on officials involved a small number of individuals."[94]

[92] Colburn (fn. 43), 192.
[93] Mark N. Hagopian, *The Phenomenon of Revolution* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1974), 306.
[94] Brown (fn. 49), 115.

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This line of reasoning leads to two other conclusions. During everyday forms of peasant resistance the destruction of property will be a pretext or cover for the theft of property. I do not know of such examples, however. One also expects peasants not to destroy property they need. Guha reports that peasants burn forests that are worked commercially but not forests that they use: "There is no evidence that the vast extent of broad-leaved forests, also under the control of the state, were at all affected. As in other societies in different historical epochs, this destruction by arson was not simply a nihilistic release but carefully selective in the targets attacked. As Eric Hobsbawm has argued, such destruction is never indiscriminate, for 'what is useful for poor men'—in this instance broad-leaved species far more than chir—is spared."[95]

DISSIDENT PEASANT ORGANIZATIONS

I now turn to supply considerations. Two types of dissident peasant organizations must be considered: those that are self-organized and those that are organized by outsiders. Both organizations aim to provide selective incentives efficiently.

Self-governing peasant institutions are prominent during everyday forms of peasant resistance. Such institutions are created in order to minimize the costs of obtaining selective incentives. Five cost-minimization techniques are employed. First, peasants adopt a "conspiracy of silence." Scott suggests that everyday forms of peasant resistance "cannot be sustained without a fairly high level of tacit cooperation among the class of resistors."[96] Brown suggests that "the peasantry's conspiracy of silence consisted of three elements: the refusal to report crime, the refusal to identify criminals, and the refusal to tell the truth about crime."[97] He concludes that "the conspiracy of silence brought the costs to atomistic action far lower than they would have been without community support."[98] Second, peasants do not employ formal organizations. Most everyday forms of peasant resistance are, in fact, unplanned and unsystematic. Third, peasants do not make their everyday forms of resistance part of an openly declared struggle; rather, they keep things quiet. They do not seek a direct confrontation with authorities; nor do they offer a symbolic public challenge to the existing power structure. Fourth, peasants keep everyday forms of peasant resistance on a small scale, which avoids the organizational costs of simultaneously mobilizing all potential

[95] Ramachandra Guha, "Saboteurs in the Forest: Colonialism and the Peasant Resistance in the Indian Himalaya," in Colburn (fn. 43), 82.
[96] Cited in Brown (fn. 49).
[97] Brown (fn. 49), 109.
[98] Ibid., 117.

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sympathizers. Finally, peasants disguise their everyday forms of resistance by keeping their activities clandestine, concealed, and surreptitious. Scott points out several "nocturnal threats by masked men."[99] Such instances occurred during Captain Swing, the Rebecca Riots, and Les Memoiselle. In addition, peasants often try to avoid detection by making anonymous threats.

In sum, everyday forms of peasant resistance are rooted in institutions that are cooperative, informal, undeclared, small-scale, and secretive. These arrangements serve the needs of the peasantry because they keep down the costs of selective incentives, costs that are paid in terms of economic oppression and political repression.

Selective incentives also explain another self-organized institution underlying collective dissent: bandwagons of protest and rebellion.[100] Mousnier offers the following account of the peasants of the French countryside during the seventeenth century: "Having during one of the riots managed to plunder some houses in the town, [they] withdrew with the loot to their villages, and their neighbors were soon stirred up by their bad example to engage in plundering. . . . In a moment, all the villagers dropped their ploughs and took up arms instead."[101] Bandwagons of peasant protest—the spatial contagion and temporal diffusion of peasant upheavals—thus may be traceable to the perceived availability of selective incentives.

There are other examples of dissidents organizing and governing themselves during protests and rebellions so as to provide selective incentives: the structure of mafias, peasant armies, social bandits, and base areas have been discussed in the literature. Worthy of further investigation are the study of the self-organizing and self-governing institutions created by dissidents to carry out their campaigns of collective dissent, how dissidents organize themselves to obtain selective incentives, and how they govern themselves to distribute those selective incentives.[102]

Now consider externally organized peasants. Entrepreneurs recognize a simple truth: successful organizations require rule-enforcing mechanisms; that is, their success is contingent on their ability to offer selective incentives that induce followers to act in certain ways. Organizations therefore achieve "mobilization by manipulation,"[103] including private

[99] James C. Scott, "Everyday Forms of Resistance," in Colburn (fn. 43), 247.
[100] Lichbach (fn. 13), sec. 4.1.2.
[101] Mousnier (fn. 59), 45.
[102] Lichbach (fn. 13), sec. 5.1.
[103] John A. Hannigan, "Alaine Touraine, Manuel Castells and Social Movement Theory: A Critical Appraisal," *Sociological Quarterly* 26, no. 4 (1985), 441.

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rewards. To assure that they can control the flow of selective incentives to a wary clientele, entrepreneurs design peasant organizations that are able to perform at least three tasks: obtain resources, recruit new members, and retain existing members.

How do dissident entrepreneurs find the resources needed to offer their followers selective incentives? According to Fireman and Gamson: "Organizers may offer selective incentives even though they lack the resources to provide them right away. Like entrepreneurs, organizers try to create or pool resources by using their skills and connections to convince constituents that they will be able to deliver selective incentives in the future."[104] Peasant entrepreneurs use six techniques to obtain and manage resources that are convertible into selective incentives.

First, they urge their followers to plunder. For example, supporters will be urged to rebel against their masters and take their possessions. Entrepreneurs encouraged Russian serfs, for instance, to murder their masters, burn title deeds, and then take food, money, and wives.[105]

Second, dissident entrepreneurs redistribute resources, a strategy that may be seen as "from each according to his or her politics, to each according to his or her politics." The idea, in other words, is to take from those outside the movement and give to those inside the movement. Popkin provides evidence on how the forced redistribution of resources creates selective incentives: "The Viet Minh collected large 'donations' from the well-to-do (protection money, in the eyes of the rich) and used some of this money to support the teachers."[106] As one of their followers reported, "The Viet Minh came through on their promises. They actually took the land from the landlords and distributed it among their followers.[107] Another example of this strategy comes from a Peruvian guerrilla organization: "Sendero has provided significant benefits to its supporters. Of course, it promised a better life. But the movement has also taken action—violent action—to benefit the peasants materially. After blacklisting relatively well-to-do landowners, shopkeepers and intermediaries, and either killing them or causing them to flee, Sendero distributed their property among villagers, and canceled debts to them."[108]

Third, dissident leaders attempt to privatize a good, issue, or grievance in which the group is interested. This solves the peasants' collective action problem by making benefits excludable and rival. Entrepreneurs

[104] Fireman and Gamson (fn. 29), 18.
[105] Avrich (fn. 80), 30.
[106] Popkin (fn. 12), 225.
[107] Ibid., 240.
[108] Cynthia McClintock, "Why Peasants Rebel: The Case of Peru's Sendero Luminoso," *World Politics* 37 (October 1984), 81.

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can control such benefits. For example, a dissident group can sell services on a fee-for-service basis and develop into a business enterprise. McClintock reports that Sendero, the Peruvian guerrilla organization, "offers recruits basic subsistence (probably possible as a result of Sendero's economic levies on the drug trade)."[109]

Fourth, dissident leaders can break the elites' monopoly on political institutions. Entrepreneurs may intervene for their supporters in local government;[110] they may also create new village organizations.[111] Local courts established by the Viet Minh to arbitrate local disputes, for instance, often provided selective incentives.

Fifth, dissident entrepreneurs seek patrons who can provide selective incentives. The regime, of course, is a potentially wealthy benefactor, since governments often reward peasants. Dissident entrepreneurs attempt to turn these rewards into selective incentives that they can control. Bates observes, for example, that entrepreneurs often demand divisible benefits from government (for example, schools, roads, clinics) rather than collective benefits (for example, higher prices for goods).[112] This is because entrepreneurs can parcel out divisible benefits to their peasant supporters. Entrepreneurs also prefer the government to distribute private rather than communal land because they can then parcel out the private land to their peasant supporters. Government thus turns out to be a particularly important patron of rural peasant organizations.

Finally, recall that selective incentives are always in short supply and are always demanded by the poorer peasants. Peasant entrepreneurs must therefore ration selective incentives: they reserve the expensive material incentives for mobilizing a few important elite participants and use the relatively costless selective incentives to mobilize the many nonelite participants. Wilson suggests that "exclusive material benefits are useful for attracting and holding members, but not for motivating present members to take on additional burdens or to perform particular tasks; individual material incentives, on the other hand, are designed precisely to secure not new members but specific contributions of time and efforts."[113] Marwell and Oliver conclude similarly that "money can buy time, but it is mostly used to buy large amounts of time from full-time activists and, almost never used to buy small amounts of time from a

[109] Ibid.
[110] Popkin (fn. 12).
[111] Ibid., 238; Lichbach (fn. 13), sec. 5.2.3.4.
[112] Robert H. Bates, "Macropolitical Economy in the Field of Development," in James A. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds., *Perspectives on Positive Political Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 43.
[113] James Q. Wilson, *Political Organizations* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 37.

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large number of people."[114] And Osanka reports of the guerrilla wars he studied that expensive selective incentives were offered only to elites: "The paid procedure of guerrilla recruitment is the least practiced procedure of the three [i.e., paid, forced, persuaded]. Guerrilla leadership will usually resort to this method only in cases where a unique technical skill is needed and the individuals possessing the unique skill cannot be persuaded to perform the needed task by ideological or moral argument. Professional people such as chemists, pharmacists, or doctors of medicine are the most common types that might be induced to serve the guerrillas by these means."[115] In short, while peasant entrepreneurs might offer expensive private benefits to activists, they rarely offer costly rewards for simply joining the group.

Recruitment strategies are a second aspect of dissident peasant organization affected by selective incentives. Entrepreneurs do not try to overcome the Peasant's Dilemma solely by ideology and appeal to a peasant's sense of duty and obligation. Since all dissident peasant groups appeal to material self-interest, dissident entrepreneurs thus prefer to use their peasant clientele's self-interests rather than to overcome those self-interests with appeals to the collective interest. Consequently, the typical dissident peasant organization devotes more resources to materialistic than to ideological appeals.[116]

The consequences for recruitment strategies are clear. First, entrepreneurs emphasize public goods that are specific and concrete, rather than general and abstract, as the building blocks of dissident peasant organizations. For example, dissident peasant organizations will emphasize their fight for a road and a bridge and not their struggle for "socialism" and "justice." In short, entrepreneurs seek benefits that are tangible, visible, and unambiguous (for example, jobs, roads, and bridges) rather than intangible, invisible, and ambiguous (for example, world revolution, socialism, and justice). Second, entrepreneurs appeal to peasants' immediate concerns rather than to their long-run interests. Third, entrepreneurs forge narrow short-term, single-issue coalitions, finding them to be more successful than long-term multiple-issue coalitions. Finally, dissident peasant organizations capitalize on community and local experience.[117] Consider former Speaker of the House Tip O'Neill's maxim of American politics: all politics are local. The collective action approach

[114] Gerald Marwell and Pamela Oliver, "Collective Action Theory and Social Movements Research," *Research in Social Movements, Conflict, and Change* 7 (1984), 15.

[115] Osanka (fn. 37), 411.

[116] Gordon Tullock, "The Economics of Revolution," in H. J. Johnson, J. J. Leach, and R. G. Muehlmann, eds., *Revolution, Systems, and Theories* (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1979), 53.

[117] Saul D. Alinsky, *Reveille for Radicals* (New York: Vintage Books, 1946).

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implies two related maxims: all grievances are local; all collective dissent is local.[118] Peasant struggles will thus be rooted in local quarrels or grievances rather than national struggles or issues. Several expectations follow. Dissident peasant organizations that attach local issues to national ones will be more successful than organizations that rely solely on national issues. Local peasant revolts are more likely to succeed than national peasant revolutions. Indigenous and native leaders who can tap into local issues are more likely to succeed in organizing peasants than are outside leaders.

These recruitment strategies are indeed found in organized peasant rebellions. Skocpol comments accordingly on the limited appeal of ideology in the great revolutions: "Peasants participated in these Revolutions without being converted to radical visions of a desired new national society, and without becoming a nationally organized class-for-themselves. Instead they struggled for concrete goals—typically involving access to more land, or freedom from claims on their surpluses."[119] Wesson observes that "Chinese rebel movements usually begin in opposition to local officials, remaining nominally loyal to the emperor until forced into total opposition."[120] Popkin reports that in Vietnam successful peasant entrepreneurs organized individual villages around important local problems. They first won support for less risky, small-scale projects that provided immediate and concrete benefits. They then tried to organize peasants for more uncertain, large-scale projects that could provide abstract benefits in the long run:

> In all four cases the initial organization of peasants focused on local goods and goods with immediate payoffs. This suggests that an important way to increase peasants' estimates of success, and therefore, the probability of contribution, is to decrease the scope of the project for which he is being recruited—and thus shorten the interval before benefits are received. The profits derived from local organizing can then be directed by the leadership to larger, more national goals and projects, which take longer to pay off.[121]

Thompson[122] and Rudé[123] offer many examples of peasants' concrete grievances and specific rent-seeking activities. Such examples, as Scott suggests, may be multiplied manyfold: "A historical examination of the rank and file of nearly any manifestly revolutionary movement will show

[118] This idea is, of course, consistent with Olson's federal group solution; see Lichbach (fn. 13), sec. 6.3.3.

[119] Skocpol (fn. 5), 114.

[120] Robert G. Wesson, *The Imperial Order* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 202.

[121] Popkin (fn. 12), 262.

[122] Thompson (fn. 70).

[123] Rudé (fn. 58).

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that the objectives sought are usually limited and even reformist in tone, although the means adopted to achieve them may be revolutionary. Thus trade-union consciousness is not, as Lenin claimed, the major obstacle to revolution, but rather the only plausible basis for it.[124]

Hence, many recruitment strategies employed by peasant entrepreneurs find their origin in the search for selective incentives. Recruitment cannot sustain an organization indefinitely, however. To retain recruits, dissident entrepreneurs must provide selective incentives over the long haul. This means, quite simply, that entrepreneurs offer activists the opportunity to turn their activism into a career.

A study of career patterns in collective dissent offers some final implications of the idea that dissident peasants seek material selective incentives. Kahn observes that "the best organizers in the world tend to become unhappy when they miss their paychecks for three weeks in a row."[125] In short, whereas activists initially volunteer their time, they quickly attempt to become paid staff and thereby make a career out of membership in a dissident group. Such efforts snowball, as each participant argues, "Look, if *they* are going to get paid for doing this, why should *I* do it for free?"[126] Dissident entrepreneurs can appreciate and exploit careerism by providing patronage in exchange for support. In the short run, entrepreneurs offer activists positions in the dissident organization. Tarrow reports, for example, that "the movement press...provided jobs for people in the movement sector who needed to support themselves 'outside the system.'"[127] In the long run, entrepreneurs promise activists positions in the postrevolutionary regime. Hagopian reports, for instance, that "in the French Revolution, many *sans culottes* militants even if they were not moved by ambition alone, considered the procurement of a position as the legitimate payment for militant activity."[128]

Academics have observed this iron law of professionalism and careerism in collective dissent. Hagopian, for example, writes that "it is not only the topmost of the revolutionary elite who feel tempted to use office for personal and mundane purposes. The transformation of ordinary militant into functionary is a good part of the late history of most revolutions."[129] McCarthy and Zald note that over time more and more

[124] Scott (fn. 42), 317–18.
[125] Si Kahn, *Organizing: A Guide for Grassroots Leaders* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982), 68.
[126] Ibid., 70.
[127] Sidney Tarrow, *Democracy and Disorder: Protest and Politics in Italy, 1965–1975* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 230.
[128] Hagopian (fn. 93), 230.
[129] Ibid.

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activists are paid for their activities.[130] A leadership cadre of paid professionals typically emerges. Indeed, the dissidents themselves have noticed this iron law. Thus, Kahn observes that "there are professional organizers...who earn a living helping people organize themselves."[131] Further study of this phenomenon in legal and extralegal peasant organizations is needed.

THE AUTHORITIES

The state and its allies also influence the supply of selective incentives. In fact, it is much easier to find examples of selective incentives offered by elites and authorities than by nonelites and dissidents. Governments respond to unorganized rural protest by offering private rewards to two sets of actors.

Regimes offer selective incentives to the forces of "order": armies, police, and militia. Two examples illustrate the point. Mousnier reports that a seventeenth-century French king offered selective incentives to those of his troops who put down peasant disturbances: "The soldiers broke into larders and wardrobes; stole money, clothes, jewels, food, and wine; slaughtered the poultry, carried off the cattle, threw furniture and doors into the fire; raped women and girls; and manhandled or murdered their husbands and fathers."[132] Second, local governments, business leaders, and large landowners financed the fascist thugs who intimidated peasants in pre-Mussolini Italy.

Regimes also offer private rewards to the forces of "disorder," hoping to co-opt potentially dissident peasants into becoming "paid riders" and hence to turn peasant rebellions into peasant-peasant struggles.[133] Three examples illustrate the point. Mousnier reports that the French king often put down peasant revolts by recruiting soldiers among the rebelling regions, "reducing thereby the number of rebels."[134] Scott reports that Razak, one of his peasant villagers,

> paid the M$1 subscription to join the village branch of the ruling party, which dominates politics and the division of whatever loaves and fishes filter down to the village level....Razak's logic, shared by some but by no means all of the village poor, has paid the expected dividends. When a drought a year earlier forced the cancellation of the irrigated paddy sea-

[130] John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, *The Trend of Social Movements in America: Professionalization and Resource Mobilization* (Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1973).

[131] Kahn (fn. 125), 9.

[132] Mousnier (fn. 59), 43.

[133] D. R. Lee and T. Sandler, "On the Optimal Retaliation against Terrorists: The Paid-Rider Option," *Public Choice* 61, no. 2 (1989).

[134] Mousnier (fn. 59), 66.

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> son, the government created a work-relief program. Politics weighted heavily in the selection of workers and Razak was a winner. The local Farmers' Association office hired him to take care of their poultry for forty days at M$4.50 a day, and he was paid M$50 to help clear weeds from a section of irrigation canal. None of the poor villagers who were on the wrong side of the political fence did nearly as well.[135]

The Mexican Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) is a final example of how government-provided selective incentives contain popular participation. This governing party controls worker and peasant unions through an elaborate system of payoffs and patron-client ties.

Local elites also react to the success of material selective incentives at mobilizing peasants. For example, how might landlords respond to Brechtian or Schweikan forms of resistance? The problem of and solution to everyday forms of peasant resistance that involve opportunism are well identified in the new institutional economies literature.[136] Landlords face a moral hazard problem: they have a difficult time discovering whether meager returns from their land are caused by bad luck or the poor performance of their peasant laborers. Landlords confronted by opportunism will thus try to impose on their tenants a form of contract such as fixed rent, share, or wage that is designed to minimize such tactics. If landlords dominate village legal institutions, one expects that contract law will take account of landlord interests in this matter. The problem and solution to everyday forms of peasant resistance that involve theft are well identified in the economics of crime literature.[137] Landlords confronted by theft will employ various monitoring and policing behaviors. They will attempt, for example, to increase the severity and certainty of punishment. Furthermore, if landlords dominate village police institutions, one expects policing policies to take landlord interests into account.

The state influences the level of selective incentives in collective dissent in yet another way. In states where political corruption is widespread, the translation of political into economic power is both crude and direct. For example, where the typical sources of economic power, such as landownership and control of mineral resources, are inaccessible and static, government is often the sole means of achieving wealth and power. Post–World War II examples of parasitic and predatory states include Cuba under Batista, Nicaragua under Samosa, Haiti under Papa

[135] Scott (fn. 42), 11–12.
[136] Eggertsson (fn. 47).
[137] Gary S. Becker, "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," *Journal of Political Economy* 76 (March–April 1968).

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Doc, Iran under the Shah, and the Philippines under Marcos. Kling suggests that under such regimes, "government does not merely constitute the stakes of a struggle among rival economic interests; government itself is a unique base of economic power."[138] Nkrumah's dictum, "Seek ye first the political kingdom,"[139] is therefore particularly relevant. Predatory states thus encourage rent seeking among elites and therefore selective incentive seeking among peasants.

THE POLITICS OF SELECTIVE INCENTIVES

In sum, government, the private sector, and a variety of dissident groups can provide selective incentives. Given that peasants have more than one potential supplier, they can comparison shop for the best deal[140] offered by the various dissident groups and opt to join certain rural movements rather than others based on the relative selective incentives available. Popkin shows how various dissident groups in Vietnam competed for supporters by offering selective incentives.[141] He also shows why the Communist Party was successful: it organized itself to provide selective incentives far more effectively than any other group.

In the competition among dissident peasant organizations, the optimal way to offer selective incentives is to be the only supplier. Entrepreneurs realize that selective incentives are less effective at overcoming their group's collective action problem under two conditions: someone (government, the private sector, or another dissident group) can provide the same selective incentives that they can; someone can provide selective incentives more cheaply. The consequences are clear. Dissident peasant organizations will find that more peasants join their group if they ensure that the *only* way to obtain selective incentives is to join the group.[142] Dissident peasant organizations that have exclusive access to selective incentives will be better able to mobilize supporters than groups that do not monopolize access. The lesson for potential peasant leaders is clear: entrepreneurs who can control excludable selective incentives will be more successful than those who cannot.

[138] Merle Kling, "Towards a Theory of Power and Political Instability in Latin America," *Western Political Quarterly* 9 (March 1956).

[139] Roberta E. McKown, "Domestic Correlates of Military Intervention in African Politics," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 3 (Fall 1975), 193.

[140] Peasants who are bullied and brutalized into joining dissident movements have, of course, relatively little "choice." The market metaphor is not meant to demean the experiences of the millions of peasants who have been maimed and murdered in the name of revolution. See (fn. 14).

[141] Popkin (fn. 19).

[142] Lichbach (fn. 13); Ronald Rogowski, "Causes and Varieties of Nationalism: A Rationalist Account," in Edward Tiryakian and Ronald Rogowski, eds., *New Nationalisms of the Developed West: Toward Explanation* (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1985), 89.

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Competing dissident peasant organizations therefore seek to end the competition, as each attempts to become the monopoly supplier of selective incentives.

One might assume (based on elementary microeconomic theory) that efforts to monopolize the supply of selective incentives would reduce the supply of selective incentives. It might appear further that competition among the suppliers of selective incentives favors appeals based on selective incentives rather than appeals based on collective benefits. The reality is otherwise, however; competition among dissident peasant organizations, and competition between the regime and dissident peasant organizations, actually decreases the supply of selective incentives; and it is monopoly that offers dissident peasant organizations the better opportunities to win support by materialistic appeals.

The reason is that competition makes ideological appeals relevant—peasants must pay attention to the different appeals. The success of one side rather than the other will help to define the national agenda and hence affect the peasant's personal situation and his or her local community. When multiple dissident groups compete for support, dissidents therefore donate to affect public good programs and not merely to obtain the good.[143] If, however, either a dissident peasant organization or the authorities exercise a monopoly in some local community, there is no incentive to pay attention to the various stands on great national issues. Peasants will instead most likely strike their best deal with the existing powers.[144]

Competition between the state and a dissident peasant organization damages the use of selective incentives for an additional reason. As already indicated, regimes can usually outbid dissidents. Hence, dissident peasant organizations, unable to enter a bidding war, are likely to emphasize collective benefits over selective incentives.[145] In order to mobilize support with selective incentives, dissident peasant organizations thus need to be geographically remote from the regime. When they are far removed from the regime they can use selective incentives to convert the apathetic to the involved, the nonactivist to the activist.

[143] Lichbach (fn. 13), sec. 6.4.3.

[144] For a parallel argument about political parties in the American South, see V. O. Key, *Southern Politics* (New York: Knopf, 1950). For one about Kenyan political parties, see Robert H. Bates, *Beyond the Miracle of the Market: The Political Economy of Agrarian Development in Kenya* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 91–92.

[145] There is again a parallel in the political parties literature; see Shefter (fn. 91), 417. Internally organized parties (e.g., those that are formed by dissident government elites) are more likely than are externally organized parties (e.g., those that are formed by counterelites) to use patronage. The great ideologies that often emerge in externally organized parties are thus a substitute for government-offered patronage.

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In sum, the struggle over the selective incentives solution to the peasants' collective action problem is a crucial aspect of the political struggle between peasants and their opponents. It helps determine whether material selective incentives or nonmaterial collective benefits will be emphasized in mobilizing peasants. Materialistic appeals will be made to poor and middle peasants, especially when one supplier of selective incentives gains a monopoly. Such appeals are particularly attractive in states with widespread political corruption. Ideological appeals will be made to rich peasants. They will be especially prominent when the competition among suppliers is fierce. They are particularly attractive in states without a strong tradition of political corruption.

The Outcomes of Selective Incentives: Unintended Consequences

The centrality of selective incentives to peasant struggles has so far been demonstrated here in two ways: by providing evidence of the widespread existence of selective incentives in peasant struggles and by tracing the origins of selective incentives to the political struggles of the peasantry. A nagging problem remains. Colburn puts his finger on it: "It is an embarrassment that the supposed benefactors of the revolution prove to be as selfish as the economic elite of the old order."[146] Two questions thus arise. First, does not the pursuit of material self-interest automatically disqualify peasant behavior from being considered "political," let alone truly "revolutionary"? And second, does not the pursuit of material self-interest hurt rather than help the collective cause of the peasantry?

The first question can be divided into the issues of whether the goals and/or the means of materially self-interested peasants are political. In addressing these two issues, one confronts the limitations of collective action theories: they do not allow for an a priori determination of whether the peasantry's aims are political. This issue can only be decided a posteriori by empirical work. Collective action theories assume that some group exists in the sense that common goals exist. Hence, if peasants do not share common goals that extend beyond the pursuit of material self-interest; if peasants do not pursue a public good in addition to selective incentives; if peasants are not interested in social justice as a complement to personal aggrandizement; or if peasants have no political ambitions but only criminal ones—then the theory developed here *does not apply*.[147] For example, where peasants do not use a conception of

[146] Colburn (fn. 43), 195. Or, to quote a line from a Woody Guthrie song, "Some rob you with a six-gun, some with a fountain pen."

[147] In short, no collective goal, no collectivity; no collectivity, no selective incentives. The collective action model thus fits Thompson's (fn. 70) notion of class = class consciousness. Other theories of class

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right and wrong (for example, "the norm of reciprocity," "the right to subsistence")[148] and where they do not see their actions as directed toward righting those wrongs, collective action theories are not relevant. No public good, after all, is being sought. The search for selective incentives can supplement but not replace the search for collective gains.

Whether the peasantry's means are political is also an empirical question, not an analytical one. Collective action theories assume that a series of individual peasant actions help achieve some public good. If such a dissident "production function" does not exist; if peasants have no sense that they are working collectively toward some common end; or if peasants are oblivious to their interactions, then the theory developed here also *does not apply*. For instance, if peasants who loot manors during a jacquerie do not believe that their activities further their collective cause *as well as* offer personal enrichment, then they are indeed thieves and not rebels. No collective dissent, after all, is being undertaken.

One example of the controversy over whether materially self-interested peasants pursue common or political goals and use common or political means is the debate over whether everyday forms of peasant resistance are political. In those situations self-help schemes do result in self-aggrandizement, but common/political goals and common/political actions definitely exist as well. Brown maintains that peasants who use everyday forms of peasant resistance pursue political goals. As he puts it, "Almost all political acts were self-interested in the sense that they were designed to redress individual grievances."[149] Brown also maintains that peasants who use everyday forms of peasant resistance pursue political means, which he sees in the implicit cooperation among peasants: "Atomistic acts should be considered political because they were made thinkable by the consensus and support of the community. . . . A shoplifter helps himself in a way that is not political. A group of shoppers who, in an atmosphere of distress over high prices, simultaneously refused to pay for their groceries or stand back while a few attack the grocer, are helping themselves in a communitarian—and political—fashion."[150] In other words, the conclusion "public goods or political goals

argue differently. Marx's notion was that class = means of production. Perry Anderson, *Arguments within English Marxism* (London: New Left Books, 1980), 43, defends this later position: "Social classes may not become conscious of themselves, may fail to act or behave in common, but they still remain—materially, historically—classes." Collective action theories, therefore, take a particular point of view on the issue of group formation. However, a collectivity in which virtually no one realizes that there is a collectivity might, quite literally, have the biggest collective action problem of all.

[148] Scott (fn. 3).

[149] Brown (fn. 49), 107.

[150] Ibid., 108.

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are not sought; collective action or political means are not employed" does not follow from the premise "peasants are pursuing their self-interest." Self-interested behavior does not automatically imply apolitical behavior. The pursuit of selective incentives does not diminish the politics of the peasantry's goals or means. This issue, as indicated earlier, must be settled outside of the collective action framework.

The pursuit of self-interest and the pursuit of class interest are thus not contradictory. As Scott argues, "If class domination is a process of systematic appropriation, then the measures devised to thwart that appropriation constitute a form of resistance. All class struggle must necessarily join self-interested material needs with conflict."[151] White makes a similar point: "When peasants react in a utilitarian and individualist fashion against the powerful forces destroying their lives they are also engaging in class struggle. In acting to marginally increase their chance for survival against devastating odds, they are also carrying out acts of resistance."[152] The generalization of Scott and White's argument was offered by the first-century Palestinian rabbi Hillel: "If I am not for myself, who will be for me? And if I am for myself only, what am I? And if not now, when?"[153]

Now consider the second question: does the pursuit of material self-interest actually further collective political goals? Recall that critics charge that the idea implies that public goods are unnecessary for rebellion. Some peasants who are unconcerned with political goals could be led to collective action by the lure of selective incentives.[154] Such people might contribute to the public good, but can they serve as the foundation of a political movement?

If disinterest in the public good characterizes many dissident peasants, any achievement of the public good by the peasantry occurs despite the fact that many peasants are pursuing a private agenda. And here we note a great irony: self-interest and not collective interest can lead to collective success. That collective action can be the unintentional by-product of the pursuit of private interests was one of Olson's original and most important insights. We can now understand an often observed syndrome in peasant struggles: dissident peasants do not formally, explicitly, or consciously pursue a common goal; collective goals, ideologies, and policies are only remotely connected to peasant collective action; peasants take individual actions for personal aggrandizement; peasants are some-

[151] Scott (fn. 99), 22.

[152] James W. White, "Rational Rioters: Leaders, Followers, and Popular Protest in Early Modern Japan," *Politics and Society* 16 (March 1988), 49.

[153] *Ethics of the Fathers* 1:14.

[154] But not all, for then there would be no collective action problem.

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how able to overcome these difficulties and alleviate their burdens. The unintended consequences of individual actions are again at work. For example, peasants in the tsar's army deserted en masse during World War I. Three collective goals, one might speculate, were sought: bring down the tsar, conclude the war, and end conscription. No soldier had to think to himself, If I desert, the war will end. Each soldier wanted only to end his own involvement with the tsar's army. Deserting was thus the selective incentive available to each of the peasant soldiers. This selective incentive ultimately allowed all of them to achieve the three public goods they all sought.

Successful collective action thus appears fragile, an unintended consequence of self-interest. However, might the glass be half full rather than half empty? The other side of the coin is that self-interest can indeed further the collective interest. Even if a public good is obtained as a by-product of the pursuit of private goods, a public good *is* obtained. In this sense, the selective incentives argument combines Smith and Marx. Class struggle, the organizing principle of Marxian analysis, is pursued through maximizing one's utility subject to constraints, the organizing principle of neoclassical economics. There is no contradiction between the pursuit of material self-interest and the pursuit of class struggle (compare Scott, White, and Hillel). The pursuit of material self-interest need not hurt collective action—indeed, may even be the sine qua non of successful collective action.

Two conclusions follow. First, a public good alone is never enough to start a peasant rebellion. The prospect of material selective incentives must somehow enter the picture. Second, selective incentives alone are never enough to sustain a peasant rebellion. To be effective, selective incentives must be tied to ideological appeals. Selective incentives without political ideology are counterproductive. Like everything else, they have a diminishing marginal utility. And like almost everything else, they have complements and substitutes.

Hence, peasant entrepreneurs who provide material selective incentives must also emphasize goals. This principle explains why unorganized peasant upheavals and rural banditry almost always degenerate: participants are too easily attracted to selective incentives. Organization is thus the sine qua non of successful peasant upheavals because it rations selective incentives. Peasant organizations would limit selective incentives even if they did not have limited resources.

In sum, the selective incentives solution to Olson's problem no doubt expresses part of the truth. There are numerous examples of selective incentives proving to be absolutely essential to peasant rebellions. The

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intended consequences of selective incentives include successful mobilization and the successful achievement of a public good. However, counterexamples can just as easily be found where selective incentives were much less relevant to peasant struggles. The unintended consequences of selective incentives included co-optation, reformism, and the diversion from revolutionary goals. The key then is to discover where and when the solution works. Under what conditions do selective incentives actually mobilize peasants? Where and when do they achieve the public good sought? My argument is that successful peasant organizations are able to balance appeals to material selective incentives with appeals to the public good.[155] Neither exclusively romantic nor exclusively rationalist views of the peasantry are justified. A peasant, no less than anyone else, needs a head and a heart. Collective action theories reveal *the flaws of a disembodied focus on one to the exclusion of the other.*

Conclusion

This analysis has addressed two challenges to the selective incentives idea.

First, almost anything that motivates people (for example, prestige, altruism) can be labeled a selective incentive. Hence, the selective incentives idea is tautological. It merely redescribes collective action with another vocabulary. I would respond that a narrowly materialist conception of selective incentives fits many of the facts of peasant struggles. Peasant rebels do seek private pecuniary rewards. Moreover, a narrowly materialist conception of selective incentives offers many important insights into peasant conflicts. The causes, courses, and consequences of peasant struggles are affected by the peasantry's search for private material rewards.

Second, the selective incentives solution has the four logical flaws identified earlier. To this I would respond that empirical study resolves the analytical difficulties. (1) Selective incentives have deftly combined with the pursuit of public goods. The pursuit of selective incentives renders the public good not irrelevant but rather even more relevant. (2) Entrepreneurs have been willing to invest in the production of selective incentives. The public good aspect of selective incentives gets solved. (3) Dissidents attempt to overcome their competitive disadvantage in providing selective incentives by becoming a monopoly. Competition stirs action, even when confronted by a powerful foe such

[155] Desai and Eckstein (fn. 2) reach a similar conclusion by a different route. They argue that peasant insurgency combines the millenarian "spirit" of traditional peasant rebellion with the "rational" ideologies, organizations, and tactics of the modern era.

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as the state. And (4) peasants adopt several strategies to overcome their limited resources and create selective incentives. Resources are not a given but change over time.

This analysis has also revealed the value of examining material selective incentives in peasant struggles. A study of the causes and consequences of selective incentives leads to a study of the politics of peasant struggles. Selective incentives affect the strategies and tactics of various actors, including peasants, landlords, allies of the peasantry, and the state. They affect the institutional structure of peasant organization. And they affect nonmaterial altruistic appeals.

In sum, peasant collective action is a dilemma wrapped inside a paradox wrapped inside an irony. The dilemma is that peasants would be better off cooperating, yet they do not. The paradox is that rational peasants should not cooperate, but they do. The irony is that selfishness can explain the paradox and solve the dilemma. Selfishness, that is, often permits the cooperation that facilitates the emergence of purportedly selfless goals.

Our appreciation of peasant collective action is enriched by our understanding of these truths. Peasants, just like the rest of us, like to be paid for what they do. And peasants, just like the rest of us, attempt to balance the public and the private spheres of their lives.

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Review Article

POWER AND THE CONTROL OF CAPITAL

By JEFFREY A. WINTERS*

Sylvia Maxfield. *Governing Capital: International Finance and Mexican Politics.* Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990, 198 pp.

Jung-en Woo (now Meredith Woo-Cumings). *Race to the Swift: State and Finance in Korean Industrialization.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1991, 280 pp.

Jeffry A. Frieden. *Debt, Development, and Democracy: Modern Political Economy and Latin America, 1965–1985.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991, 280 pp.

Introduction

THE dominant political tensions within capitalism concern the control of investment resources and the division of the surplus from production. The source of the friction is the sharp separation between economic and political power. Hence, although individuals exercising private discretion over substantial economic resources fueled the charge for representative institutions in Europe, the rise of democracy was from the beginning a doubly stunted project.[1] Representation was deliberately restricted to the propertied males who pressed for it, and more importantly direct discretionary control over capital was kept as much as possible out of government hands.[2] Meanwhile, the

* My thanks to Matthew Evangelista, Robert Pahre, and Edward Gibson for their comments and conversations. I take full responsibility for all errors.

[1] See Barrington Moore, Jr., *The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966); Joseph A. Schumpeter, "The Crisis of the Tax State," in Richard A. Musgrave and Alan T. Peacock, eds., *Classics in the Theory of Public Finance* (New York: MacMillan, 1958), esp. 14–16; Robert H. Bates and Da-Hsiang Donald Lien, "A Note on Taxation, Development and Representative Government," *Politics and Society* 14, no. 1 (1985); Edgar Kiser and Yoram Barzel, "The Origins of Democracy in England" (Preliminary draft presented at the conference on "Revenue Extraction and the Institutionalization of the State," Seattle, April 27–29, 1990).

[2] Karl Polanyi writes: "In England it became the unwritten law of the Constitution that the working class must be denied the vote. The Chartist leaders were jailed; their adherents, numbered in the millions, were derided by a legislature representing a bare fraction of the population, and the mere demand for the ballot was often treated as a criminal act by the authorities." He adds: "Inside and outside England, from Macaulay to Mises, from Spencer to Sumner, there was not a militant liberal who did not express his conviction that popular democracy was a danger to capitalism" (p. 226). Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (Boston: Beacon Hill Press, 1944). Robert Dahl makes the point for the United States: one of the deepest concerns of John Adams,

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unpropertied struggled bitterly for generations to gain access to these exclusive representative bodies. But the victories, when won, were always partial: laborers and their allies never achieved full democratic control over society and all its resources but rather only managed to gain the opportunity to shape (in the limited sense of tinkering at the margins with profit differentials and other inducements) the climate within which private investors deployed their capital.[3] Except in extraordinary moments, more direct and binding influence on how a society's investment capital should be allocated has remained elusive. For one, the very institution of private property precludes any such thing as "a society's investment capital." Instead, a small number of individuals control capital, and they happen to be grouped and protected along nation-state lines.

The underlying ideology of capitalism maintains that far from being a source of tension, this arrangement of keeping the "economic government" strictly private is the best way to assure the prosperity and stability of the entire community.[4] The reality, meanwhile, is that conflict is widespread. And for many postcolonial systems in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, even the partial sort of democracy achieved in advanced-industrial countries is far from assured.[5] Workers struggle for the surplus against those who control the means of production.[6] As it turns out, communities and societies quite often are not well served by the investment activity of capital controllers.[7] And even officials

Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison, among others at the Constitutional Convention, was that "political equality might conflict with political liberty." They "had been alarmed by the prospect that democracy, political equality, majority rule, and even political liberty itself would endanger the rights of property owners to preserve their property and use it as they chose" (p. 2). Dahl, *A Preface to Economic Democracy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

[3] Rudolf Goldscheid writes that "the masses which eventually acquired greater power in the State saw themselves cheated of their prize when they got not the rich State but the poor one." In the era of constitutional government "state and property became separated" for the first time in history. "The rising bourgeois classes wanted a poor State, a State depending for its revenue on their good graces, because these classes knew their own power to depend upon what the State did or did not have money for" (p. 205). See Goldscheid, "A Sociological Approach to Problems of Public Finance," in Musgrave and Peacock (fn. 1), 202–13. For an opposing view, see Adam Przeworski and Michael Wallerstein, "Structural Dependence of the State on Capital," *American Political Science Review* 82 (March 1988). Frieden also believes that despite high capital mobility, governments still have significant power to control economic policies. See Frieden, "Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance," *International Organization* 45 (Autumn 1991).

[4] Spencer J. Pack, *Capitalism as a Moral System* (London: Edward Elgar, 1991), provides a useful review.

[5] Of course, Canada, Australia, and the United States are all postcolonial. Throughout this essay the term refers to countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Though not ideal, it is preferable to "Third World" or "developing."

[6] Harry Braverman, *Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974).

[7] On the use of the term "capital controllers" instead of the more narrow "capitalists," see Ralf Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959),

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staffing the guarantor-state find that the decisions of investing classes complicate their own plans for staying in power and maintaining political stability.[8] This results in challenges to the privileged position of private capital controllers, even from those who in principle accept the fundamental rights of investors to dispose of their resources as they please. It is hardly surprising then that investors deploy their capital to defend the very prerogatives of private property as much as to capture wider markets and make handsome profits.

As with other sites of contestation within capitalism, the realm of banking and finance reflects the tensions inherent in a system that concentrates in the hands of an unelected and unaccountable few discretionary power over resources crucial to the life chances of the many. Notwithstanding the technocratic flavor of most writings on banking and finance, the resources involved are no more insulated from the power struggles over basic control than are those in any other area within capitalism. In at least two senses, however, the political economy of finance capital is different. First, financial capital is markedly more fluid and mobile than other forms. The structural-political power of those controlling liquid capital is augmented by the sheer speed and scale with which essential investment resources can be supplied or withdrawn.[9] And second, the relationship between finance capital and the state is more complex and mixed than with other forms of capital. The staggering flows of transnational finance capital have a much more murky "nationality," with the result that they fit less well into the nation-centered analytical categories still quite common in theories of capital-state relations. And yet the state tends to play an

esp. 41–48. The literature on the tension between communities and those controlling capital for them is extensive and extremely rich. See Christopher Gunn and Hazel Dayton Gunn, *Reclaiming Capital: Democratic Initiatives and Community Development* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991); John R. Logan and Harvey L. Molotoch, *Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); Peter K. Eisinger, *The Rise of the Entrepreneurial State: State and Local Economic Development Policy in the United States* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988); Matthew Crenson, *The Un-Politics of Air Pollution* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971); Paul E. Peterson, *City Limits* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1981); D. C. Perrons, "The Role of Ireland in the New International Division of Labour: A Proposed Framework for Regional Analysis," *Regional Studies* 15, no. 2 (1981); M. F. Ward, "Political Economy, Industrial Location and the European Motor Car Industry in the Postwar Period," *Regional Studies* 16, no. 6 (1982); Richard A. Walker and Michael Storper, "Capital and Industrial Location," *Progress in Human Geography* 5, no. 4 (1981).

[8] Polanyi (fn. 2) makes the point nicely. See also Charles E. Lindblom, "The Market as Prison," *Journal of Politics* 44 (May 1982); idem, *Politics and Markets* (New York: Basic Books, 1977); and Fred Block, "The Ruling Class Does Not Rule: Notes on the Marxist Theory of the State," *Socialist Revolution* 7 (May–June 1977).

[9] Those controlling less mobile forms of capital also exercise structural power, though the time between, say, a threat to disinvest and actually doing so tends to be much longer. From the perspective of a government official, more time translates into less pressure.

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exaggerated role in mobilizing and controlling finance capital, even when the state sector for direct production is small. Advanced-industrial states (and the multilateral bodies they fund and dominate) act as suppliers of huge flows of loan capital and grants to postcolonial systems.

The Political Economy of Banking and Finance

Although financiers have operated for centuries—initially as suppliers of credit to European princes and merchants—the political leverage enjoyed by actors controlling liquid assets has begun to be examined only recently.[10] Marx was quite interested in the class power of capital but did not analyze bankers in any systematic way, largely because they were not yet significant players in capitalist industry as providers of resources for private investment. It was not until Hilferding first examined the rise of joint-stock companies and the entry of bank finance into the industrial realm that the political impact of *finanz Kapital* was probed. Hilferding's work inspired considerable interest and debate, notably from Lenin, Bukharin, and Luxemburg.[11] Even so, however, they never focused on the distinctive political leverage of those commanding financial resources. Rather, their work reflected the concerns of the time and was preoccupied more with the movement away from the classical, competitive relations among firms observed by Marx and toward concentration and monopoly, the result in part of the new role of credit capital in industry. The clear danger of this new phase of capitalism was heightened conflict between imperialist powers.[12]

[10] For a useful historical perspective, see Larry Neal, *The Rise of Financial Capitalism: International Capital Markets in the Age of Reason* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). See also Herbert Feis, *Europe, the World's Banker, 1870–1914* (1930; reprint, New York: A. M. Kelley, 1964).

[11] Rudolf Hilferding, *Finance Capital: A Study in the Latest Phase of Capitalist Development*, edited with an introduction by Tom Bottomore (1910; reprint, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981); V. I. Lenin, *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism* (1917; reprint, Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1950); Rosa Luxemburg, *The Accumulation of Capital* (1913; reprint, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951); N. Bukharin, *Imperialism and the World Economy* (1917; reprint, London: Merlin, 1972). Hilferding's analysis of the expanding role of banks in industry from the middle of the nineteenth century forward, particularly in Central Europe, prepared the way for Alexander Gerschenkron's very influential *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1962), esp. chaps. 1, 2, 6.

[12] Unlike Bukharin, Hilferding did not believe that interimperialist war was inevitable. Indeed, he felt the new organizing role for industry being played by banks and even the state introduced a degree of regulation and planning in the economy that augured well for socialists. In Hilferding's view, the new relationship between state and bourgeoisie meant that the state should no longer be smashed but rather should be taken over and extended. See Bottomore's discussion in Hilferding (fn. 11), 8–9. In *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism* (London: Verso, 1978), esp. parts I and II, Nicos Poulantzas revisits the ideas of Hilferding, Lenin, and Luxemburg concerning finance capital. Polanyi's discussion (fn. 2) of the powerful role played by *haute finance* in *preventing* the outbreak of large-scale war in Europe during the nineteenth century is also noteworthy.

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New directions in the political-economic impact of finance capital were not charted until after World War II. The postcolonial era prompted interest in the role banks and the state might play in industrialization for the so-called latecomers. There was from the outset a decidedly apolitical tenor to the writings of the developmentalists (the efficacy of state intervention, price distortions, rents, costs, marginal utilities, and so on).[13] A parallel literature arose for advanced-industrial countries, which by the late 1960s and early 1970s were experiencing extreme monetary difficulties, inflation, slowed industrial output, and rising unemployment. Considerable attention was directed to the role of banking and finance in these maladies.[14]

Contesting the perspective of the policy analysts were dependency theorists, who did not merely ask which policies were best or would work but also tried to inject a power dimension into the debate. In their view, liquid resources being supplied to the former colonies were more than simply finance capital flowing for development purposes to areas of capital scarcity. Consistently tied to these flows were demands for policy changes that would strengthen (1) markets as arbiters of access and opportunity and (2) private property as the dominant form of resource control. That is, they were a manifestation of power favoring selected actors, groups, and relations of production. For the most part, the emphasis remained on multilateral bodies such as the World Bank, the IMF, and the various regional development banks.[15] Largely unexplored was the part played by the myriad other controllers of liq-

[13] Gerschenkron (fn. 11); Ronald McKinnon, *Money and Capital in Economic Development* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1973); Edward Shaw, *Financial Deepening in Economic Development* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973). Maurice Dobb concerns himself only with the matter of the economic efficacy of planning and directing industry, leaving aside the political question of controlling capital. See Dobb, "Some Reflections on the Theory of Investment Planning and Economic Growth," and idem, "The Question of 'Investment-Priority for Heavy Industry,'" both in Dobb, *Papers on Capitalism, Development, and Planning* (New York: International Publishers, 1967). For an overview of developments in this literature, see Stephan Haggard, Chung Lee, and Sylvia Maxfield, eds., *The Politics of Finance in Developing Countries* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, forthcoming), chap. 1.

[14] This literature is quite large. Important contributions include Fred Hirsch and John H. Goldthorpe, eds., *The Political Economy of Inflation* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978); Leon N. Lindberg and Charles S. Maier, eds., *The Politics of Inflation and Economic Stagnation: Theoretical Approaches and International Case Studies* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985); Thomas Ilgen, *Autonomy and Interdependence: U.S.-Western European Monetary and Trade Relations, 1958–1984* (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Allanheld, 1985). For a business perspective, see David M. Meerschwam, *Breaking Financial Boundaries: Global Capital, National Deregulation, and Financial Services Firms* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1991). A recent and thoughtful contribution is Richard O'Brien, *Global Financial Integration: The End of Geography* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1992).

[15] A work that was quite influential is Cheryl Payer, *The Debt Trap: The IMF and the Third World* (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1974). A more recent work is Robin Broad, *Unequal Alliance: The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Philippines* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).

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uid capital who were increasingly making their presence felt.

More recently a new literature has emerged for advanced-industrial contexts. Less policy driven and more consciously concerned with power relations surrounding finance within and between nations, these writings are heavily institutionalist in orientation. They focus not so much on the actors or groupings of actors who command financial resources as on the origins and types of institutions through which they operate in different national contexts and on the opportunities and constraints presented by different institutional constellations.[16] There is now a rich and sophisticated body of work on the founding and structuring of the independence of central banks, the organization of the banking system, the relationships between banks and industry, and the bureaucratic capacity of policymakers to intervene in all of these.[17]

The books under review focus on postcolonial countries. They are certainly strongly influenced by the historical-institutionalists who have studied Europe and North America. But they also break new ground in the analysis of finance capital in the Third World, because they have moved beyond the dependency approach, yet maintained and deepened its concern with the power of actors to control capital.[18] Each in its own way highlights the various forms assumed by capital, as well as the struggles over how, when, where, and in what amounts investment resources are finally deployed. The end use of capital varies with who or what initially supplies the resources. Equally important are the channels

[16] Important works in this literature include John Zysman, *Governments, Markets, and Growth: Financial Systems and the Politics of Industrial Change* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983); and Frances Rosenbluth, *Financial Politics in Contemporary Japan* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989). Another important historical-institutionalist work is Peter Katzenstein, *Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976). Works with a long historical perspective include Walter Bagehot, *Lombard Street* (1927; reprint, London: Kegan, Paul and Company, 1973); Vera C. Smith, *The Rationale of Central Banking* (London: P. S. King and Son, 1936); Rondo E. Cameron, *Banking and Economic Development: Some Lessons of History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972); Rondo E. Cameron et al., eds., *Banking in the Early Stages of Industrialization: A Study in Comparative Economic History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967); and finally P. L. Cottrell, Hakan Lindgren, and Alice Teichova, eds., *European Industry and Banking between the Wars: A Review of Bank-Industry Relations* (New York: Leicester University Press, 1992).

[17] Gianni Toniolo, ed., *Central Banks' Independence in Historical Perspective* (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988); Patrick Downes and Reza Vaez-Zadeh, eds., *The Evolving Role of Central Banks* (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1991); and John B. Goodman, "The Politics of Central Bank Independence," *Comparative Politics* 23 (April 1991).

[18] One of the few attempts besides Maxfield to focus on the power of bankers themselves is Jose Harris and Pat Thane, "British and European Bankers 1880–1914: An 'Aristocratic Bourgeoisie'?" in Pat Thane, Geoffrey Crossick, and Roderick Floud, eds., *The Power of the Past: Essays for Eric Hobsbawm* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). Though mainly concerned with Marxist debates over links between the old aristocracy and the emergent bourgeoisie, these authors reconstruct what is known about the social and political affiliations and economic power of bankers and financiers in late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century Europe. See also Michael Moran, "Finance Capital and Pressure-Group Politics in Britain," *British Journal of Political Science* 11 (October 1981).

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through which the resources flow. Control over end use can be wrested from those supplying capital. And power can accrue to intermediary actors or groups, including factions within states, when they can position themselves as the sole conduit for crucial resources. An enduring concern in state-society debates has been the extent to which capital controllers, fairly narrowly construed as those deploying resources for direct investment, constrain the policy options of state leaders or at least favor the policy prescriptions of a faction of policymakers. With varying success, the authors address these issues and chart new analytical territory. The closing section of this essay offers a theoretical framework for further work on power and the control of capital.

Governing Capital

Sylvia Maxfield's *Governing Capital* is a provocative addition to the literature on the political economy of finance and banking in postcolonial states. In the richly textured manner of a skilled area specialist, the work emphasizes the historical and institutional foundations of capital control in each national context and the ways different patterns of capital control affect national responses to quite similar external constraints and opportunities. It is unusual, however, in that it contains both a fine case study of the failed attempt of the Mexican state to control capital by nationalizing the banking sector *and* the argument that "in an increasingly internationalized world, capital should be governed" (p. vii). This is a curious position because one of the book's central messages is that capacities to govern capital are not changed easily and that if anything the universal trend is toward less governability not more—hence, Maxfield's sober observation that in the twenty-first century the "disciplinary force of international financial flows" will increasingly constrain the options available to policymakers. "If the possibilities for popular reform in Mexico have been slim," she admits, "international financial integration makes them even slimmer" (p. 17).

The contending forces in Maxfield's story are two coalitions or alliances—loose and informal groupings united by a commitment to a common "policy current." Dedicated to creating and maintaining a policy climate favoring the widest possible discretion for private capital controllers is the "bankers' alliance," consisting of the largest, most mobile, and most transnationally linked players: private bankers, large-scale traders and industrialists, and public sector monetary authorities. Since the Porfirian period early this century, the bankers' alliance has fought for a tight monetary policy, full and free convertibility of the peso, minimal taxes on profits and luxury consumption, and minimal

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state regulation of financial markets.[19] According to Maxfield, the bankers' alliance has dominated policies affecting the movement and control of investment resources nationally and internationally for most of this century, but especially from 1917 to the mid-1930s, from the mid-1950s to 1970, and since 1982.

Contesting the policies of the bankers' alliance is what Maxfield calls the Cardenas coalition, which arose in the early and mid-1930s. Consisting of state-organized labor and peasant groups, together with government officials in the Ministries of Labor and Agriculture sharing their interests, the Cardenas coalition has sought to use the Mexican state to exert influence over capital controllers. The policy current pushed by the Cardenas coalition includes agrarian reform, labor rights, loose monetary policy, exchange controls, real and enforceable wealth and profit taxes, and state command of strategic industries. Even in its heyday in the 1930s, the coalition never won the battles over taxation and exchange controls. Its members fared better on monetary policy until the 1950s, when the hand of the bankers' alliance "was strengthened by the weight of international creditors" (p. 13).

Maxfield's understanding of Mexican finance emphasizes the interplay between external economic forces and these domestic coalitions. She argues two main points. First, external financial linkages have been crucial in mediating the power struggles between the bankers' alliance and the Cardenas coalition. The linkages have mostly undergirded the steady dominance by the bankers' alliance over economic policy in Mexico, though changes in them have also allowed for episodes of ascendance for the Cardenas coalition. And second, Maxfield follows the historical-institutionalists in asserting that national responses to quite similar external forces depend on institutional and political developments that typically have deep historical roots. The willingness and capacity of policymakers to manage liquid capital, particularly as external economic forces undergo major changes, turns on the presence and strength of a social force paralleling Maxfield's bankers' alliance in Mexico. A strong bankers' alliance means that even in moments of opportunity, when the power of private capital controllers is weakened, attempts to govern capital will be muted or subverted. When a bankers' alliance is weak or absent, countries should have a greater capacity and demonstrated willingness to control private capital.

A major contribution of Maxfield's book lies in the concerted effort

[19] Polanyi (fn. 2) writes: "Bentham was the first to recognize that inflation and deflation were interventions in the right of property: the former a tax on, the latter an interference with, business" (p. 226).

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to tether political power and government policies to control over crucial financial resources, especially those moving across national boundaries. Work of this kind is sorely lacking in a literature that has taken most of its analytical cues from the World Bank and IMF. The major shortcoming of the book, as will become clear below, is that Maxfield did not push the theoretical implications of her case material as far as she might have. But first some quibbles.

The central bank, the timing and circumstances of its founding, and its relationship with the Ministry of Finance are important considerations in Maxfield's framework. Indeed, the differences along these lines between Brazil and Mexico account for divergences in the economic policies of the two countries, and especially the wider (though still limited and declining) options for controlling capital in Brazil. Unfortunately, these issues are raised only in the context of the comparative chapter that closes the book and not in the theoretical chapter, where various literatures are discussed. There are case studies and even some comparative work on central banks that could have been mentioned and integrated.[20] The comparative chapter is very nicely done, though Maxfield drops the issue of bank nationalizations. The account of the abortive nationalization of Mexico's banking sector not only gives the book drama and color but also serves as a vehicle for conveying key theoretical insights. Given the number of countries that also tried to take over the banking sector only to have the policy reversed, the chance was missed to assess how widely the factors operating in Mexico could be applied.[21] Or pushing Maxfield's comparison

[20] See the classic work by Henry Parker Willis, *The Theory and Practice of Central Banking: With Special Reference to the American Experience, 1913–1935* (New York: Harper Publishers, 1936); Paul M. Warburg, *The Federal Reserve System, Its Origins and Growth: Reflections and Recollections* (New York: MacMillan, 1930); Charles A. Goodhart, *The Evolution of Central Banks* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988); Toniolo (fn. 17); and Goodman (fn. 17). Useful case studies and and comparative volumes include Erin Elver Jucker-Fleetwood, *Money and Finance in Africa: The Experience of Ghana, Morocco, Nigeria, the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, the Sudan, and Tunisia from the Establishment of their Central Banks until 1962* (New York: Praeger, 1964); Lee Hock Lock, *Central Banking in Malaysia: A Study of the Development of the Financial System and Monetary Management* (Singapore: Buttersworth, 1987); *Central Banking in an Era of Change: Landmark Speeches, 1959–1988* (Kuala Lumpur: Bank Negara Malaysia, 1989); *Central Bank of Kenya: Its Evolution, Responsibilities, and Organization* (Nairobi: Central Bank, 1986); Abdul-Amir Badrud-Din, *The Bank of Lebanon: Central Banking in a Financial Centre and Entrepot* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1984); *The Central Bank of Sri Lanka: Functions and Workings* (Colombo: Central Bank, 1986); Charles Collyns, *Alternatives to the Central Bank in the Developing World*, Occasional Paper no. 20 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1983); Ethan B. Kapstein, "Between Power and Purpose: Central Bankers and the Politics of Regulatory Convergence," *International Organization* 46 (Winter 1992).

[21] A quick list of nationalizations that were (or are being) reversed would include Colombia (1982; reversed in 1992), Peru (1987, when the Banco de Credito's front door was bashed in by a small tank; reversed within two years), El Salvador (1980; reversed in 1993), Pakistan (1972; reversed in early 1990s), India (1969; private banks could open as of 1993), Libya (1970; private banks allowed again

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with Brazil, why did state leaders there *not* move against the private banking sector?

External Linkages and the Bases of Internal Power

The five middle chapters of Maxfield's book present a lucid narrative of the changing fortunes of Mexico's two battling coalitions. More than any other single factor, changes in Mexico's external credit relations have shaped which alliance would have the upper hand. Maxfield explains it this way: "The greater the need for good relations with international creditors, the more weight the creditors and those bankers with close ties to them have in the policy process. In the 1920s Mexico was in default on its international debts but needed to renegotiate and receive fresh funds, in part to help capitalize the new Central Bank. In this period the bankers' alliance was relatively successful in imposing its policy preferences" (p. 93). Although the phrase "need for good relations" is a bit vague, the notion here is that power derived from the bridging role played by the bankers' alliance. At key junctures only its members could deliver.[22] Aware that those controlling the resources that could be used for debt relief would not supply their capital unconditionally, members of the bankers' alliance could position themselves and their policy demands as the valve that would commence the flow.

This changed in the 1930s and 1940s, only to turn around again in the 1950s. "The alliance was less successful in the following two decades, when Mexico once again fell into default and was isolated from international financial markets and the world economy in general. As access to foreign loans again became important in the 1950s, the fortunes of the bankers' alliance improved" (p. 93). The 1970s and early 1980s brought yet another swing against the bankers, as "easy access to foreign exchange during the debt boom temporarily weakened their policy influence" (p. 17). During this period of "excess global liquidity," the bankers' alliance "saw its clout decline" (pp. 93–94). It experienced a "partial erosion of its institutional base within the state" (p. 126). Since 1981, however, circumstances have strongly favored the bankers' alliance. "When the debt boom went bust and Mexico's inter-

in 1993), Portugal (1975; reversed in 1993), and even France (1981–82; reversed in 1987). To my knowledge, nationalizations of the banking sector in the following states have not been reversed: Israel (1983), Iraq (1965), Uganda (1966), Oman (1968), and Tanzania (1967).

[22] This point receives further elaboration in Miguel Angel Centeno and Sylvia Maxfield, "The Marriage of Finance and Order: Changes in the Mexican Political Elite," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 24 (February 1992).

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national creditors were once again in a powerful position vis-à-vis Mexican policy makers, the influence of the bankers' alliance rose once again" (p. 94).

How does Maxfield theorize about the forces at work here? She says of the bankers' alliance that "its periods of dominance coincided with years of heavy Mexican reliance on foreign credits" (p. 9). This would suggest that drawing on foreign loan capital on a massive scale was sufficient to empower the bankers. And yet she writes of the 1970s: "Ironically, in the period when the most salient feature of the international financial markets was great enthusiasism [*sic*] for Third World lending, the bankers' alliance found its influence over policy formulation slightly weakened. For example, tight monetary policy was needed but hard to justify politically when foreign exchange was pouring into the economy" (p. 16). Shifting the analytical emphasis, Maxfield also writes:"Changes in the extent of Mexico's vulnerability to sudden capital outflows and reciprocal need for capital inflows explain variations over time in the ability of the bankers' alliance to shape economic policy" (p. 17).[23]

With the exception of this last quote, these passages are cast in a way that blurs the insightful analytical points Maxfield intends to make. She avoids a direct statement of her theory of power with phrases like the bankers' alliance was "favored," its "hand was weakened," its "clout" declined, its position within the state suffered a "partial erosion," and so on. Maxfield's own analysis demonstrates, moreover, that the bankers' alliance *was not always dominant* during periods when Mexico relied heavily on foreign credits, nor was the need for good relations with creditors always the crux of the issue. In the 1970s international integration rose dramatically, Mexico's reliance on loans from foreign banks grew at a fantastic rate, and it was important that Mexico have good relations with the banks doing the lending. And yet despite all this, the policy leverage of the domestic bankers and their friends within the state declined. Maxfield could have avoided much of this confusion had she concentrated as much on the *form and character* of international financial integration as she did on its *level*. The crucial considerations lie in the patterns of control over the resource flows, what channels they flow through, what conditions (if any) the initial supplier attaches to their provision, whether and how these constraints can be loosened, and whether and when new constraints can be

[23] She clarifies her argument still further when she says elsewhere: "The more vulnerable Mexico was to international capital outflows and, conversely, the greater the country's need for foreign inflows, the more leverage the bankers' alliance had in domestic policy debates" (p. 165).

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attached by downstream actors or institutions through which the resources may have to pass.

In fact, all the elements are in place in *Governing Capital* to make these power considerations more transparent. One starting point would emphasize that the sources of power for the bankers' alliance and the Cardenas coalition are very different in character. Maxfield shows that the Cardenas coalition has a mass base of millions of peasants and laborers. Its power is organizational and depends on mobilization and direct political action, or at least the potential to achieve them. The bankers' alliance by contrast has no mass base. The political influence of its members is rooted first in the control they can *usually* exert over Mexico's access to financial resources and other forms of investment capital, whether private or institutional, and second, for the private actors in the alliance, in their ability to destabilize the economy through investment slowdowns or the relocation of capital abroad. The power they wield is decidedly more structural in nature insofar as it is grounded in the two defining pillars of capitalist systems—markets and private discretion over capital. While Maxfield is quite correct in suggesting that the key determinant in the fortunes of the bankers' alliance was Mexico's vulnerability to the use of this structural leverage, this insight goes undeveloped.

Note that the two periods during which the bankers' alliance was weakest both involved circumstances that dealt a body blow to the structural bases of its power. In the 1930s, in the wake of the Great Depression, a breakdown in the international credit system left the bankers' alliance with nothing to deliver, which undermined the leverage they could muster from being the sole conduit for resources.[24] In the 1970s their power was sapped by an inversion of the 1930s: financial capital was abundant, but there were multiple suppliers competing to provide it. It was not just that the minister of finance or the governor of the central bank could not "justify" a tight monetary policy in this milieu. Even if the bankers' alliance had produced graphs, charts, and equations showing with airtight neoclassical economic logic that

[24] It is clear that this leverage was solidly restored by the time Silva Herzog, the minister of finance in the early 1980s and a core representative of the bankers' alliance, was scheduled to fly to Toronto to negotiate with the World Bank and IMF for relief on the country's massive debt, which was in desperate need of restructuring. Herzog objected to some of the president's choices to head the newly nationalized banks in 1982. "The finance minister refused to leave for the meeting in Toronto," Maxfield writes, "until several names were stricken from the list of new bank directors." A bank analyst said that by the time Herzog was through, "there was no one the former owners [of the banks] could object to" (p. 149). These early victories were crucial in subverting the attempt by the Mexican state to seize control of the country's financial structure. By the early 1990s the banks would be privatized.

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inflation would skyrocket and that there would be hell to pay if the credit boom crashed—the difference was that they had no credible material threat to back up their analyses and predictions.[25]

A number of interesting things occurred as policymakers gained access to abundant resources with minimal constraints attached to them. One was the creation of a "power-space" that allowed the Cardenas coalition to push through more of its policies, or at a minimum to defeat those ordinarily won by the bankers' alliance. Another was the creation in 1976 of a new government channel, the Ministry of Budget and Planning, through which these new resources would flow and thereby circumvent any residual power the central bank and Ministry of Finance may have had.[26]

A third and quite telling development was the emergence in 1975 of the CCE (the Business Coordinating Council) during the Echeverria presidency.[27] The country's business class had long been divided along size and sectoral lines into state-corporatist bodies. Concanaco and Concamin represented relatively more mobile, transnationally oriented, larger-scale traders and industrialists—all of whom were members of the bankers' alliance. The Canacintra, meanwhile, represented small and medium-size manufacturers, who were decidedly less mobile and less integrated into transnational flows of capital and goods. The Canacintra tended to side with the Cardenas coalition since its members could not get access to cheap credit and were more hurt than helped by an open trade and capital regime.

The interesting fact is that from the 1950s to the 1970s, big business in Concanaco and Concamin had usually maintained a nonconfrontational relationship with the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). This is not surprising since their most potent leverage was structural, and thus depended more on signaling the demands and objections of large-scale capital controllers, and then backing up their stance with capital flight and sluggish investment rates in the event

[25] The structural power of private capital controllers associated with the bankers' alliance was restored almost as rapidly as it had been undermined. Kuo reports the following figures: Between the early 1970s and the early 1980s, international bank lending to developing countries totaled $700 billion. Annual flows of medium- and long-term credit peaked in 1982 at $37.6 billion. The drop thereafter was precipitous. Lending (in billions) in 1983 was $23.9; in 1984 just $18.9; in 1985 down to $14.1. In the first half of 1986 the volume of long- and medium-term bank loans to postcolonial states was only $2.9 billion! See Chich-Heng Kuo, *International Capital Movements and the Developing World: The Case of Taiwan* (New York: Praeger, 1991), 5.

[26] See Maxfield, 126. A similar development occurred in Indonesia about the same time, with the creation of *Tim Keppres Sepuluh*, or "Team 10." See Jeffrey A. Winters, *Power in Motion: Capital Mobility and the Indonesian State* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, forthcoming), chap. 3.

[27] Maxfield's excellent discussion of the CCE (Consejo Coordinador Empresarial) and other business groups can be found on pp. 55–56 and pp. 120–30.

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policymakers had not already anticipated the reaction of business or ignored the signals.[28] It was only in the 1970s, when their structural power was drastically weakened, that they formed the CCE to apply political pressure through "voice." According to Maxfield, "Businessmen in the bankers' alliance felt increasingly helpless to stop Echeverria's inflation and foreign loan-fueled public spending boom and growth of state intervention in the economy" (p. 120). The formation of the CCE represented a new adversarial posture within the business community to confront what was perceived as "growing hostility toward private enterprise" (p. 121).

Governing Capital is an important book. Elegantly crafted and highly readable, it also fits nicely into the debates of the historical-institutionalists like Zysman, Katzenstein, and Rosenbluth. Maxfield extends that literature to postcolonial contexts while also drawing attention, through her coalitional and policy-current approaches, to social forces like the bankers' alliance. Of even greater significance is Maxfield's pioneering contribution in the area of structural power rooted in patterns of control over investment resources in capitalist systems.

Controlling Capital in South Korea

In *Race to the Swift*, Meredith Woo-Cumings challenges some of the more simplistic theories about the rise of the NICs, particularly those intended to divine the magic policy formula needed to catapult an economy into NIC-dom.[29] She does this by taking history seriously, featuring geopolitics and cold war security issues in accounting for the fortunes of Korea and Taiwan—issues that have "long dwelt in the shadows of existing historiography" (p. 44). The book succeeds admirably, suggesting that "so long as security issues remain segregated from studies of economic growth, any speculation of whether or not the 'East Asian pattern' can be duplicated in the rest of the Third World must remain incomplete, if not fruitless" (p. 85).

In addition to this argument, a second thread weaves through the book, one that gives it even more analytical strength and makes it an

[28] In Mexico, Maxfield notes, "Central Bank and Finance Ministry officials often ruled out policy changes expected to displease bankers and large-scale industrialists, on the grounds that they would cause capital flight" (p. 183). On the importance of signaling and anticipation, see Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Response to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970); Bates and Lien (fn.1); Block (fn. 8); and Winters (fn. 26).

[29] In this vein, see Wade's devastating attack on the "neoliberal paradigm," which he characterizes as having entered a "degenerative stage, taking on attributes of a disciplined delusional system" (p. 280). Robert Wade, "East Asia's Economic Success: Conflicting Perspectives, Partial Insights, Shaky Evidence," *World Politics* 44 (January 1992).

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important contribution to the political economy of financial flows. Woo-Cumings does at least three quite provocative things. First, she takes what has so far been a mostly passive story about how factors in the external environment affect power balances internally and transforms it by stressing how policymakers can, under certain circumstances, manipulate their external environment in ways that augment their flexibility bidirectionally, both toward their patron-allies abroad and toward social groups at home.[30] This was accomplished in Korea through a concerted effort to loosen constraints on resources supplied from without and then to deploy them domestically with astonishing latitude. Second, she shows that it was the Koreans' security obsession and their big-power allies that made possible this transfer of control over massive financial resources. And finally, she sheds light on one of the central themes in this essay: the crucial relationship between how resources are controlled within a predominantly capitalist system on the one hand and the range of policy options decision makers can realistically consider on the other. "Depending on the type and degree of financial control," writes Woo-Cumings, "money can be turned into a mechanism for political control, and for restructuring the economy and the society, as well" (p. x).

Channels, Resource Flows, and Power

Woo-Cumings pays careful attention to the origins of investment resources, the forms they assume, how they are controlled, and any opportunities that may exist to challenge that control so that power can shift to new actors or institutions. "At the *core* of state power," she argues, "is its channeling of the flow of money" (p. 2; emphasis in original). She correctly notes that the ability of capital suppliers to monitor and enforce the use of their resources is critical in determining the range of flexibility policymakers will enjoy. In Latin America, Woo-Cumings argues, foreign capital invested by MNCs "possessed its own investment and market goals and bypassed the state, thus emerging as

[30] I present a somewhat similar analysis of Indonesian's deregulation of finance in the early 1980s. I argue that economic ministers in Indonesia did not passively manage crises originating in international financial linkages, but instead manipulated and even augmented them as part of their struggles against opponents within the state. See Jeffrey A. Winters, "Banking Reform in Indonesia: External Linkages and Created Crises" (Mimeo, December 1992). An early version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 1992. For an excellent analysis of the myriad ways private bankers in the U.S. have used their control of finance to exert political pressure, see Davita Silfen Glasberg, *The Power of Collective Purse Strings: The Effects of Bank Hegemony on Corporations and the State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).

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a formidable domestic force that hamstrung the state." Korea relied far more on financial flows, thereby "reducing foreign goal direction" (p. 8) because these resources are more difficult for suppliers to control. Moreover, as Woo-Cumings illustrates, even within the category "liquid capital" there are degrees of constraint that matter. When Korea shifted in the 1970s from interstate funds to commercial loans, particularly Eurocurrency funds that did not fall within any regulatory framework,[31] policymakers were accorded "greater autonomy in the conduct of the domestic economy—with less kibitzing than with bilateral aid" (p. 151). Had it not been for the abundance and decidedly untied nature of these resources, the Koreans might not have succeeded in overcoming staunch World Bank and IMF opposition in the 1970s to the Big Push, the state-led effort to develop heavy industry.

Ironically, it was not financial autarky but rather deep integration into international flows of capital that gave Korea the autonomy it needed. Nevertheless, what mattered most, as in the Mexican case, was not just the level but also the form and character of that integration. Woo-Cumings writes: "The Korean state has moved from a dependent, penetrated status to one of relative autonomy by positioning itself astride the flow of foreign capital, refracting capital in a prismatic fashion to fund rising industries, create mammoth firms, buttress its social support, and in dialectical fashion wrest national autonomy from the external system" (pp. 6–7). Woo-Cumings reminds her readers repeatedly that many of the theoretical insights of the Latin American literature do not travel well to Northeast Asia. One does not find, for example, anything remotely resembling a bankers' alliance or a Cardenas coalition in Korea. On the contrary, it was the state that created a new class of entrepreneurs "out of a historical vacuum caused by colonization and war" (p. x). The state did not merely control the banking system, it owned it. The central bank was so weak and ineffective that it hardly merited the name.[32] And when resources flowed into Korea from abroad, they were channeled not through the Ministry of Finance or the Economic Planning Board, where conservative econ-

[31] On the absence of an effective regulatory framework for these funds and also on why banks loaned in the risky manner they did in the 1970s, see Phillip A. Wellons, *Borrowing by Developing Countries on the Euro-Currency Market*, Development Centre Studies (Paris: Development Centre of the OECD, 1977). The difficulties faced by Indonesian economic officials and their allies in the World Bank and IMF as they tried to control Pertamina's borrowing spree are discussed in Winters (fn. 26), chap. 2.

[32] In an attempt to counter what Korean officials were doing with U.S. money flows, Arthur Bloomfield, an economist with the U.S. Federal Reserve, was sent to Korea in the 1950s to create a financial system with a "genuine central bank." Bloomfield's efforts resulted in a call for the privatization of the banking system and the drafting of the Act Establishing the Bank of Korea, which, according to Woo-Cumings, "would remain by and large a curiosity on paper" (p. 51).

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omists might have tried to impose monetary restraint and check inflation, but rather through "a coterie headed by a political appointee at the Presidential Palace—the First Economic Secretary to the President" (pp. 128–29). In the 1970s the coterie dutifully deployed the resources in service of the president's plan to build heavy industries, apparently without giving a great deal of thought to the "efficiency" or inflationary implications. According to Woo-Cumings, none of this makes sense without taking account of security issues, which happen to have played a far less prominent role in Latin America and Africa, and which figure in state theory in comparative politics only "in passing, almost as an afterthought" (p. 5).

Defensive Industrialization

Woo-Cumings suggests that the forced industrializations of the continental European states and Japan provide a better analytical touchstone for Korea and Taiwan than the experiences of countries in Latin America and Africa, where political and economic security were less directly threatened.[33] A major difference in Northeast Asia, however, lies in the role of "outside guarantors" like the United States and Japan, which for their own reasons were determined not to permit frontline allies to fall into the communist orbit. This security environment "showers benefits on the guaranteed state in the form of bilateral aid or multilateral loans" (p. 8), enhancing maneuverability. For the Koreans, there were two problems with this arrangement. First, they did not fully trust that the Americans would maintain their troop commitments to the peninsula, much less be willing to go to war *again* in the event of a full-scale attack from the north. And second, Korea's bitter experiences with Japan earlier this century, which Woo-Cumings recounts very effectively, made the prospect of once again becoming a part of Japan's Asian sphere—which, to the astonishment of the Koreans, is what the Americans had in mind—quite objectionable (p. 53). In a double sense, then, Korea's need for political and economic security propelled an aggressive strategy of defensive industrialization.

The Hidden Potentials of Penetration

During the 1950s and 1960s Korea received vast amounts of highly liquid "institutional" capital. In general, institutional capital has flowed

[33] See Gerschenkron (fn. 11); and Perry Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State* (London: Verso Press, 1979), esp. pt. II.

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in abundance to postcolonial states since World War II. Unlike private capital, it is mobilized mostly by advanced-industrial states and transferred bilaterally or through multilateral institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, or one of the several regional development banks. Although indistinguishable from any other form of liquid capital once it enters a recipient's treasury, institutional capital is distinctive in that the motivations for providing it tend to be quite complex and frequently contradictory. Between 1946 and 1976 Korea received $15 billion in institutional capital, or $600 per capita over the three-decade period. These resources flowed overwhelmingly from the United States as economic and military grants and loans, with only two states, Israel and Vietnam, receiving more on a per capita basis. In 1958, a fairly good year for institutional capital flows, economic assistance from the U.S. represented fully 70 percent of the Korean state's domestic revenue base (p. 45).[34]

Seoul's huge USAID mission naturally sought to monitor and direct the end use of these resources. It pressed hard for market liberalization and privatizing the banks, "[using] aid as a bargaining chip" in the classic fashion. But how could the Koreans "escape the abuses that might arise from a quasi-colonial situation and turn the external situation to their advantage? The answer is that the penetration was not one way but both ways, because of the cold war milieu" (pp. 8–9).[35] "Poised" as it was "on the geopolitical fault lines," Korea was able to exploit its strategic importance to the United States to confound efforts at maintaining a tight U.S. grip on the end use of the resources being supplied. The Koreans, like the Taiwanese, lobbied members of Congress about the importance of keeping resources flowing to the front lines, no matter what. Woo-Cumings writes: "Both were able to manipulate the bureaucratic cleavages within the United States government. Korea was perhaps more successful in its access to the Pentagon than was Taiwan, because of the heavy American troop commitment in the peninsula. It was effective in playing off the Defense Department against the State Department" (p. 9). In this manner, certain U.S.

[34] In 1960 foreign assistance passing through state channels still accounted for more than three-quarters of all investment in Korea (p. 81). By the late 1960s the proportion still hovered around 50 percent (p. 108).

[35] Woo-Cumings builds on the insights here of Robert O. Keohane, "The Big Influence of Small Allies," *Foreign Policy* 2 (1971), which, not surprisingly, focuses mostly on Korea and Taiwan. Callaghy also underscores the point in a different context, in noting that "the international system also has important particularistic characteristics as its constituent states, corporations, organizations, and classes pursue their own ideal and material interests. This allows . . . states some relative autonomy [externally]." See Thomas M. Callaghy, *The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 33.

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client states, but especially Korea, were able to do three things simultaneously: reorder the pattern of control over crucial resources, avoid having to adopt the policies that had been successfully imposed on other countries with less leverage, and, in Woo-Cumings's felicitous expression, "refract" the flows into the Korean system in ways that allowed policymakers close to the president to exert commanding influence over whole sectors of the economy.

Just as signs of a weakening U.S. commitment to Korea were growing clearer in the mid-1960s, the Koreans finally forged a rapprochement with Japan and settled on $800 million in war reparations, which the Japanese insisted on calling "grants." The timing could not have been better. The U.S. Exim Bank and the World Bank had just reneged on their pledges to supply the credit for the Pohang Steel plant, calling it a white elephant. Although Japan made it clear that it wanted the funds to be used for purposes that would not compete with Japanese business interests, Park Chung Hee went ahead and used the highly liquid capital to build Pohang (p. 88).

The Japanese reparations money represented both a transition and a prelude. By the late 1960s and the early 1970s, events like the Nixon opening to China and negotiations to end the Vietnam War undermined the Koreans' ability to squeeze large flows out of the U.S. while jamming efforts at U.S. bureaucratic control over the resources. Even as U.S. perceptions of danger in Northeast Asia were changing, the Koreans continued to be gripped by a siege mentality that impelled them into a heavier phase of industrialization.[36] The Nixon doctrine signaled that Koreans would, in President Park's words, have to "go it alone." The Pohang facility was deeply symbolic insofar as "steel was a metaphor for self-reliance and national security, and the push for heavy industrialization was a way of fortifying the frontier" (p. 120). The Koreans also turned to making their own weapons and managed to secure an early loan from Chase Manhattan and First National City Bank in the amount of $60 million, a princely sum in the late 1960s.

More Discretion over Capital

Pohang Steel was only the first element of a six-part scheme to build a heavy industrial base that was intended not so much to boost Korea into the advanced industrial world as finally to guarantee it the nation-

[36] One can hardly fault the South Koreans for feeling insecure. "Of some 629 guerrilla-related incidents reported for 1968 alone," Woo-Cumings writes, "the most noteworthy was a North Korean commando attack on the presidential residence that claimed some 100 casualties and was a near miss on Park's life" (p. 122).

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al security that had been so elusive in this century. Timing once again worked to Korea's benefit—but with a twist that underscores the importance Korean leaders have attached to establishing patterns of control over resources and enhancing maneuverability. The idea of pursuing six target industries—steel, chemical, metal, machine building, shipbuilding, and electronics—had been around at least since 1970. But the Korean leadership could not get its allies to commit the bilateral or multilateral resources. The Japanese were not terribly pleased by the prospect of a direct competitor in these sectors. A year after Korea announced it would proceed with the Big Push by borrowing commercially, the IMF and World Bank were still expressing grave concerns, for example, that the shipbuilding idea was "reckless" and "fantastic" (p. 132).

Private loan capital poured into Korea in the 1970s and the early 1980s, much as it did elsewhere. The world was awash in petrodollars "without political strings attached—just an incessant search for borrowers" (p. 150). The transfers to Korea were enormous, and the manner in which they were served up was astounding. Nearly all the capital flowed through the state bank system and carried sovereign guarantees, though even these were waived by the late 1970s. Money was "literally being pushed on Korea," to quote Woo-Cumings (p. 158). By way of illustration, Korea let it be known in 1979 that it was interested in borrowing $300 million. Participants in a loan syndicate offered $747 million, and Korea ended up "accepting" $600 million.[37]

The twist to the tale lay in the lessons Korean officials learned from their own prismatic on-lending to the *chaebol*, the country's conglomerates. The highly leveraged Korean conglomerates were certainly created by the state and subject to its discretionary powers over investment resources in the form of loans with negative interest rates. But the firms learned that to ensure the uninterrupted flow of credit, they needed to "become large enough that the possibility of bankruptcy would pose a social threat" (p. 13). Korean officials applied a similar logic to their external borrowing in hopes of guaranteeing the *reliability* of future flows.

By 1978 Korean officials noticed that Japanese and European lenders were encroaching on the market shares of U.S. banks. From a cost or efficiency perspective this should have been seen as a positive development. Korea would have more lenders to choose from, and spreads on the loans would certainly improve. Korean officials already had virtually unfettered control over the end use of the resources they

[37] See Woo-Cumings, 229 n. 27.

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borrowed. But this was not sufficient for a security state. The Koreans sought the additional degree of control from being able to count on reliable flows, much as they had during the earlier relationship with a security-driven United States. The nub of the problem, Woo-Cumings points out, was that Koreans were "borrowing too little from too many countries that do not have significant security interests in Korea." The remedy was instructive: "The Korean government chose to bypass the cheaper European credit in favor of the more expensive *but* indelibly American loans" (p. 158; emphasis in original). By 1981 Korea had restructured its portfolio of foreign loans so that they were overwhelmingly drawn from the U.S. and Japan. Woo-Cumings captures the irony quite elegantly: "Koreans thus wooed multinational banks as interconnecting putty between nations and their financial systems, so that they may rise and fall, sink and swim together. Through the politics of foreign debt, Koreans sought to wrest autonomy through interdependence, to cleave into the international system so as to be freed from abject dependence" (p. 159).

Woo-Cumings provides a rich analysis of the political economy of finance in Korea that both contrasts sharply with Maxfield's material and observations and overlaps in ways that are important for building a theory of political power rooted in capital control. It is striking that the high degree of autonomy enjoyed by Korean policymakers is related to the fact that until recently direct investors, whether domestic or foreign, have played a relatively minor or dependent part. Unlike capital invested directly, institutional and commercial capital allowed substantially more political space because control over its end use was either low or could be reduced under the right circumstances. This autonomy increased in direct proportion to the scale of the resources being supplied and the proportion of the country's investment needs that they satisfied. Also in the Latin American cases, the episodes of greatest autonomy from the structural grip of private capital controllers on economic policy occurred when policymakers gained access to resources that were sufficiently large and untied to supplant some of the investment by private actors. And particularly illuminating was the fact that the bankers lost control even though the flows were in the form of loans and credits.

Neoclassical Political Economy

Jeffry Frieden's *Debt, Development, and Democracy* also examines flows of financial resources, though it tends to emphasize how loan capital gets allocated within countries rather than international linkages,

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sources of capital, or changing patterns of control. The book advances three interrelated themes. The first centers on the methodology employed; after weighing various appellations, Frieden decides to label it "modern political economy" (p. 16). It is an unfortunate choice that could lead to distracting debates about "traditional" and "postmodern" political economy. Frieden's method stresses a "systematic regard for microfoundations" and the "logical deduction of their implications" (p. 244). Since it is borrowed wholesale from neoclassical economics it should thus properly be called "neoclassical political economy," if it is to be named at all. The analytical merits of the approach will be conveyed in the course of the broader presentation of the book's arguments and evidence.

The second theme concerns how disaffected segments of Latin America's investing classes came to push for "democracy," which is used interchangeably with "civilian rule." When faced with an economic crisis in which sectoral elements of business "cannot achieve their policy goals within existing [military-dominated] institutions," the "sectors involved will demand institutional change, such as democratization." Democratic institutions per se were not the goal but rather were the "tools" used by vaguely defined "major socioeconomic actors" to ensure favorable government policies that apparently could not be won from institutions dominated by military figures (p. 36). A five-stage chart presents a "stylized evolution of crisis politics" illustrating how civilian rule comes about. The details of this framework and Frieden's case evidence are probably best left to a review essay focusing on transitions from authoritarian rule.

The third theme, by far the most important and thoroughly developed, is the one that will be explored here. It consists of two major elements: why countries responded differently to quite similar external financial constraints and opportunities (in this case access to cheap and abundant commercial credit in the 1970s and the early 1980s) and, for a subset of the cases, why interventionist states allocated the flows of foreign credit along the lines they did. The "simplicity" of the argument is arresting.[38] Governments permit market forces to allocate external credit surges when their countries are marked by high class conflict (Argentina and Chile). When class conflict is low (or maybe

[38] Frieden sprinkles disclaimers around to alert his audience that he knows he has made "heroic simplifications" and, true to the neoclassical view of things, has stripped reality down to a few core motives and relations. "I do this," he writes, "in the interest of explanatory power and expository simplicity" (p. x). He adds that his book represents "an opening salvo" and that "more complex and nuanced tools than generally used here" will be needed as "modern political economy" develops (p. 12).

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just lower?), governments will manage the allocation along sectoral lines (Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela).[39] It is not clear what happens when class conflict is medium, or even how one knows class conflict is medium. As for who got the lion's share of the resources in interventionist states—foreign credits flowed to those who had strong "preference intensities" for receiving them *and* who could lobby effectively. "Asset specificity" tells us about intensity of preferences, while "concentration" and class cooperation within an economic sector determine lobbying effectiveness.[40]

Class versus Sectoral Politics

Class conflict is fundamental to Frieden's arguments about cross-national variations in Latin American economic policy. "I do not purport to explain the prevalence or absence of class conflict in the societies under study," he writes, "I simply take it as given" (p. 35). Rather than being a constant in capitalist systems, class conflict seems to exist for Frieden only when battles between capital and labor erupt openly as strikes, demonstrations, or successful campaigns to elect socialist leaders. According to this view, the quiescence that results from the thorough intimidation of unions or the skillful co-optation of their leadership means class conflict has subsided. As Lonsdale pointedly observed, consensus should be seen "not as the uncontested base of power but as a consequence of its successful exercise."[41]

Frieden's ideas about class conflict are inseparable from his sectoral approach and the related concepts of asset specificity and concentration. Sectoral politics are "the norm over which class divisions prevail only in unusual circumstances" (p. 7). But when class conflict is high, sectoral politics decline. Frieden gives two somewhat contradictory reasons for this. High class conflict appears to lead to more elite cohesion, thus overriding sectoral demands because the need to defend the

[39] Frieden's chapter on Brazil is particularly wide-ranging, including numerous references to works written in Portuguese. He also conducted interviews with "hundreds" of officials, investors, scholars, and journalists in Latin America. Regrettably, evidence of these interviews appears only five or six times in the footnotes.

[40] Frieden relies mainly on Williamson for his concept of asset specificity and on Olson and Hardin for concentration and the associated collective action problems. See Oliver E. Williamson, *The Economic Institutions of Capitalism* (New York: Free Press, 1985); Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965); and Russell Hardin, *Collective Action* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982). Also see Peter G. Warr, "The Private Provision of a Public Good Is Independent of the Distribution of Income," *Economics Letters* 23 (1983), 207–11.

[41] John Lonsdale, "States and Social Processes in Africa: A Historiographical Survey," *African Studies Review* 24 (June-September 1981), 144.

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prerogatives of private property looms large, as in Chile and Argentina (pp. 9, 34–35). The implication is that capital controllers stop making demands along sectoral lines because they understand that it is not in their class interest to do so. The result is that government policies are more "orthodox," meaning markets regulate access and opportunity. Although Frieden cites Maxfield's *Governing Capital*, he does not respond to her attacks on a 1988 version of the high-low class conflict argument.[42] "First, class conflict is difficult to define and measure. It varies considerably over time within any given country," Maxfield writes. "In Mexico, a high class-conflict country according to Frieden [in 1988], class conflict was low during the most orthodox policy period (1954–1970) and high as heterodoxy appeared (1970–1976)" (Maxfield, 18). Not only are these policy outcomes contrary to what Frieden would predict, but in the book under review Mexico is described in static terms as a "low class conflict" state.

Frieden's second explanation concerns sectoral cohesion, which is related to the concentration concept and effective lobbying. If class conflict is high, then labor and capital within sectors do not unite, resulting in lower intrasectoral cohesion and thus a diminished capacity to lobby policymakers for sectoral policies. In Chile, for instance, "class conflict dampened sectoral complaints" (p. 38). Frieden expresses his position as a proposition: "Where conflict dominates, the sector will not formulate unified demands on policy makers and will be less likely to achieve its goals" (p. 34). In other words, it is not that sectoral demands disappear but rather that they become less effective.[43] Frieden's language stops just short of blaming labor for the high level of class conflict in Chile and Argentina, as well as for the poor economic performance of these states compared with the "successful" Brazilian case.[44]

[42] See Jeffry Frieden, "Classes, Sectors, and Foreign Debt in Latin America," *Comparative Politics* 21, no.1 (1988).

[43] This sort of high-low, effective-ineffective, interventionist-noninterventionist dualism informs the entire study. One wonders where cases like Indonesia would fit in; Frieden would probably classify it as "low class conflict," because of the massacre of nearly a million alleged communists in 1965. Since the late 1960s its economic policy has been a dizzying mixture of markets and intervention, though *not* along sectoral lines, it should be said. And what of the Philippines, where Marcos steadfastly pursued crony-capitalism even as the New People's Army took control of ever wider areas of the country? See Paul D. Hutchcroft's excellent essay, "Oligarchs and Cronies in the Philippine State: The Politics of Patrimonial Plunder, *World Politics* 43 (April 1991).

[44] Frieden's choice of words is reminiscent of standard American press reports in which labor always "demands" and management always "offers." In Chile, he says, "labor militancy grew by leaps and bounds" (p. 149). Politics became "increasingly polarized" thanks to the "strength of the Chilean left," which "drove the country's business community to a level of concern over property rights unmatched elsewhere in Latin America" and thereby "set the stage for the military coup of September 1973" (p. 143). In Argentina, the Peronists had "alienated business" (p. 206) and were responsible for

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Concept of Power and Politics

Frieden is mainly interested in the game of sectoral politics and thus devotes most of his book to the low-class-conflict cases of Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela, where sectoral players succeeded in pressuring policymakers to allocate foreign loan capital in ways free markets apparently would not have. The most startling aspect of this book is its vision of the state, policy-making, and societal power: from beginning to end, the state is a black box where the economic bureaucracy "is essentially a reactor to private demands." As Frieden writes: "I downplay the possibility that a significant set of pressures may have emanated from the bureaucratic or political institutions of the government itself" (p. 39).

Precisely how financial resources get distributed domestically is explained, as noted above, by how intensely a sector wants or needs favorable government responses and how effectively the sector can lobby for them. Frieden offers an account of this process, starting from the economic characteristics of the capital or resources of different actors. Some actors are more distressed by unfavorable policies than are others, depending on the form of the capital they control.[45] Asset specificity refers to "the degree to which the return on an asset depends on its use in a particular circumstance" (p. 20). An asset with low specificity would be money or finance capital, which can be redeployed with relative ease. "Holders of completely liquid assets are indifferent to policy, for they can move their funds to whatever activity is earning the highest rate of return" (p. 21). A highly specific asset is one that is "caught" in a particular use and cannot be redeployed for something else. Frieden gives the example of a machine that can only make nameplates for Ford Escorts. It is valuable as long as Ford makes Escorts, but if the line is discontinued, the machine's next best use "may be as scrap" (p. 21). Holders of highly specific assets have "a great deal at stake" (p. 8) and are quite motivated to lobby if policy changes will affect their ability to use these assets, and thus affect their value. In other words, only people who control highly specific assets have strong preference intensities.

Frieden's treatment of asset specificity suffers from a major weakness—he does not distinguish it analytically from capital mobility. Whereas asset specificity centers on flexibility of *use*, capital mobility

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the "political unrest" that rendered that country unattractive to potential lenders (p. 207). One wonders where "business militancy" was in all of this or even what it might look like.

[45] "The general point," Frieden writes, "is that economic characteristics of assets determine the policy preferences of their owners" (p. 22).

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centers on flexibility of *location*. And whereas the former is an essentialist concept that tells us only about the motivations of a resource controller (intensity of preference), the latter is a spatial concept that tells us about *both motivations and power*. It is true that there is some overlap. Finance capital has low asset specificity and tends also to be highly mobile across jurisdictional lines. Fixed or sunken capital is often both highly specific and decidedly less mobile. But note that a building is highly immobile but can often be used for a variety of purposes. Likewise, a machine that can only make the Ford nameplates may be useless if Fords are discontinued *in a given jurisdiction*. But its value can be restored if moved to another jurisdiction, say from the U.S. to Mexico, where the production of Escorts has been relocated. Capital mobility is only partly determined by the character of the capital itself. It is also shaped by changes in technology and costs of communications and transport, as well as policies that permit capital movement. In Frieden's discussion, policy is something that holders of assets react to; it is not a factor determining asset specificity itself. Power is also intrinsic to capital mobility: as we have seen, the ability to supply or withdraw resources under conditions of scarcity has profound political consequences.[46]

Frieden's concept of asset specificity lacks a power dimension, and thus he must look elsewhere for an explanation of how preference intensities get translated into leverage over the decisions of policymakers. Hence, not only is all political power reduced to American-style, pluralist lobbying by sectors, but the treatment of lobbying itself is abstract and unidimensional. It is well known, for instance, that many things can make for successful lobbying, all of which concern bringing other power resources to bear in the lobbying process. A sector may be a large employer, it might donate funds for election campaigns or pay off officials in less subtle ways, it might be a crucial earner of foreign exchange, or it may control important information. The lobbyists hired by a sector may have special personal relationships with policymakers that confer access and influence. Frieden fails to incorporate these elements of lobbying, perhaps because including them would have forced him to research and write a very different book.

Instead, effectiveness in lobbying for Frieden depends only on intrasectoral concentration (number of firms involved) and cohesion (good or bad labor-capital relations). Beyond these simple considerations, the

[46] Frieden downplays this point in his book, though he has written lucidly on it elsewhere. See Frieden (fn. 42). For further insights into the ways those with mobile assets were able to respond to debt problems in Latin America, see David Felix and Juana Sanchez, "Pooling Foreign Assets and Liabilities of Latin American Debtors to Solve Their Debt Crisis: Estimates of Capital Flight and Alternative Pooling Mechanisms," *Research in International Business and Finance* 7 (1989).

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squeaky wheel gets the grease. Thus, on the recipients of loan capital, Frieden writes:

> My analytical expectation is that policymakers provided more resources to those who exerted more [lobbying] pressure on them, and that economic interest groups exerted pressure on policymakers in direct proportion to what they had to gain or lose from policy and to the ease with which they could mobilize. This implies that economic policies were tailored to the desires of well-organized interest groups with a great deal at stake. (p. 8)[47]

Frieden's model is so narrow that it recognizes no other form of political leverage. Whatever the intensity of a group's policy interest, "they must organize to exert effective political pressure" (p. 22). This denies structural forms of power (manifested in capital flight or the threat of it), agenda setting, patron-client networks, terror, and the like.[48] Frieden justifies his approach as follows: "Where we see policy favoring interest groups that logic and theory tell us are most likely to bring pressure to bear on policymakers, it is appropriate to infer, at least provisionally, that there is a line of cause and effect that relates lobbying pressure and policy" (p. 11). The word "provisionally" is important here. It follows directly on passages sprinkled with words like "hard data," "statistical evidence," "too few observations," "softer data," and "rigorous evaluation." The implication is that the vast literature on power and policy-making in Latin America is so limited that at least

[47] In an appendix to his chapter on Brazil, Frieden tries to show that a disproportionate share of foreign loans did go to concentrated/cohesive sectors with high asset specificity. A single indicator, the four-firm concentration ratio (the percentage of output accounted for by the largest four firms in an industry), tells us all we need to know. Frieden assumes that a high concentration of output among the top four firms occurs because of high asset specificity. This same ratio, remarkably, gives a "rough sense of cohesion" because "more concentrated sectors are easier to organize" (p. 139). Here Frieden has either changed what he means by "cohesion" (from a measure of relations between labor and capital within a sector to relations among firms), or he thinks it is easier to organize good relations between labor and capital when a sector's four-firm concentration ratio is high. In any event, it is convenient to have a single indicator that measures everything. Maxfield reiterates in *Governing Capital* that foreign loans flowed to large firms in Mexico while small and medium-size firms in Canacintra were forced to borrow from higher-priced domestic institutions. Woo-Cumings, as we saw, also stresses firm size as a critical factor in who received financial resources from the state in Korea. She adds: "Korean bankers, who are state employees, and Ministry of Finance officials might show favoritism to larger enterprises in anticipation of their 'retirement' into business" (p. 230 n. 38). Meanwhile, small and medium-scale firms borrowed at more expensive rates through the "curb," an informal network. My own observations of conditions across Southeast Asia support the conclusion that foreign commercial loans flow overwhelmingly to large businesses and investors with important political and military connections. In his zeal to show that asset specificity explains loan patterns, Frieden uses data from a single study to conclude: "No correlation was found between the prevalence of large firms in each sector and the sector's external borrowing. . . . Many other potential independent variables—participation of foreign corporations, capital-output ratios, export orientation—were also tested, with no statistically significant results" (p. 140).

[48] Frieden's footnotes and even his own writings indicate he is fully aware of these other modalities of power. For the sake of the modern political economy method, he has apparently decided to treat them as unimportant.

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until hard evidence and rigorous analysis are available, one is justified in reducing everything to lobbying. Nonetheless, however essential the lobbying nexus may be to Frieden's analysis, it was apparently not so important as to merit sustained investigation. The book's country chapters contain virtually no mention of the subject, except to say that it occurred. The reader is left with the impression that there are no differences worth noting between lobbying in the United States and Latin America, or between Mexico and Brazil.

Frieden wants to develop analytical tools that can be used across a variety of contexts. Indeed, of the three books under review, his is the only one that attempts to present multiple cases for comparative analysis. As a scholar seeking to bridge the disciplines of economics and politics, Frieden both succeeds and fails. He succeeds in the obvious breadth of his reading in economics and in the insights he brings to finance in Latin America. He succeeds also in introducing the notion of asset specificity to political scientists working on postcolonial systems. It is a useful tool for thinking about how different capital controllers should react to different policies, based on the range of uses to which their assets can be put. Unfortunately, as political analysis, this book fails in two senses. It represents a step backward for students of power, both in Latin America and elsewhere. More importantly, insofar as Frieden hopes economists will gain new insights about power and politics from this book, he has done them a disservice.

A Framework for Analyzing Patterns of Capital Control

At the close of the twentieth century, it is quite evident that we have entered a phase of capitalism that is as transformative as was the Industrial Revolution of more than a century ago. Enormous changes in capital mobility have led to a "locational revolution." Its hallmark is a disjuncture, historically unique in character and degree, between where and how control over investment resources is conferred and defended and where and how these resources can be and are located by capital controllers for profit. On the one hand, private property remains a national construct. This must be so because private property is sustained and legitimized by a mixture of custom and coercion that has its greatest potency at the level of the nation-state. On the other hand, the locational decisions for investment and production have far more ambiguous benefits for "home" territories and the populations identified with them.

The books under review deal fairly narrowly with finance capital and banking but nevertheless suggest a broader framework for examining

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current and future trends within and across capitalist countries. Most significantly, they draw attention to the point that levels of power and control for initial suppliers vary with the different forms of capital involved and that control over the end use of investment resources can, depending on the channels through which they flow, shift to other actors. Maxfield's work makes clear that in the struggle between the bankers' alliance and the Cardenas coalition, it is not enough to point out that transnational flows of capital play a critical role. As important is who or what controls the resources, what forms the resources assume, and what opportunities exist for competing policy groups to leverage the conditionality of capital flows for their own advantage. Woo-Cumings, meanwhile, underscores the point that the space within which policymakers operate varies with different capital controllers and can be enlarged when several actors with competing motives control the same flows of capital.

In working toward a framework for thinking about power and the control of capital, it is useful to begin with the observation that formal political power is organized in an array of jurisdictions, the most important of which is the nation-state.[49] Of the many constraints political leaders face within these jurisdictions, one of the most basic is the constant pressure to prevent investment and production from falling to levels that threaten social reproduction and the system's stability. Resources that can be used for investment assume a variety of forms and have different patterns of control attached to them. Some resources are quite liquid and mobile and can move among jurisdictions, while others are far more fixed and immobile. Some are directly mobilized and deployed by decision makers in the state while others are accumulated and invested by private actors.

Many aspects of resource control are of course beyond the scope of this discussion. Here attention will focus on two questions. First, from the perspective of policymakers at the level of the nation-state, how much discretion exists over the end use of resources supplied from different sources, and under what conditions can the grip on different resources be pried loose and constraints removed? And second, if capital controllers exercise structural power as they supply and withdraw scarce investment resources, how does that power vary with differences in the particular form and mobility of the capital in question? Both of these questions are at the heart of the political economy of banking and

[49] Within states are nested subjurisdictions (provinces, counties, cities). In recent decades supranational jurisdictional lines have also begun to form (the European Community and, on a much more modest scale, NAFTA).

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finance, especially in postcolonial systems.

Table 1 suggests one way of thinking about capital control, the durability of constraints imposed by different kinds of suppliers, and the potential for state officials to increase their discretionary control over the end use of investment resources. It should be understood that these relations differ in important ways across systems (particularly in the extent of controls imposed on private capital) and that these differences are crucial in accounting for cross-national variations in response to similar external conditions.[50] The first column lists different types of capital that can contribute to a system's investment needs. Assuming a given investment climate, the degree of discretionary control that policymakers can exert increases from top to bottom. The first two types, private direct investment and portfolio investment, are the most tightly constrained. The ability of state officials to deploy these resources as they desire is minimal. It is the defining prerogative of private investors to dispose of their resources as they choose, in most cases including relocating them to other jurisdictions.

Interstate loans, the next source, have been particularly important for postcolonial systems and, more recently, for Eastern Europe and Russia. These investment resources, while still tied by the terms set forth by the supplier(s), are far more liquid and flexible than direct investment flows from private actors. As the Korean case illustrates, the recipient can take advantage of conflicting policy positions and motivations within a single country or manipulate the members of a credit consortium to keep credit flows high even as the conditions of their supply consistently go unsatisfied. Interstate flows necessarily pass through the intermediate channel of the recipient state. Opportunities exist at this stage to have new purposes attached to resources as they are budgeted and allocated. Precisely which institutional arms of the recipient state receive and on-lend the resources is crucial. Meanwhile, although supplier states and multilateral bodies do try to monitor the end use of loans, there are limits to how far they can go in auditing the books of a sovereign state. In many instances even high officials in the recipient state cannot track the whereabouts of resources once they are transferred.[51]

[50] Chapter 7 in Maxfield, which compares Brazil and Mexico, provides an excellent discussion of the sorts of historical-institutional differences that help account for cross-national variations.

[51] The will to monitor is not always strong, particularly when the recipient diverting the money to unintended uses happens to be an important ally. In 1990 I watched officials at USAID in Jakarta scramble as a U.S. Government Accounting Office mission swept through with calculators in hand. The USAID people pleaded with the pointy-headed GAO team to "take into account the delicate situation we face in Indonesia."

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TABLE 1
A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING CAPITAL CONTROL AND END USE

Source(s) Type	*Constraints/Motives*	*Intermediate Channel(s)*	*Policymaker Discretion over End Use*
Private direct investment	Supplier has clear purpose for end use. Constraints on resources very high.	None.Supplier deploys resources directly.	Low. As intended by original supplier.Source monitors and directs end use fully.
Portfolio investment	Often multiple suppliers. Purpose of end use less clear. Resources moderately constrained.	Through recipient firm. Motives and intentions of firm's owners/managers intervene.	Low. End use may diverge from intentions of portfolio investor, but not due to state actors. Capacity of source to monitor and direct end use is reduced.
Interstate loans	Often multiple suppliers. Suppliers can have contradictory purposes for end use. Weaker constraints on resources.	Through recipient state. Competing intentions of state (or state component) intervene.	Medium. End use may conflict with one or all supplier factions. Capacity of source(s) to monitor exists. Ability to direct end use varies but can be high.
Private loans	Suppliers often syndicated. Sovereign guarantee is key. Supplier concerned less with end use and more with risk. Quite weak constraints on resources.	Through recipient state. Often more discretion for executive branch than with bi/multilateral credit.	Medium to high. Intended end use, if specified, can be avoided. Weak capacity (and inclination) of suppliers to monitor and enforce end use.
State capital	No additional constraints that policy makers do not ordinarily confront.	None. State deploys resources directly, though internal channels through which this is done matter.	Highest. Discretion limited only by state coherence and internal capacities to implement policies.

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Private loans from commercial banks and through the Eurocurrency market are even less constrained than interstate transfers. Not only would it be costly for banks to have examiners roaming the world to make sure that the funds they provide are used for the purposes contracted, but it would also be bad for business relations.[52] Instead, banks rely on ratings and reports put out by the World Bank and IMF, and wherever possible they seek sovereign guarantees. Because international banks do not have institutions that parallel those in the recipient state, it is more difficult to insist on transfers being made through particular channels, such as the Central Bank or Ministry of Finance. It is easier for executive branches in borrowing states to have private loans pass directly through the special agencies they set up to handle "development" transfers. In times of crisis or scarcity, however, these flows become much more conditional. The last source is the state's own resources, which are raised through taxation, domestic borrowing (from banks or directly from the public using bonds), and the state's ownership of surplus-generating entities. It is clear that policymakers have the most discretion over these resources.

Higher and more durable constraints on the end use of resources mean that insofar as policymakers want or need this capital invested, they will have to produce the policy environment demanded by those controlling the supply of capital. Similarly, weaker constraints on the end use of resources mean policymakers have far more political "space" to pursue other agendas. If the flows of loosely tied resources are large enough to substitute for a considerable share of the society's investment needs, that political space may widen enough to make possible even policies that impinge directly on the prerogatives of private property control. The reason is that the powerful structural veto of capital, manifested in capital flight and capital strikes, is undermined by access to replacement resources.[53]

The capacity to supply or withdraw one's investment resources rapidly enhances one's political power.[54] Among capital controllers,

[52] "Private lenders—who provide the largest fraction of international lending—have been loathe to involve themselves in the internal affairs of borrowing nations, for both political and business reasons. Most international banks have a variety of financial interests in potential borrowing countries, and these interests make it important for the banks to maintain good relations with the host governments. Involvement in domestic economic policy could threaten these relations. Further, it is difficult for any one bank to impose stringent conditions on a borrower because the opportunity often exists for the borrower to take his business elsewhere." *U.S. Participation in the Witteveen Facility: The Need for a New Source of International Finance*, Budget Issue Paper for Fiscal Year 1979 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, GPO, March 1978), 16.

[53] See Brendan Brown, *The Flight of International Capital: A Contemporary History* (London: Croom Helm, 1987).

[54] See Bates and Lien (fn.1); Lindblom (fn. 8, 1977, 1982); Block (fn. 8); Winters (fn. 26). The

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those with the most liquid and mobile forms are able to react most rapidly to a policy change, or even the hint of one. Financial capital is easily the most mobile and volatile of all forms. Tremendous pressure can be brought to bear on a country's balance of payments and reserves by a massive movement of resources into other currencies.[55] Across the postcolonial world, but especially in Latin America, one of the most devastating forms of structural political power is expressed through capital flight. The relocation of capital abroad can occur rapidly or unfold over an extended period, depending on the duration of the policies to which the movements are reacting. In the short term financial capital necessarily leads the way, often on a massive scale, as Maxfield shows in the Mexican case.[56] But over the longer term other resources can relocate in the form of real estate purchases and even the movement of production facilities.

It is crucial to understand, however, that capital mobility is determined only in part by the form of the investment resources. Two other factors are also important. One is having someplace to which to relocate. This tends not to be an issue when moving among jurisdictions within nation-states. But given the less secure and more complicated nature of the international arena (involving monetary instruments and institutions over which "home" governments may have little or no influence), capital mobility may decline across all forms of capital in

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"resource dependence" school in sociology is crucial to the structuralist view. See Amos H. Hawley, *Human Ecology: A Theory of Community Structure* (New York: Ronald Press, 1950); Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald S. Salancik, *The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective* (New York: Harper and Row, 1978); Jeffrey Pfeffer, *Power in Organizations* (Boston: Pitman Publishers, 1981).

[55] The stock market, meanwhile, is a daily barometer of business confidence. With good news, like the announcement of an austerity budget that cuts spending for subsidies and social services, the stock index will soar. On word of policies business finds deeply injurious or invasive, the market can collapse.

[56] Frieden makes the point very nicely:

> Today, long-term international investment flows are extraordinarily large, and direct investment has been dwarfed by other, more arms-length, forms of cross-border capital movements. According to one source, net international bond and bank lending was $440 billion in 1989, up from $180 billion just five years earlier. Capital outflows from the thirteen leading industrialized countries averaged $444 billion in 1989, with almost two-thirds of the amount consisting of portfolio investment, in contrast to $52 billion in the late 1970s, with two-thirds consisting of foreign direct investment. Capital outflows were equivalent to 15 percent of world merchandise trade in 1989, in contrast to 7 percent in the late 1970s. According to another source, the outstanding stock of international bank and bond lending was $3.6 trillion in 1989, equivalent to 25 percent of the aggregate gross national product (GNP) of the industrialized countries, in contrast to under $200 billion and 5 percent of aggregate GNP in 1973. (p. 428)

See Jeffry A. Frieden, "Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance," *International Organization* 45 (Autumn 1991).

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times of broad economic and political crisis.[57] The second factor is slightly more abstract. Whatever its form, private property and the rights associated with it exist because of the laws and policies of states. While the institution of private property is widespread, and despite clear trends toward convergence, the range of discretion over private resources is not identical everywhere. The reasons for the differences lie in the history of capitalism in each national context and the relationship between capital controllers and the state. As the locational revolution unfolds, the need increases for careful analysis of the sources and durability of these differences, as well as of their impact on the struggle over the control of capital.

[57] Block and Skocpol discuss the exceptional circumstances under which the structural power of capital controllers is undermined. See Block (fn. 8); and Theda Skocpol, "Political Response to Capitalist Crisis: Neo-Marxist Theories of the State and the Case of the New Deal," *Politics and Society* 10, no. 2 (1980).

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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